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This thesis is a micro-demographic analysis of human fertility from Chinese genealogies in the 
Ming (1368-1644) and Qing (1644-1911) dynasties. It exploits a new genealogical dataset 
comprising 72,861 individuals from six lineages to account for the fertility decisions taken in 
Chinese families. Following the comprehensive micro-level analyses of a small population, the 
thesis demonstrates the main features at an individual level of the fertility patterns and the 
relationships between demographic outcomes and social outcomes in imperial China.  
This thesis consists of three substantive chapters. The first constructs the marital fertility 
levels and provides the ongoing debate with quantitative evidence on whether the Chinese 
consciously practised fertility controls in the pre-modern era. The second substantive chapter 
shows the social gradients in fertility and examines the mechanisms through which social status 
affected fertility. The third expands the reproductive success story of a single generation into a 
multi-generational one, focusing on the process of transmitting fertility choices across 
generations and the effects of family size on the quality of the children.  
The three chapters together exhibit the micro-demographic dynamics in Chinese families 
from the fourteenth to the twentieth centuries. The thesis shows that Ming-Qing China had a 
moderate fertility level, with no deliberate fertility controls. Throughout the entire period, 
climbing up the social ladder could significantly increase men’s net reproduction through 
increasing their marriage chances and the number of marriages they could have. Moreover, 
elites in traditional China also managed to transmit reproductive success to their offspring, 
mainly by passing on their high social outcomes. Family size could also affect the quality of 
the offspring, but the effect was not powerful enough to bring about any change in parents’ 
fertility choices. 
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In sum, the thesis contributes to the prior literature from two main perspectives. First, it 
showcases a new individual-level dataset that has great potential for research in Chinese 
economic history and demography. Second, this systematic research deepens our understanding 
of China’s demography by re-addressing traditional questions and by investigating frontier 
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1.1 World population growth and trends in fertility 
The world’s population reached 7.7 billion in mid-2019 (UN 2019). In 2019, the global total 
fertility rate (TFR) – the total number of births per woman1 – was 2.5, which was only slightly 
more than the replacement-level fertility of 2.1 births (UN 2020).2 On a global scale, nearly 
half the world’s population live in a country where the fertility rate is below 2.1. According to 
the United Nations’ (2020) fertility report, in 2019, the TFR in China, the largest developing 
country globally, was 1.7; it is closely comparable to the rates in many developed countries, 
such as the United Kingdom (1.7), France (1.8), Germany (1.6), and the United States (1.8).  
However, seen against the backdrop of human existence, both the large population and the 
low fertility rates are relatively new to human society. The emergence of the Industrial 
Revolution two hundred years ago not only transformed the landscape and economy of Britain, 
but also triggered a worldwide demographic shift. As Figure 1.1 shows, the population has not 
increased at a constant rate throughout history, and almost all of the growth has occurred since 
the 1800s. In the context of the rapid worldwide population growth, fertility, however, started 
to show signs of decline in the early nineteenth century.  
 
1 More specifically, total fertility rate (TFR) refers to the number of children who would be born per woman if 
she were to pass through all the childbearing years, 15-49 (UN, Population Division). Available at  
https://www.un.org/en/development/desa/population/publications/dataset/fertility/total-fertility.asp. 
2 Replacement-level fertility refers to “the level of fertility at which a population exactly replaces itself from one 
generation to the next” (Searchinger et al. 2013). The high fertility levels in many African countries have driven 
the global TFR higher than the replacement level. In 2010-2015, 55 countries or regions had a TFR higher than 




Figure 1.1 World population growth, 1000BCE to 2050 
Sources: The population before 1950 is estimated as in McEvedy and Jones (1978). The population from 1950 
onwards is estimated by the Population Division of the Department of Economic and Social Affairs, United 
Nations (2019).  
 
Accompanied by the sustained decline of fertility since the 1800s, the relationship between 
fertility and income has also been modified. In the pre-modern period, “the elasticity of fertility 
with respect to incomes was positive” (Guinnane 2011). As Malthus (1826, pp. 6) postulated, 
in places “where the means of subsistence were so abundant…the increase of the human 
species would evidently be much greater than any increase that has been hitherto known”, and 
the greater size of population would erode any improvements in living standards. For instance, 
Figure 1.2 shows that in pre-industrial England, the population size and real wages always 
moved in opposite directions. Nonetheless, the fertility transition broke the old order in the 
Malthusian world; today the relationship between fertility and income is largely negative, as 
clearly shown in Figure 1.3. Moreover, the modern world has also evolved to a stage of 



























Figure 1.2 The relationship between population and real wages, England 1200-1800 
Source: Clark 2010, Table 7 and Table 28.  
 
 
Figure 1.3 Relationship between fertility and income in 2018 
Notes: 1. Each point represents a country or a region. In total, 228 countries and areas are included. 2. Estimates 
are for the year 2018.  
Sources: TFR estimates: United Nations Population Division. World Population Prospects: 2019 Revision. GDP 
per capita estimates: World Bank national accounts data.  
 
Nonetheless, the timing and speed of all these transitions vary considerably between 
different countries. Western Europe was undoubtedly in the lead with the demographic changes 
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declining fertility, which began around 1800 (Knodel and van de Walle 1986). When Britain’s 
total fertility began to decline in the 1880s, it took only about 40 years for births to drop from 
5 per woman to fewer than 2 (Woods 2000; Jaadla et al. 2020). In contrast, China, the country 
inhabited by nearly forty per cent of the world’s population in 1800, lagged far behind. 
Although China’s fertility level is similar to those of most European countries at present, the 
fertility pattern and family system of imperial China have consistently been treated as complete 
contrasts to their European counterparts (Malthus 1826; Hajnal 1982). However, as pointed out 
by previous scholars (see for example, Lee and Wang 1999a; 1999b), this impression is to some 
extent misleading. Hence, this thesis is interested in providing an in-depth micro-demographic 
analysis of human fertility in pre-modern China. By using a new genealogical dataset that 
includes information on 72,861 individuals from six lineages in Southeast China, I have been 
able to systematically examine Chinese fertility in the Ming (1368-1644) and Qing (1644-1911) 
dynasties.  
This thesis consists of three substantive chapters. The first chapter reconstructs the level of 
marital fertility in the lineages, the second investigates the socio-economic determinants of 
male reproduction, and the third examines the long-run survival of Chinese lineages and the 
mechanisms through which short-run fertility was able to affect long-run survival of bloodlines. 
The three chapters together demonstrate the micro-demographic dynamics in Chinese families 
in the fourteenth to the twentieth centuries.  
The rest of this introduction traces, first, the empirical and theoretical motivations for doing 
this research. Second, it provides a background to China’s population history between 1300 
and 1900. Third, it introduces previous Chinese genealogical studies, and presents the basic 
information about the region, the lineages, and the genealogies explored in this thesis. Finally, 
it outlines the structure of the thesis.   
 17 
1.2 Why Chinese historical fertility? 
1.2.1 Empirical motivations 
Montesquieu’s supposition that “in China, the women are so prolific, and the human species 
multiplies so fast” (Montesquieu 1989, pp.127-128) underlay the basis of Western 
understanding of Chinese population and fertility. Malthus’ (1826) view that the China of his 
day was solely dominated by positive checks and had no preventive checks was for a long time 
widely accepted in academia. 
After the 1980s, the Chinese studies of more and more Western scholars became accessible 
in China, eventually enabling the Chinese scholars to communicate with and respond to their 
Western counterparts.3 From the 1990s, with the growing disputes on the Great Divergence 
between China and the West, Chinese historical demography began to receive more attention. 
Because of the large geographic area and the complex ethnic composition of China, many 
issues are still under debate. The lack of systematic and consistent national population registers 
over time makes it difficult to conduct national-level demographic studies, whether on fertility, 
mortality, or marriage patterns.  
Therefore, a generalized picture of Chinese historical demography must begin with micro-
level studies until enough have been made to generalize from them. The progress in European 
demographic history in the last three decades has mostly been based on individual records, and 
this kind of individual and family level analysis should also be the avenue for future studies of 
Chinese demography (Harrell 1995).4 Similarly, Guinnane (2011) draws attention to the use of 
unexploited individual-level data in fertility studies, “especially individual-level data that 
include wealth and income, or reasonable proxies for wealth and income (such as occupation).” 
Chinese genealogical records are sources that include such individual-level information.  
 
3 For the reasons for the absence of demographic research in China and the development of the discipline, see 
Lavely, Lee, and Wang (1990). 
4 For instance, Cummins (2017) mainly uses the genealogical records provided by the LDS Church to study the 
increase of longevity of European elites from 800 to 1800. Clark and Cummins (2015a) have tracked the surnames 
in the genealogies to discover the features of social mobility in Britain from 1170 to 2012. 
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In recent decades, demographers and sociologists have started to use genealogies to 
examine historical demography in China, but, given the enormous stock of genealogies, only a 
fraction has so far been explored. In my thesis, I construct a new genealogical dataset that 
consists of information about more than 70,000 individuals for over 500 years, which allows 
me to conduct a systematic and in-depth study of Chinese micro-demographic dynamics.  
 
1.2.2 Theoretical motivations 
Why are some countries rich and others poor? The historical root of the wide economic 
divergence across countries that we observe in the world today is probably the most intriguing 
topic in economic history studies, and demography is one of the key factors that shape a 
country’s development pattern in the long run.  
Livi-Bacci (2012, pp. 1-2) points out that “population has been synonymous with prosperity, 
stability and security” and “a crude index” of social development for the most part of human 
history. Similarly, as emphasized by Wrigley (1969, p. 13) and Schofield (1989, p.279), 
demography in a traditional society is both a reflection and a determinant of its economic and 
social conditions. Not only demographers, but economists have also realized that 
understanding the interactions between demographic and economic conditions is key to 
explaining economic growth (Doepke 2004).  
In the endogenous growth models, the “population-idea nexus” is always of the essence 
(Mokyr and Voth 2010, p.11). Technology, a key element of economic development, does not 
“just happen”, but depends on the population. Early models in the endogenous growth literature 
imply that in most eras, a large population could stimulate technological changes (see, for 
example, Kremer 1993). Given that each individual’s chance of coming up with an innovation 
is largely constant, a growing population would increase the probability of generating new 
ideas. Kremer’ model predicts that without technological exchange between countries, those 
with larger population will have a higher technology growth rate, but eventually the rise in 
income will cause a decline in fertility and thus in population growth. In many newly proposed 
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unified growth models that seek to explaining both the Malthusian stagnation and economic 
take-off, the relationship between fertility and technology in the long run is carefully traced. 
In the Unified Growth Theory that Galor and his co-authors (Galor and Weil 2000; Galor 
and Moav 2002; Galor 2011) develop, human history is divided into three stages, the 
Malthusian Epoch, the Post-Malthusian Regime, and the Modern Growth Regime. In the 
Malthusian epoch, improved living standards lead to higher net reproduction, and a larger 
population stimulates faster technological progress. In the two latter stages, human capital takes 
over the dominant role in advancing the frontier of technology. When technological progress 
accelerates, human capital is more highly valued. Hence, although with the rise in income 
parents are able to have more children, investing in the “quality” of children could provide 
them with more additional utility than increasing the number of children (Becker 1960). Thus 
when human capital stock increases fertility is effectively limited. Finally, limited fertility, high 
human capital stock, and rapid technological progress finally trigger the modern economic 
growth. 
However, how do these theories square with the empirical evidence from Ming-Qing China? 
Can they effectively account for its economic stagnation and its failure to transform itself into 
a modern growth regime in the two dynasties? In order to address these two broad questions, I 
decide to tackle several more detailed questions concerning the pattern of Chinese fertility from 
the fourteenth to the twentieth centuries. More specifically, how high was the fertility level and 
did Chinese couples consciously control fertility? How did individuals’ fertility choices 
respond to their economic conditions? How did one generation’s fertility decisions affect the 
demographic and educational outcomes of their descendants in the long run?  
 
1.3 Chinese historical macro-demography 
Table 1.1 lists six sets of widely cited estimates of China’s population from 1300 to 1900. The 
major sources used are the national registration and provinces’ local gazetteers (fangzhi, 方志) 
in the Ming and Qing dynasties. These records are official, compiled first by literate clerks in 
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county-level governments, then aggregated by the prefecture-level governments, and finally 
by provincial and national authorities. Skinner (1986) criticizes this kind of top-down approach 
of studying only the aggregated data and suggests using the disaggregated data, the original 
county-level records. Hence, Cao (2001) exploits more than 3,000 volumes of county- and 
prefecture-level records and about 100 volumes of notes and writings by literati of the period, 
and reconstructs a more accurate demographic history (see column “Ge-Cao” of Table 1.1).  
Although gaps and differences are unavoidable in different scholars’ estimates, as shown in 
Table 1.1, they still provide us with a general idea of the population size and also its trend in 
Ming-Qing China. From 1300 to 1900, according to Cao’s estimate in column 6, China’s 
population increased almost sevenfold. For the most part, it increased at a regular and steady 
rate, but two major population losses were also suffered in these six centuries. One, in the first 
half of the seventeenth century, was caused by the Manchu invasion and a series of internal 
conflicts. The other was in the nineteenth century, because of the Taiping Rebellion (1851-
1864). Cao (2001) and Li and Lin (2015) believe that the death toll from the rebellion could 
have reached at least 70 million. 
 
Table 1.1 Chinese population, 1300-1900 (millions) 








1300   86   59.8 
1393 60.5 65-80 81  63.4 74.3 
1500  150 110  91.9  
1600 150 120-200 160   173.43 
1650  100-150 140 130  160 
1700   160 150 160  
1750 179.5 200-250 225 215 225 276 
1800 295.3  330 320 350 352.3 
1850 430 410(±25) 435 420 422.5 436 
1893  385(±25) 415  386.1 394 
1900  430(±25)1 475  396.4 411 
Notes: 1. The number is the estimate for 1913. 2. Lee and Wang’s data were largely selected from Zhao and Xie 
(1988). 3. The number is the estimate of the population in 1580. 
Sources: Ho 1959; Perkins 1969; McEvedy and Jones 1978, Lavely and Wong 1998, Lee and Wang 1999a; Ge 
1991; Cao 2001; Cao and Chen 2002. 
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The eighteenth century is special in China’s demographic history. As suggested by all the 
estimates in Table 1.1, this was the century in which the Chinese population doubled. The rapid 
population growth was so exceptional that it aroused much attention at the time. In 1793, Hong 
Liangji, a Chinese bureaucrat and scholar, expressed his worries about a booming population 
in his essay “On governance and well-being of the empire” (Zhi Ping Pian, 治平篇),  
“Our society has been stable for more than a hundred years. In terms of the number 
of households, it is five times more than thirty years ago, ten times more than six decades 
ago and twenty times more than a hundred years ago…Farms and houses are always 
scarce, and they are not enough for the excessive population growth…How will Heaven 
deal with this problem? Floods, droughts and plagues are the means Heaven uses to 
mitigate the tension.”  
In the same year, Sir George Staunton visited China as a member of the famous Macartney 
Embassy. After reading the official account of the mission, Malthus was startled by the large 
population of China and also expressed his concerns about the fast population growth (Malthus 
1826, Chapter 12). Considering that the average annual population growth rate was over one 
per cent throughout the eighteenth century, both Hong’s and Malthus’ worries were reasonable. 
These aggregated accounts of the population exhibit a general picture of historical macro-
demography, but the micro-demographic dynamics remain unclear. Therefore, this thesis 
intends to exploit the genealogical records and study individuals’ fertility decisions to decipher 
the notable population numbers in the Ming-Qing era. 
 
1.4 Sources and data  
“Genealogy is the written record of family or lineage members descended from a common 
ancestor or ancestors” (Zhao 2001). The origins of keeping genealogies can be traced back to 
the time of the Six Dynasties (222-589). During this period, only noble families, that is, 
families related to a royal family, could be recognized as “lineages” and were qualified to keep 
a genealogical record. Because the marriage system was “closed” – because the noble class 
married only within its class – keeping genealogies was intended to record marriages and thus 
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to protect the “purity” of the bloodline and their political and financial privileges. Moreover, 
genealogical books were at the time compiled under the strict supervision of the central 
government (Huang 2009).  
But most of these noble lineages, which for centuries were politically and socially dominant, 
failed to survive the time of great turmoil in the Tang-Song transition period, around the tenth 
century (Johnson 1977). Their collapse, together with the formalization of keju (Chinese 
imperial examination system, 科举), triggered a “transformation in the nature and composition 
of the Chinese socio-political elites” and a rise of gentry scholars of low birth (Tackett 2014, 
p.5). In the Song (960-1279) dynasty, keeping genealogies was transformed into a common 
and private practice, although it still was more widely practised in elite families than in 
common ones. Two famous scholar-officials in the Song dynasty, Ouyang Xiu (1007-1072) 
and Su Xun (1009-1066) both compiled their own lineages’ genealogies, and their ways of 
compiling genealogies also became the prime examples for later generations to follow.  
In Ming and Qing China, when lineages evolved into the “fundamental organizing 
constructs in Chinese society”, compiling genealogical books finally became widespread 
among commoners, and was particularly prevalent in Southeast China (Zelin 2009, p. 626; 
Feng 2009; Feng and Chang 2001). Rather than protecting the family’s “purity”, the aims of 
most of these compilations became fourfold: to remind the offspring of the family’s history, to 
teach them to venerate their ancestors, to cultivate family loyalty, and to unify the lineage. 
Therefore, to the Chinese, especially to people in traditional China, genealogy means more 
than merely the “written record of family or lineage members”. A commonly held belief in 
imperial China was that, because every imperial dynasty had its orthodox historical account 
and every prefecture had its local gazetteer, every lineage should also have its own official 
historical book (Li 2016). The three types of historical record were complementary to each 
other and formed a comprehensive account of traditional Chinese society (Huang 2009). 
Genealogies record the rises and falls of a clan or a lineage over a long period of time, and are 
the best manifestation of the family’s history. With constant wars and conflicts in the late 
imperial period and the Republican era, considerable numbers of official and private records 
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have been destroyed. Fortunately, however, thanks to their significance to Chinese families, 
many genealogies have been well protected.5  
 
1.4.1 Chinese genealogy studies 
Telford (1986) estimates that more than 10,000 clan genealogies survive in China. Despite this 
enormous stock, only a small proportion of studies exploit genealogical data. The earliest 
demographic study using genealogies is I-Chin Yuan’s (1931) “Life table for a southern 
Chinese family from 1365 to 1849”. He studies the genealogical books of the Li lineage from 
Guangdong Province, and constructs ten life tables of 3,748 males and 3,752 females. Later, 
because of the usefulness of genealogies, many other scholars also started similar projects.   
The Taiwanese scholar Tsui-jung Liu has pioneered the charting of Chinese demographic 
history through genealogies. Liu (1992) explains that the lack of use of Chinese genealogical 
records from the 1950s to 1970s was largely because of the time-consuming nature of 
transcribing the data. At the time, many genealogies were stored on microfilm. Without reading 
and photocopying machines, people could only copy the data by hand. In recent decades, as 
modern science and technology have developed, reading, digitalizing, and transcribing 
genealogies are no longer impossible tasks.  
Therefore, since the 1980s, more genealogical studies have been conducted. Harrell (1985) 
explores the demography of three lineages in Xiaoshan County, Zhejiang Province, and focuses 
on the differences between the rich and poor branches within a lineage. Harrell and Pullum 
(1995) paint a general picture of the mortality, marriages, and lineage developmental cycle, 
also by examining genealogies from Xiaoshan. Telford (1990, 1992, 1995) comprehensively 
studies families in Tongcheng County, Anhui Province, reconstructing the fertility, mortality, 
and marriage patterns in the Ming and Qing dynasties. Liu (1981, 1985) studies genealogies 
from the Yangtze area and presents an overall investigation of the clans in Southeast China. 
 
5 Genealogical books always have multiple duplicates kept in the clan temple and by some large families in the clan. Moreover, 
when genealogical records were destroyed, family members would try their best to recompile or replace the lost and missing 
parts.  
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Peng and Hou (1996) investigate the long-term trend of demographic changes in the Fan 
Lineage in Jiangsu Province from 1370 to 1900. In contrast with the above writers, Lee, 
Campbell, and Wang (1993; 1994) enquire into the Qing imperial lineages who lived mainly 
in North and Northeast China, revealing the life pattern of the Qing nobles in the late imperial 
era. 
In recent years, the team led by Cao Shuji has collected a great many family records, 
including genealogical books, property division records, and accounting books from Zhejiang 
Province. A series of socioeconomic studies have focused on the population pressure, fertility 
behaviours, the allocation of wealth, commercial activities, and the localization of migrants of 
a local lineage, the Que lineage (Che and Cao 2011, 2014; Li and Zhen 2015; Cao and Jiang 
2010, 2012; Zhang 2009).   
Not only demographers and historians, but economists now also see the value of 
investigating genealogical records. Three recent works by Carol Shiue (2016, 2017, 2019) set 
an example to scholars by her use of genealogies, while also highlighting the need to use this 
“largely unexploited” source in demographic economics in the future.  
The previous genealogical research provides us with a framework for investigating the data 
and constructing further arguments. Notwithstanding all these studies, Chinese historical 
demography can be explored far more; as Harrell (1995) concludes, the study is still in its 
“infancy”.  
 
1.4.2 The region  
The main primary sources of data for this thesis are the genealogical records of six lineages 
(the Huang, the Que, the Zhou, the Zha, the Gu, and the Zhuang) from four prefectures in 
Jiangsu Province and Zhejiang Province. Of the six lineages, three are common ones (i.e., 
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families with a low proportion of scholars and officials), and three are elite lineages (i.e., 
families with a high proportion of scholars and officials).6  
The three common lineages, the Huang, the Zhou, and the Que, are all located in Songyang 
County, Chuzhou Prefecture, in southern Zhejiang. The three elite lineages are located in the 
Lower Yangtze area.7 The Zha lineage is from Haining County, Hangzhou, in north Zhejiang.8 
The two remaining elite lineages are located in Jiangsu Province. The Gu lineage had settled 
in six different counties in Suzhou,9 and the Zhuang lineage came from Wujin County in 
Changzhou. Figure 1.4 shows the locations of the two provinces and four prefectures.  
The gazetteer maps (Figures 1.5-1.8) vividly demonstrate the physical features of the 
prefectures and counties. Changzhou, Suzhou, and Hangzhou are located in the fertile Lower 
Yangtze area; they are all situated on the southern section of the Grand Canal, and Hangzhou 
is the southern terminal of the canal. Changzhou and Suzhou control the Lower Yangtze area 
north of Lake Tai, the third-largest freshwater lake in China; Hangzhou is at the head of 
Hangzhou Bay, and is connected to the multiple waterways in the Lower Yangtze area. 
Chuzhou lies within the mountainous area, not the wide alluvial plain that dominates the Lower 
Yangtze area. As depicted in Figure 1.8, the dominant physical features of Songyang County, 
the county where the three common lineages are located, are a rolling terrain and undulating 
hills.  
According to Buck’s division of China Proper (Buck 1937, see Figure 1.9 in the present 
chapter), Suzhou, Changzhou, and Hangzhou are all in the “Yangtze Wheat-Rice Area”, while 
Chuzhou is in the “Rice-Tea Area”. The three Lower Yangtze prefectures have long been major 
rice-surplus regions of China. After the completion of the Grand Canal in the seventh century, 
 
6 Che and Cao (2011; 2014) use genealogical records of two branches of the Que lineage after 1700 to test the 
effect of population pressure and economic shocks on the lineage. I thank them for kindly sharing with me the 
data on these two branches. 
7 The Lower Yangtze area comprises mainly southern Jiangsu Province and northern Zhejiang Province. 
8 Haining was the easternmost county in Hangzhou in Ming-Qing era, on the historical border of Hangzhou and 
Jiaxing. It was under the jurisdiction of Hangzhou Prefecture in the Ming and Qing dynasties, and was moved to 
Jiaxing after 1949.  
9 The six counties are Taicang, Changshu, Chongming, Kunshan, Wushan, and Wuxi.  
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Changzhou also rapidly developed into a canal port and collecting centre for grain production. 
Although Chuzhou was not a prefecture that produced much grain, Songyang County in the 
Qing dynasty was the most important rice-producing region in Chuzhou Prefecture, with a 
growing iron-smelting and silver-mining industry (Zhang and Ren 2016).10 The combination 
of rice and metal makes Songyang a typical county in rural China in the pre-modern era.11  
 
 
Figure 1.4 Map of Jiangsu and Zhejiang, China in 1820 
Source: CHGIS 2007. 
 
10 As an old local saying goes, “If Songyang has a good harvest, then all of Chuzhou will have enough food to 
eat”.  
11 Per Deng (2016, pp. 105-107), South China has yielded large quantities of rice and metal products since the 
Song dynasty. They are both common industries in Southern villages.  
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Figure 1.5 Gazetteer map of Changzhou prefecture and counties 
Source: Map 4, Chapter 2, Elman (1990). Gazetteer of Changzhou prefecture. 1886 edition. 
 
 
Figure 1.6 Gazetteer map of Suzhou prefecture and counties 
Source: Gazetteer of Suzhou prefecture, Hongwu era (1368-1398). Online collection of University of Minnesota 




Figure 1.7 Gazetteer map of Haining county and towns 
Source: Gazetteer of Haining county, 1557 edition.  
 
 
Figure 1.8 Gazetteer map of Songyang county and towns 




Figure 1.9 Eight agricultural regions of China  
Source: Buck 1937, Map 4, p. 27. 
 
As might be expected, there was also a big economic gap between the three prefectures in 
the Lower Yangtze area and Chuzhou. The Lower Yangtze area has long been considered one 
of the wealthiest areas in pre-modern China and “the country’s economic core during the last 
millennium” (Li 1998, p. 3; Ma 2008). In recent work by Broadberry, Guan, and Li (2018, 
Table 8 and Figure 8), their estimate of GDP per capita shows that although some of the richest 
regions in medieval Europe, such as Italy and the Netherlands were already way ahead of China 
by 1500, GDP per capita in the Lower Yangtze area was, until 1700, still on a par with  the 
level of leading European region.  
I apply here the population densities to roughly illustrate the levels of development of the 
four prefectures. Table 1.2 lists Cao’s (2000, 2001) population estimates for the four prefectures 
from 1391 to 1910. The dense network of waterways in Changzhou, Suzhou, and Hangzhou 
made them communication and commercial centres with high population density in the Ming-
Qing period. In the Ming dynasty, Suzhou was the most densely populated and Chuzhou the 
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least. From 1391-1580, the populations in all of the four prefectures doubled. After the decades 
of conflicts and wars during the Ming-Qing transition (1620-80), each prefecture experienced 
a massive decline of population, except for Changzhou. Changzhou lost about 12,000 people 
during 1630-50, but recovered soon after 1650, with a larger population in 1680 than in 1580. 
In 1820, the highest population density was again found in Suzhou, and the population density 
in Changzhou also increased to 516.7 people per square kilometre. However, in the second half 
of the nineteenth century, the Taiping rebellion caused another dramatic population loss in the 
Lower Yangtze region. The populations of the three Lower Yangtze prefectures in 1880 were 
only about or less than one third of their populations in 1851. In the late nineteenth and early 
twentieth centuries, these populations were restored, although their economic supremacy was 
later challenged by Shanghai. To sum up, in contrast to Changzhou, Suzhou, and Hangzhou, 
Chuzhou had low population densities: it was not comparable to the other three prefectures in 
terms of economic development. 
 
Table 1.2 Population in the four prefectures, 1391-1910 
Prefecture Area (km2) 
Population (thousand) 
1393 1580 1680 1776 1820 1851 1880 1910 
Suzhou 7111 2405 4888 3655 5111 5908 6543 2367 2528 
Changzhou 7540 776 1577 2270 3115 3896 4409 1491 2318 
Hangzhou 7509 1118 2070 1828 2682 3197 3721 805 1201 
Chuzhou 18346 748 1385 534 862 1074 1298 922 1050 
Source: Cao 2000, 2001. 
 
1.4.3 The social origins of the elite lineages 
As noted above, the Gu, the Zha, and the Zhuang lineages are three elite lineages. The main 
criterion for distinguishing the two types of family is the number and proportion of “scholar-
officials” in each. Within the strict social class structure of imperial China, the presence of 
more academic degree holders who passed the imperial examinations and more office holders 
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within a lineage brought more wealth and higher social status for the lineage (Ho 1962; Elman 
2000). Table 1.3 shows the different proportions of academic degree holders in the six lineages. 
The Zha and the Zhuang lineages had the highest proportions, with more than eleven percent 
of the male population in the two lineages holding academic degree holders.    
The Zha lineage was a prominent lineage in the Lower Yangtze area throughout the entire 
Ming-Qing period. The ancestor of the Zha lineage of Haining, Zha Junbao (1325-1385), 
moved to Yuanhua Town in Haining County in 1357. The rise to prominence of the Zha lineage 
began in the late fourteenth century, thanks to Junbao’s son, Zha Shu. Zha Shu was an 
experienced physician. Because of his superb medical skills and widespread fame, he was 
appointed chief physician in the Imperial Academy of Medicine by the Hongwu Emperor, the 
founding emperor of the Ming dynasty. The reputation of the Zha lineage as an elite lineage 
grew when a century later, in 1490, Zha Huan, in the fifth generation of the lineage, was 
awarded the jinshi degree, the highest-level academic degree that one could achieve from 
taking the imperial examinations. The lineage enjoyed its heyday in the Qing dynasty when the 
Kangxi Emperor wrote a plaque for the lineage, which was taken as the highest compliment at 
the time.  
In Classicism, Politics, and Kinship: The Ch'ang-chou School of New Text Confucianism in 
Late Imperial China, Benjamin Elman (1990) focuses on two elite lineages in Changzhou, one 
being the Zhuang lineage. The Zhuang lineage first came to prominence in the middle of the 
Ming dynasty, and its rise to high social standing was mainly because of the success of Zhuang 
Yi (1458-1528). According to his mini-biography, he earned the jinshi degree in 1496; he 
started his political career by working as chief magistrate of Baodi County in Zhili Province, 
and later he was promoted to be chief magistrate of Hejian Prefecture in Zhili and finally to the 
post of provincial administration commissioner of Shandong Province, taking charge of the 
collection and allocation of the province’s tax revenues. As Elman (1990, p.39) comments, 
“[Zhuang Yi’s] academic success, and the high political office that such success brings, 
provided the financial resources from which … the [Changzhou] lineage developed.” After 
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Zhuang Yi, nearly every generation was also able to produce a high-ranking official, which 
successfully continued the lineage’s prominence in Changzhou.12 
The Gu lineage is special here. Historically speaking, the surname Gu was one of the 
“aristocratic surnames of great antiquity” and was also one of the “big three” regional elite 
surnames in the Lower Yangtze region (Hao and Clark 2012). The earliest recorded ancestor in 
the Gu genealogies, Gu Yewang (519-581), was born in Suzhou and was a celebrated scholar-
official and historian in the Northern and Southern dynasties (386-589). Although the 
proportion of degree holders in the twenty-two generations of male population in the family 
was fairly low, among these was a relatively large number of high-degree holders and high-
ranking officials. As early as the Song dynasty, the lineage had already produced four jinshi 
degree holders. Furthermore, its long span of genealogies alone is enough to demonstrate its 
“eliteness”. 
 
Table 1.3 Academic degree holders in the six lineages 
Lineage Generation 
Number of degree holders 







Huang 1st-17th 0 4 4 0.3% 
Que 1st-25th 2 149 151 1.7% 
Zhou 1st-28th 10 41 51 4.8% 
Gu 17th-44th 31 142 173 1.0% 
Zha 1st-20th 64 528 592 11.7% 
Zhuang 1st-20th 89 420 509 11.1% 
Notes: “Upper rank” degree holders denote the candidates who passed the national-level and the provincial-level 
civil examinations, including jinshi, juren, and gongsheng. “Lower rank” degree holders denote the candidates 
who passed only the county- or prefecture-level civil exams, including the guoxuesheng, taixuesheng, lingsheng, 
fusheng, and zengsheng, xiangsheng and yisheng. 
Source: The lineage sample. 
 
12 For more of the history and the rise of the Zhuang lineage, see Elman (1990), Chapter 2. 
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1.4.4 The lineage sample 
The lineage sample in this thesis comprises the genealogies of the six lineages, which in total 
contain 96 volumes of genealogical books (see Table 1.4). The genealogies of each lineage 
would always start with the following sections: introduction to the history of the family, the 
rules of compilation, the regulations that every member had to follow, the contributions of 
some prominent figures in the family, and a tree chart of all the male members recorded in the 
book. The main body of genealogical books record, in chronological order, the names of all the 
male members of the lineage, with his corresponding mini-biography. These mini-biographies 
constitute the principal source of my genealogical dataset (see Figure 1.10 for a sample page 
from the genealogical book). Each such mini-biography tells us the male’s name(s), position 
among his brothers, birth and death dates, academic degrees and honours, the surnames of his 
wives and concubines, their birth and death dates, and, most importantly, the number of 
children whom he sired. Not all the entries, however, contain all the above information: Table 




Table 1.4 Basic information of genealogies by lineage 
Lineage Huang Que Zhou Gu Zha Zhuang Total 
Number of volumes 4 16 4 32 24 16 96 
First compilation year 1487 16643 1598 1286 c.1500 1572 / 
Last compilation year 1846 1928 1947 1876 1909 1875 / 
Number of times compiled1 6 5 12 12 9 10 / 
Average length between 
compilations (years) 















Number of generations  17 25 28 284 20 20 / 
Male entries 2,353 10,198 1,059 17,451 5,728 4,618 41,407 
Number of wives 1,701 6,749 776 13,576 4,964 3,688 31,454 
Males with birth years  1,127 7,915 730 6,528 5,163 4,074 25,537 
Individuals with birth and 
death years 
685 4,236 679 5,087 4,753 2,475 17,915 
Notes: 1. The “times” refers to the times of the large-scale compilations recorded in the prefaces to the 
genealogical books, but not including the times of small-scale editing. 2. The start of “Period covered” is the 
approximate birth year of the male in the first entry, and the end is the latest birth/death year found in the 
genealogical book. 3. This is the first compilation after the branches started to move to Zhejiang. Records of the 
male family members before generation 14 are compiled on the basis of the original records in the Jiangxi Que 
genealogies. After the fourteenth generation, all the males recorded in the Que genealogies lived in Zhejiang. 4. 
Given the long history of the Gu lineage, only generations 17-44 of the Gu lineage are studied in the present 
chapter. 



















The thesis is structured in the form of three substantive chapters. Chapter 2 begins the research 
by a descriptive study that demonstrates the trend and the level of marital fertility in the 
lineages. It finds that Ming-Qing China had a unique fertility pattern, which was a combination 
of moderate marital fertility rates and an absence of deliberate fertility controls. Chapter 3 
moves to study the forces and factors that affected the net reproduction of males and reveals a 
positive relationship between social status and fertility. Climbing the social ladder would 
significantly increase the number of sons that a male could have, mainly through increasing 
their marriage chances and the number of marriages that they could contract. Chapter 4 
investigates the story of reproductive success in a multi-generational model by testing the 
presence of two trade-offs of children in Chinese families, the Darwinian trade-off and the 
Beckerian trade-off. It shows that high fertility could be transmitted across generations mainly 
through the transmission of high social outcomes from fathers to sons. It also finds that family 
Sons’ names 
Name(s) 




size could affect the quality of the children, although the effect was not strong enough to trigger 
a change in parents’ fertility decisions. Finally, Chapter 5 concludes and discusses the 








Chapter 2  
 
Descendants over half a millennium: Marital fertility in 




The chapter studies the marital fertility of five Chinese lineages in Ming-Qing China. By 
exploiting new genealogical data and studying more than 50,000 individuals in the five lineages, 
a unique pattern of Chinese marital fertility is demonstrated. On the one hand, contrary to the 
conventional wisdom on Chinese fertility, the results show that the marital fertility rates in the 
period were much lower than those of Northwest Europe in similar periods. On the other hand, 
in line with the classic ideas, the paper finds no clear signs of parity-dependent controls within 




China has for centuries been the most populated country in the world. Malthus (1826, p.206) 
once commented that the Chinese population in the late nineteenth century was so large that it 
would “startle the faith of many readers”. However, there is still no consensus on the level of 
marital fertility in pre-modern China. The classic view of historical fertility in China was that 
its birth rate had no parallel because of the worship of large families (Mallory 1926; Tawney 
1932; Fei 1947; Chandrasekhar 1967, cited in Zhao 1997), though some scholars doubt if 
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Chinese fertility was in fact abnormally high. Barclay et al. (1976) find that the index of marital 
fertility (Ig) of China was only 0.51 in the 1930s, and there is no evidence for the “very large 
historical family size that has been imputed to the Chinese” (Barclay et al. 1976, p.613).13  
Lee and Wang (1999a, p.8) emphasize the phenomenon of low marital fertility rates in Qing 
China: “[w]hile Western married women in the absence of contraception had on average a total 
marital fertility rate (TMFR)…of 7.5 to 9, Chinese married women had a TMFR of 6 or less”. 
According to Liu (1985), in the seventeenth to the nineteenth centuries, a married woman from 
Southeast China would on average give birth to only about 5 children during her lifetime.  
Besides the debate on the absolute level of marital fertility, another unresolved issue is 
whether fertility controls existed in imperial China – whether China was a “natural fertility” 
regime or the Chinese were constantly controlling their fertility within marriages. The concept 
of “natural fertility” was first coined by Louis Henry (1953, 1976); it represents the fertility a 
population would have if there was no any form of intentional birth control within marriages. 
Henry (1961) specifies that birth control existed if a married couple avoided having more births 
after reaching the desired number, and this type of birth control is then defined as parity-
dependent control. A fertility which is determined by parity-dependent controls is regarded as 
“controlled fertility”, as Henry defines it (Coale 1986).14 
Generally, scholars who posit high Chinese fertility also describe China as a “natural 
fertility” regime. The need for old-age insurance, the custom of early marriages, and the high 
rates of infant mortality all discouraged Chinese people from consciously limiting fertility 
 
13 Ig = the ratio of the births the married women in a given population actually have to the number they would 
have had if subject to the maximal age-specific fertility schedule. An Ig of 0.51 here means that the marital fertility 
rate is 51 per cent of the highest recorded schedule, the Hutterite fertility rate. I calculate the total marital fertility 
rates of Hutterites, 1921-1930, by using data reported in Barclay et al. (1976, Table A-5). The result is 12.44, so 
the total marital fertility rate of China here is about 6.34. 
14 The existence of fertility controls in pre-modern European societies before the fertility transition has always 
been a hotly debated topic in historical demography (England: Wrigley and Schofield 1983; Wrigley et al. 1997; 
Cinnirella, Klemp, and Weisdorf 2017; Clark and Cummins 2019a; Sweden: Bengtsson and Dribe 2006; Germany: 
Knodel 1987; Amialchuk and Dimitrova 2012; Belgium: van Bavel 2004). 
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(Mallory 1926, pp.88-92; Fei 1947). Huang (2002) reckons that population in China’s past was 
mortality-driven; it was affected by “positive checks”, rather than “preventive checks”. 
The revisionists, however, argue that historical fertility in China was under systematic 
control. In their studies of the Manchu royal families in the Qing dynasty, Lee, Campbell, and 
Wang find existence of the three fertility controls that were also observed in most European 
societies during the transition period – late starting, longer spacing and early stopping (Wang, 
Lee, and Campbell 1995; Wang and Lee 1998; Lee, Campbell, and Wang 2002a). Moreover, 
they insist that the Chinese controlled fertility by widely practised female infanticide (Lee, 
Campbell, and Wang 2002b). Besides postnatal abortions, Li (2000) argues that many 
techniques of abortion and contraception were recorded in medical books published in the Song 
dynasty and were routinely used in Southeast China thereafter.15 Zhao (1997) believes that if 
Chinese people had not previously embraced the concept of regulating fertility, the One-Child 
Policy after the 1970s would not have been so smoothly and successfully implemented. Lee 
and Wang (1999a, p.92) support this reasoning and claim that “[t]he Chinese fertility 
transition…derived from a long tradition of conscious control, which facilitated the 
formulation and implementation of a national family planning program dating back to the 
middle of the twentieth century”. However, the presence or the absence of fertility controls in 
pre-modern China has not been rigorously studied and exhibited by quantitative evidence.  
Among the ongoing debates on Chinese marital fertility, this chapter seeks to reveal the 
nature of it in the Ming and Qing dynasties by studying the genealogical records of five lineages 
in Southeast China. On a basis of over 500 years of detailed records of individual births, deaths, 
and marriages, I reconstruct and re-examine the fertility patterns in the five lineages. The 
chapter mainly deals with the following research questions: how high exactly was the level of 
marital fertility in Ming-Qing China? Was it stable over time? Did the Chinese consciously 
limit fertility within marriage?  
 
15 However, the effectiveness of abortion practice and contraception techniques has been questioned. Sommer 
(2010) shows that abortion before 1949 was extremely unsafe and was mainly used when a woman wanted to 
abort an illegitimate birth.   
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I use two measures to reconstruct the marital fertility rates. First, I calculate the average 
number of sons per married male in the five lineages over the entire period. 21,608 married 
males produced in total 33,482 sons in the five hundred years, which derives an average of 
about 1.6 sons per family. Second, I estimate the total marital fertility rate and age-specific 
marital fertility rate by using detailed information about 7,767 married females in the sample. 
Of the five lineages, the Huang lineage and the Que lineage had higher marital fertility rates 
than the other three had; between 1600 and 1900 the marital fertility rates in all five lineages 
are also generally moderate, ranging from 4 to 6.  
I then test the presence of two fertility controls, parity-dependent early stopping and parity-
dependent birth spacing. With regard to early stopping behaviour, I estimate the rate of decline 
of age-specific marital fertility rates after the age of 34 in females whose net fertility at the age 
of 30 was different. I find that the decline rate for females who reached high parities before age 
30 were similar or even slower than that for females with low parities. This finding indicates 
the absence of parity-dependent early stopping in the five lineages. I apply the Cox proportional 
hazard model to test the existence of parity-dependent birth spacing. The result shows no parity 
effects on the speed of having a successive birth, which suggests that parity-dependent spacing 
behaviour was also absent.   
Therefore, this chapter argues that, as demonstrated by the fertility pattern of the five 
lineages, historical marital fertility in China was unlimited, but the rates were moderate. Clear 
signs of parity-dependent controls were absent, but still the fertility rates of all five lineages 
were comparable to, or in most cases, lower than the Western European rates in the same period.  
The following chapter has five sections. Sections 2.2 and 2.3 introduce the genealogical 
data of the five lineages, and the methodologies applied in the chapter, including a discussion 
about the biases of the data. Section 2.4 contains the descriptive results of marital fertility in 
the long run and the different age patterns of childbirth in the different lineages. It also 
examines the presence of parity-dependent early-stopping and longer-spacing behaviours. 
Section 2.5 compares the results with other estimates within and outside China and discusses 
the results on fertility controls. Section 2.6 concludes.  
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2.2 Data  
2.2.1 Nature of the data 
Still waiting to be fully exploited, genealogy is one of the most worthwhile sources for studying 
historical demography. Because of the ritualistic significance that genealogies carry, many 
genealogical books are well protected and have been maintained in many Chinese families to 
this day. Genealogies record the vicissitudes of a clan or a family line over a long period, and 
are the best evidence of its history.  
The primary data used in this chapter come from the genealogical books recording five 
lineages in Southeast China. Three of them are ordinary families, and two of them are elite 
families. The three ordinary families, Huang, Que and Zhou are from Songyang County, 
Chuzhou, South Zhejiang; the two elite families are both located in the Lower Yangtze Delta, 
the Zha lineage in Haining County, Hangzhou, North Zhejiang, and the Gu lineage in Suzhou, 
South Jiangsu. 
 
2.2.2 “Patching the holes” of the data 
Although genealogical data are valuable for research in historical demography, they also suffer 
from the common problem of under-registration (Harrell 1987; Zhao 2001; Telford 1986, 
1990). The methods that I employ to impute missing information were as follows. 
The first type of missing information concerns infant deaths. Although death information is 
deficient in nearly all Chinese genealogies, there is still no consensus on ways of tackling it.16 
In the genealogies of the five lineages, as in the genealogies from other villages in southern 
China, three particular terms are used to refer to males who have died at an early age. One is 
幼卒, which means that the individual died under the age of eight sui (approximately six to 
 
16  Liu (1985, 1992) was not concerned with the problem of missing deaths of infants, male children and 
adolescents (those who died younger than nineteen), which has always been held to account for her low estimates 
of Chinese fertility rates.   
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seven years old)17; the second is 早逝, which means that the individual died between the ages 
of fifteen and twenty sui (around thirteen to eighteen years old).18 If a male individual is 
described by either of these terms, he is generally recorded with a birth year, but not a death 
year. The third term is 未娶而卒, which means that the individual died before getting married. 
In this case, records for males are always complete, and they lived for about twenty-five sui 
(twenty-three years). These three terms refer to males who have their own mini-biographies, 
but records of earlier child deaths are different. A male child who dies between one and four 
years old does not qualify to have a generational name and his own separate mini-biography, 
but can be found under his father’s entry, with the description, 一子早逝 (having a son who 
died at an early age). Clearly, these four cases prevent us from accurately estimating the infant 
mortality rates.  
In 1800, male infant mortality in North China was as low as ten percent in the royal lineage 
(Lee et al. 1994). Harrell (1995) and Telford (1995) both suggest an infant death rate of 250 
deaths per 1000 births in South China in the Qing dynasty. Chinese scholars during the early 
twentieth century conducted a series of social surveys in both rural areas and urban areas in 
South China, and reported the infant mortality ranging from 12 per cent to 18 per cent. 19 
Although the living standards in South China in the eighteenth to the twentieth centuries were 
largely stagnant (Allen et al. 2011; Allen 2009; Baten et al. 2010; Li and van Zanden 2012), 
because of the improvements in public health after the 1850s, one would expect a decrease in 
the infant mortality rates in the early twentieth century. Therefore, a cautious infant mortality 
 
17 Ages recorded in genealogies are in sui, which is about 1.5 years longer than Western counterparts on average. 
18 See more for the explanation of the particular terms in Telford (1990). 
19 For instance, Zhang carried out a demographic survey of 2,634 people in 481 families living in three villages 
of Jiangning County near the capital of the Republic of China, Nanjing, and found that the rate of infant mortality 
was about 18.37 per cent in 1925, and about 15 per cent in Nanjing in 1931. Qiao’s survey from 1924 to 1925 of 
4,216 families in four provinces of South and Central China, Anhui, Henan, Jiangsu and Shanxi, showed that 
infant mortality was about 12.9 per cent. See Li, Xia, and Huang (2014) for the original reports of all these social 
surveys conducted around the 1920s and 1930s. 
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rate of 25 per cent is applied in the present chapter to the three ordinary lineages, and 20 per 
cent to the elite lineage.20 
The second type of missing information is the number of daughters that the male family 
members produced. The number is highly under-recorded in the genealogies. Although Lee 
and Wang (1999a) consider female infanticide to be a key strategy for controlling the number 
of births, this chapter does not view infanticide as a birth control method and, in order to report 
the rate of non-regulated marital fertility, does not take it into account.21 Thus, I approximate 
the number of daughters by using the “natural” sex ratio at birth, 105 boys to 100 girls.22 
The third type of missing information is the birth and death years of mothers and sons. In 
order to measure fertility, both the birth and death years of mothers are required. Of the 27,766 
wives recorded in the genealogies, only 5,828 have complete birth and death records. All of 
them are first included in my lineage sample. To have largely accurate estimates of fertility 
rates, women missing both birth and death years, and women whose data lack more than half 
of their sons’ birth years are excluded from the sample.  
For females with only a birth year or a death year recorded, and also with more than half of 
their sons’ birth years recorded, I try to impute their missing birth or death years by referring 
to the standard life tables for the Lower Yangtze Valley in 1800 constructed by Elvin and Fox 
(2007), and also by referring to the number of children they had. A woman with missing 
 
20 Results from using different infant mortality rates are reported in Appendix 2.B.1. 
21 Malthus (1798, cited in Macfarlane 2003, p.13) first put infanticide into his wide category of “positive checks”, 
which is also agreed by most scholars, “[t]he positive checks to population include all the causes, which tend in 
any way prematurely to shorten the duration of human life, such as … wars, infanticide, plague, and famine.” 
Cornell (1996) claims that rather than “postnatal abortion”, he prefers to call infanticide “infant homicide”, and 
views it “as a component of mortality rather than of fertility”.  
22 In fact, reported by several hospital survey data in China in the 1920s and 1930s, the ratios are all higher than 
the natural one (Li et al. 2014). According to the 1927-1929 register records of 2,909 births in an obstetric hospital 
in Shanghai, the sex ratio at birth was 116.8 boys to 100 girls; based on the survey of 4,000 births in Peking Union 
Medical College Hospital, the sex ratio was 119.1 to 100; in 1931, the record of 793 births in a hospital in Nanjing 
showed the ratio as 120.2 to 100. Compared to administrative records, which would be easily suffered from the 
issue of non-registration of births, the hospital records were much more accurate and plausible in reporting the 
natural sex ratio at birth of the Chinese, but the skewed ratio still suggests that practices which could decrease the 
number of female births, such as sex-specific abortions, may exist. 
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birth/death-year data will be cautiously and conservatively given a death year according to 
several rules based on the following situations.  
First, all these women are divided into two categories – one consists of women who had no 
children, or had sons without the sons’ birth years being recorded, and the other of women who 
had sons whose birth years were noted. Second, two methods are applied to the two categories. 
For the former category, if the woman had no children, she would be considered as dead at 20-
24 years old; if she had one or two children, then she would be estimated to be dead in age 
group 25-29; if three children, then the age group 30-34; four children, the age group 35-39 
and so on. For the latter category, the woman’s birth/death year is estimated according to Elvin 
and Fox’s life tables, by adding the remaining life expectancy to her at the age when she gave 
birth to her last son.  
In terms of the missing birth years of sons, I apply the technique that Ts’ui-jung Liu (1978, 
1985) applies in studying lineages in Zhejiang and Taiwan. If the birth year of the first son or 
the last of several sons is missing, the missing year is estimated by subtracting five years from 
the birth year of the second son, or by adding five years to the birth year of the penultimate 
son.23 If the birth year of a son born in the middle is missing, then the missing value is filled 
by the midpoint of the birth interval bounded by the birth years of sons just before and just 
after the son whose birth-year was missing.  
Table 2.1 presents the number of married females finally selected for the sample, and the 
proportion of females and of sons with missing year records. Table 2.2 summarises the statistics 
of the birth and death records of the females who are in the sample. 
  
 
23 Liu (1985) adds three years to the previous son’s birth year to estimate the next son’s birth year. However, from 
her later study of forty-eight lineages in the Ming and Qing dynasties, it appears that the average birth interval 
between two sons is around four to five years (Liu 1992).  
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Table 2.1 Married females and sons without birth/death years, the lineage sample 
Lineage No. of wives 
No. of wives, 
no birth year 
No. of wives, 
no death year 
No. of sons 
No. of sons, 
no birth year 
Zhou 393 33 84 503 17 
Que 1,898 32 70 3,836 278 
Huang 906 88 189 1,569 51 
Zha 2,071 428 321 2,434 115 
Gu 2,499 7 427 3,723 581 
Total 7,767 588 1,091 12,065 1,042 
Source: The lineage sample. 
 
Table 2.2 Summary statistics, married females 
Statistics N Mean Std. Min Max 
Birth year 7,767 1785.32 62.79 1304 1934 
Death year 7,767 1832.14     61.08        1388        2004 
Age at the 1st birth 5,523     24.46     5.42          13          52 
Age at the 2nd birth 3,395     28.97     5.50          15          57 
Age at the 3rd birth 1,790     32.61     5.27          17          52 
Age at the 4th birth  859     35.39     4.99          23          55 
Age at the 5th birth 324     37.33     4.40          26          54 
Age at the 6th birth 130     39.07     3.98          29          47 
Age at the 7th birth 36     40.36     3.83          35          48 
Age at the 8th birth 7     44.14     5.15          38          51 
Notes: The term ‘birth’ denotes a male birth. There is no record of daughters’ birth years. 
Source: The lineage sample. 
 
2.3 Measuring fertility 
2.3.1 Standard and non-standard fertility measures 
In demographic studies, the standard method of measuring fertility is to link fertility to females, 
rather than males. Constrained by the lack of female information in the genealogies, this 
chapter employs both standard and non-standard measures. The two main standard measures 
that this chapter used are the total marital fertility rates (TMFR) and the age-specific marital 
fertility rates (ASMFR), since only married females are included in the genealogical books. 
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The total marital fertility rate is the number of births a married woman would hypothetically 
bear throughout her entire reproductive span, normally from 15 to 49 years of age. It is 
calculated as: 
 
                             𝑇𝑀𝐹𝑅 = 5 × 𝐴𝑆𝑀𝐹𝑅𝑖 ,                    (1) 
 
where ASMFR is the age-specific marital fertility rate of age group i (for 5-year age groups). 
More specifically, ASMFR is the number of births in a certain age group per year or in a 








                           𝐵𝑖𝑟𝑡ℎ𝑖 = (𝑆𝑜𝑛𝑖 1.05 + 𝑆𝑜𝑛𝑖⁄ ) × 1.25(𝑜𝑟 1.20) ,               (2) 
 
where Birth is the number of births to married women in age group i in a given reference period, 
and Exposure equals the number of married women-years of exposure in age group i during 
the reference period. As previously discussed, the number of daughters is approximated by 
combining the number of sons and the natural sex ratio, and the total births are also inflated by 
including a 25 per cent (or 20 per cent) infant mortality rate.  
At the same time, the number of sons recorded per marriage and per married male will also 
be reported. This kind of non-standard and male-relative fertility measure is applied in Clark 
and Cummins (2015b), when they analyse fertility in England by using males’ wills. In this 
chapter, net fertility in terms of sons is also a valid measure to show the differences between 
lineages in the long-run, though it admittedly differs from the conventional female-relative 
fertility measures.  
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2.3.2 Potential biases caused by the missing records 
Shiue (2016) examines the selection bias and the survivor bias in turn in the genealogical books 
of seven lineages in Tongcheng County and found that neither one of the bias effects was 
significant. I follow the same methods and report in Appendix 2.A the results regarding these 
two biases in the male population; in my sample, neither of the biases is significant either. All 
the male family members are ritualistically significant for the genealogy, regardless of wealth 
or status.  
Although all of the male family members and their wives would have been included in the 
genealogies, the completeness of their records is affected by social status and certain other 
demographic features. Generally speaking, the females who produced more sons are more 
likely to have a complete birth and death year record.24 To deal with the potential bias, I try 
cautiously to impute as many as possible of the birth/death years on the basis of the methods 
mentioned in Section 2.2.2. Despite the bias, the women selected into the sample proved to a 
great extent not to have been more fertile than the women who are not selected. The average 
number of sons per woman in the selected female sample is 1.55, while that in the entire female 
sample is 1.31.  
An inevitable bias is that the fertility rate might be somewhat underestimated, since women 
with no sons would be viewed as childless in the calculation, even though they might have 
given birth to many daughters. Approximating the number of daughters by using the sex ratio 
at birth could not estimate the number of births to “sonless” mothers. However, because this 
method would also have overestimated the fertility of women who gave birth to sons only, the 
aggregate estimate of the fertility rate would not have significantly deviated from the actual 
fertility rate. I use the family reconstitution data of Rosny-sous-Bois, a French village near 
Paris, to calculate the marital fertility rates by using sons’ records only and both sons’ and 
daughters’ records (Séguy 2001; Weir 1995). The two sets of estimates are entirely comparable 
 
24A basic logistic regression shows that conditioning on the lineage fixed effect, if a female were to have one more 
son, her odds of having a complete record of both birth and death years versus having an incomplete records 
would increase by a factor of 1.23 (with a robust standard error 0.13).  
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(see Figure 2.B2 in Appendix 2.B), which shows that the method used in the chapter to 
calculate marital fertility rate is robust to the bias.  
Another possible bias derived from the systematic under-recording of daughters’ 
information is related to my examination of the presence of parity-dependent fertility controls. 
The lack of daughters’ records would move forward the timing of stopping and lengthen the 
birth intervals, and thus bias the tests towards finding spurious evidence of fertility controls. 
However, my results reported in Section 2.4.2 clearly suggest that the findings are robust to 
the potential bias.  
 
2.4 Results 
2.4.1 Marital fertility over time 
This section describes the marital fertility in the five lineages in the Ming and Qing dynasties. 
Table 2.3 details the recorded number of sons (net fertility in terms of sons) per married male 
by generation.  
According to the birth records in the genealogies, the greatest number of sons that a male 
had was five in the Zha lineage, seven in the Zhou lineage, eight in the Huang lineage, nine in 
the Gu lineage and ten in the Que lineage. However, having such a big family actually was 
very rare for anyone in the five lineages. Table 2.3 finds a moderate level of sons per married 
male; the average number of sons per married male in all five lineages is 1.55. Averagely 
speaking, every married male had fewer than two sons, except for the Huang lineage, where an 
average married male had 2.03 sons averagely. The lowest number of sons can be found in the 
Zha Lineage, about 1.45 sons. Given that males would marry more than once in their lives, the 
female-related fertility would show varying patterns.25  
  
 
25 The proportion of married males in the five lineages are: 68.5 per cent in the Huang lineage, 65.4 per cent in 
the Que lineage, 63.3 per cent in the Zhou lineage, 80.8 per cent in the Zha lineage, and 68.9 per cent in the Gu 
lineage. Within the population of married males, 8.94 per cent of married males in the Huang lineage, 4.67 per 
cent in the Que lineage, 14.32 per cent in the Zhou lineage, 10.27 per cent in the Zha lineage, and 7.68 per cent 
in the Gu lineage married more than once.  
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Huang 1st-4th  13 32 2.46 
 5th-8th   172 383 2.23 
 9th-12th   581 1186 2.04 
 13th-16th 386 744 1.93 
 1st-16th 1,139 2,313 2.03 
Que 1st-6th  27 41 1.52 
 7th-12th   346 757 2.19 
 13th-18th   2,244 4,909 2.19 
 19th-21th 2,442 3,893 1.59 
 1st-21th 5,059 9,600 1.90 
Zhou 1st-6th  14 31 2.21 
 7th-12th   146 253 1.73 
 13th-18th   141 226 1.65 
 19th-24th 244 415 1.70 
 1st-24th 545 925 1.70 
Zha 1st-6th  63 124 2.25 
 7th-12th   973 1,657 1.73 
 13th-18th   1,810 2,406 1.33 
 1st-18th 2,846 4,187 1.47 
Gu 17th-23rd  206 380 1.84 
 24th-30th   1,273 2,195 1.72 
 31st-37th  8,084 11,952 1.48 
 38th-44th 2,456 2,855 1.16 




21,608 33,482 1.55 
Note: Net fertility (sons only) refers to the total number of sons recorded in the mini-biographies of the married 
male, which is not adjusted by the 25 per cent or 20 per cent infant mortality rates.  





Figure 2.1 Adjusted total marital fertility rates of the five lineages, 1620-1920 
Notes: 1. The numbers of births in the Zha lineage and the Gu lineage are adjusted upwardly by 20 per cent, and 
the births of the other three lineages are adjusted upwards by 25 per cent. 2. Limited by the completeness of 
records of birth and death years, the time periods of the Zhou and the Que 1680-1920, the Huang 1620-1830, the 
Zha 1650-1860, the Gu 1620-1890. See Table 2.4 for the values of TMFR in each 30-year period of the five 
lineages. 
 































Huang 5.32 5.32 5.66 6.38 7.66 6.44 6.42 . . . 
Que . . 5.83 6.97 7.71 5.64 6.14 6.21 5.68 5.83 
Zhou . . 3.19 3.03 3.89 4.60 3.93 4.09 3.49 3.28 
Zha . 3.09 3.73 3.52 3.68 3.89 4.14 3.07 . . 
Gu 4.23 4.76 4.46 4.48 4.32 3.89 4.35 4.13 3.80 . 
Note: The rates are adjusted upwards by 20 per cent in the Zha lineage and the Gu lineage, and 25 per cent in the 
other three lineages. 
 
Figure 2.1 shows the time trend of total marital fertility rates in the five lineages, and Table 
2.4 details the values plotted in Figure 2.1. In general, in all five lineages, no steady upward or 
downward linear trend can be found. Consistent with the previous findings of net fertility, the 
Zhou, the Zha, and the Gu lineages had much lower marital fertility rates than the Huang and 
Que lineages throughout the entire period. The trends of the two elite lineages were steadier 
































than those of the other three common lineages, with the rates mainly ranging between four and 
five in the Gu lineage, and between three and four in the Zha lineage. A noteworthy fact is that, 
compared to the other two ordinary lineages, the Zhou lineage had low marital fertility, similar 
to that of the Zha and the Gu.  
Regarding the three ordinary lineages, though the trends are relatively unsteady, most often 
the rates of these three lineages did not vary significantly but fluctuated within a range of one 
birth. Nevertheless, in the eighteenth century, the three ordinary lineages all experienced a 
notable rise in marital fertility. The rate in the Zhou lineage increased from 3.03 to the highest 
rate of 4.60 in 1770-1799; in the Que lineage, it increased from 5.83 in 1680-1709 to the highest 
rate of 7.71 in 1740-1769, but dropped to 5.64 by the end of the eighteenth century. Similarly, 
the Huang lineage also experienced the highest rate (7.66) in the period 1740-1769, and 
maintained a high level for the next sixty years. As previously mentioned, it is argued by 
scholars that the eighteenth-century China experienced a remarkable “population boom” 
(Fairbank 1978; Zhao and Xie 1988; Cao 2000), and the notable rise of fertility in the three 
lineages conforms to the fast population growth during this period.26 
Figure 2.2 shows the age-specific marital fertility schedule over time in the five lineages. 
The results shown in the figure are divided into four 50-year birth cohorts (five cohorts for the 
Gu lineage), in order to track the differences between different periods in each lineage.27 Figure 
2.2 suggests similar trends over time in the five lineages. The age patterns of marital fertility 
also demonstrate that the women from age 25 to age 34 were more fertile than women in the 
other age groups.28 Moreover, the shape of the age pattern curve can also indicate whether or 
 
26 See Appendix 2.B.1 for the marital fertility rates boundary of the five lineages by including different infant 
mortality rates. 
27 For the Zhou and the Que, the four births cohorts are 1700-1749, 1750-1799, 1800-1849, and 1850-1899; for 
the Huang and the Zha, the cohorts are 1650-1699, 1700-1749, 1750-1799, 1800-1850; for the Gu, the cohorts are 
1650-1699, 1700-1749, 1750-1799, 1800-1850, and 1850-1899. 
28 As Liu (1995) suggests, the actual age-specific marital fertility rates of age group 15-19 should be slightly 
higher, because not all the married women included in the denominator for calculating the rate of this group were 
already married by the age of 20. However, the gap could only have been very small, because the number of births, 
the numerator of this group, was very low. 
 52 




































































































































































































































2.4.2 Fertility controls within marriage 
2.4.2.1 Age pattern of marital fertility  
Whether the fertility of a population is a “natural fertility” or a “controlled fertility” can be 
shown by the age pattern of fertility. As specified by Henry (1961), the way to distinguish these 
two types of fertility is to find whether the couples settle on a desired target for the number of 
children they will have. According to the marital fertility model, first proposed by Coale and 
Trussell (1974), and later developed by Wilson, Oeppen, and Pardoe (1988), the age-specific 
schedule of a “natural” marital fertility would follow a convex function, mainly determined by 
the decline of biological fecundity with age, while a “controlled” marital fertility would follow 
a linear, or even a concave function, with the decline of fertility at the same rate or an increasing 
rate, because of the use of parity-dependent controls after the maximum number of children 
had been reached (Knodel 1983; van Bavel 2003).  
Table 2.5 lists the TMFR in the five lineages, and the five curves in Figure 2.3 demonstrate 
the age-specific marital fertility throughout the entire time period. The curves exhibit no clear 
evidence of parity-dependent fertility controls. Due to the assumed universal young marriage 
age of females, those in the age group 25-29 had the highest rate in all five lineages, but the 
declines afterwards all displayed more of a convex than a concave shape. Although the age 
pattern of fertility can give explicit evidence of fertility control, I show some more direct results 
in the next section. 
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Table 2.5 Total marital fertility rates (TMFR) in all five lineages 
Time periods Lineage TMFR 
1620-1830 Huang 5.95 
1680-1920 Que 6.07 
1680-1920 Zhou 3.76 
1650-1860 Zha 3.71 
1620-1890 Gu 4.09 
Source: The lineage sample. 
 
 
Figure 2.3 Age-specific marital fertility rates in all five lineages, 1620-1920 
Note: The rates of all five lineages are adjusted by the infant mortality rates, and also take account of the numbers 
of daughters. 
 
2.4.2.2 Parity-dependent early stopping  
Based on the test proposed and applied by Clark and Cummins (2019a) to examine the 
existence in pre-industrial England of a type of parity-dependent control, early stopping, a 
similar test is also run in the section. I test the hypothesis that if the desired number of children 
existed and achieved, the couple would stop having more births. If the target number existed, 
the fertility patterns of groups of women with different levels of fecundity at a certain age 




































determines the reproduction span of women, women who married at different ages should also 
display different fertility patterns.  
Nonetheless, given the nature of the genealogical data, I could not rigorously reproduce the 
test in Clark and Cummins (2019a), but had to adapt it to some extent. First, as the marriage 
ages of women are inaccessible from the genealogies, and as only the sons’ birth years are 
accessible, I choose to analyse the women who gave birth to their first son before the age of 
24, because these women might get married at similar ages. Second, because of the limited 
data on males’ death years, I could not test the effect of net parity on later fecundity. As Liu 
(1985) suggests, I use the “sons-ever-born” method, and set the net parity by the recorded 
number of sons that a woman had had at the relevant age.  
These women are then divided into three subgroups. The “high” group consists of women 
who had borne more than 3 sons before the age of 30; the “median” group comprises women 
who had given birth to 2 sons before the age of 30; and the “low” group contains women who 
had given birth to only 1 son before age 30. The age-specific marital fertility rates of the three 
groups are then be calculated. If the target number of children existed, the index of sons (taking 
marital fertility rate in the age-group 30-34 as 1) of the high group should decrease after age 
34 more dramatically than the indices of the two other groups. In other words, the paralleled 
decreasing rates in the three groups represent the absence of early stopping in the sample 
population. If couples chose to avoid having more sons after reaching the maximum desired 
number of sons, the women in the “high”, “medium”, and “low” groups would have followed 
different fertility patterns after the age of 30-34.  
The fertility patterns of women in the five plots of the five lineages in Figure 2.4 suggest 
that early stopping does not exist in the group of females who start having births from the age-
group 20 to 24 in all of the five lineages. With higher fertility before age 30, instead of 
experiencing a more rapid decline, the women keep the high level of fertility later in their lives, 
while if they have lower fertility before age 30, they are highly likely to have lower fertility 
after this age. The approximate linear movement clearly indicates that there is little evidence 
of families setting a target number of sons, or of parity-dependent controls in general.  
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However, the missing information about daughters could bias the results. If the bias derived 
from the systematic under-recording of family members, especially daughters, in lineages over 
time existed, it would bias the test towards finding spurious fertility controls in Chinese fertility. 
However, even with the possibility of the bias, and even with data of sons alone, I cannot show 
evidence for the existence of early stopping in imperial China, which clearly proves that the 
results are robust to this bias.29   
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2.4.2.3 Parity-dependent birth spacing 
Wrigley (2004, p. 319, Table 12.1) finds that from 1700 to 1837 in England the mean birth 
interval was about 30 to 31 months (about 2.5 to 2.6 years).30 Using the same dataset, Cinnirella 
et al. (2017) show that the number of mean spacing days from 1540 to 1850 was 924.5 days 
(about 2.53 years). The estimates of the five lineages are actually comparable. The average 
closed birth intervals between two sons in the five lineages were around 5 to 6 years, which 
means the birth interval between two birth should be around 2.5 to 3 years. The spacing in pre-
modern China was not significantly greater than that in pre-modern England.31  
This section focuses on another related question, how did birth spacing change with the 
changing stock of sons in the family. If couples adjusted their fertility choices by the stock of 
sons in the family and reduced the speed of having a successive birth, then parity-dependent 
birth spacing, another type of birth control, existed.  
I use the subsample which contains 5,523 females who had at least one son and examines 
the birth spacing in the sample. Figure 2.5 presents the Kaplan-Meier curves for females of 
having another male birth before they reached the age of 49. I plot the survival curves of having 
a successive male birth for females of parity 1, 2, 3, and 4, as the majority of females in the 
sample gave birth to fewer than five sons.  
I analyse both open birth intervals – intervals from the last birth to the menopause or death, 
and closed birth intervals – intervals between two male births. Therefore, for example, the 
curve for parity 1 in the figure measures the timing of the second son if the female had at least 
two sons. If the female only had one son over her lifetime, then it measures the interval from 
 
30 Wrigley’s estimation excludes the parity 0 intervals, and also the intervals following an infant death, which 
makes the estimation more comparable to the Chinese case here, since my calculation cannot include parity 0 
intervals and intervals after infant deaths.  
31 Studies show that the common inclination to breastfeeding in the traditional Chinese culture may lengthen birth 
intervals. According to Bongaarts (1983), with no breastfeeding, the mean time period of post-partum amenorrhea 
is only about 1.5 to 2 months, while the duration of breastfeeding lengthens the duration of amenorrhea: one more 
month of breastfeeding causes approximately one more month of amenorrhea. As shown in Hsiung (1995), 
Chinese women chose to extend their breastfeeding time to more than two years, so in general, the amenorrhea 
interval for Chinese mothers could be about two years, which would prolong the birth interval. 
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the year of her first male birth to the year when she reached age 49 or her death year if she died 
before age 49.  
As expected, the probability of having a successive male birth decreased with the increase 
of parity. In terms of the length of birth intervals, 50 per cent of the females of parity 1 delivered 
the second son within 7 years since the first male birth. The median “survival” periods of 
having a successive male birth for females of parity 2 and parity 3 were both about 9 years. For 
females who gave births to at least five sons, most of them had their fifth son within 6 years 
after the birth of the fourth son. In general, the birth interval between the first and the second 
male births was shorter than the other three intervals; the spacing between the second and the 
third male births and that between the third and the fourth male births were similar.  
 
 
Figure 2.5 Kaplan-Meier survival curves by parity 
Notes: 1. The chart shows females with at least one male birth. 2. The shaded area indicates the 95% confidence 
interval. 
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To substantiate the relationship between the stock of sons and birth spacing, I follow the 
method used in previous studies (e.g. Cinnirella et al. 2017; Clark and Cummins 2019a).32 I 
run a basic Cox proportional hazard model to estimate the hazard rates of the conception of a 
successive birth based on the following equation, 
 
                                  ℎ(𝑡|𝑋𝑗) = ℎ𝑜(𝑡)exp (𝑋𝑗𝛽𝑥).                             (3) 
 
Individuals studied in the model are the mothers who were aged between 15 to 49 and had at 
least one male birth. The term ℎ𝑜(𝑡) is the baseline hazard function of time, measured in years. 
𝑋𝑗 denotes the demographic covariates, and I control for the parity and mother’s age in the 
model. Therefore, the dependent variable in this model is the birth interval, both open and 
closed, which is measured in years.33  
I define parity as the number of sons that has ever born to the family by the start of the 
interval and I construct a dummy variable for each parity. “Mother age group”, which is time 
varying, denotes the age of the mother in the interval. Moreover, two different levels of 
stratification are applied, the birth cohort stratification and the lineage stratification. To obtain 
the birth cohorts, I divide the birth date of the sons in the sample into eleven birth cohorts, 
starting with a “pre-1450” cohort, ending with a “post-1900” cohort, and with nine 50-year 
birth cohorts in between.  
Table 2.6 details the results, and I plot the hazard ratios in each specification in Figure 2.6. 
Column 1 shows the results of the model with no fixed effect included. In columns 2 and 3, I 
 
32 I also run a logistic model to estimate the relationship between the probability of having a birth at a given year 
and the birth order of the birth, based on the equation, 
𝐵𝑖𝑟𝑡ℎ𝑖,𝑡 = 𝑃𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖 + 𝐴𝑔𝑒𝑔𝑟𝑜𝑢𝑝𝑖,𝑡 + 𝐿𝑖𝑛𝑒𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑖 + 𝐶𝑜ℎ𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑖 + 𝑖 ,  (4) 
where all the variables are as in the Cox proportional hazard model. I report the results in Table 2.B2 and Figure 
2.B4 in Appendix 2.B. The results are consistent with those of the Cox proportional hazard model.  
33 The interval equals the birth interval between two male births minus one. Because I define the conception of 
the successive birth as “failure”, I subtract one year from the birth interval to approximate the year of the 
conception of the next birth. 
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apply the birth cohort and the lineage stratifications respectively; the model in column 4 is 
stratified by cohort and lineage together. The results are much the same in the four models.  
Coefficients on all the parity dummies are lower than 1, showing that compared to the 
reference group, Parity 1, women at parity higher than 1 would experience the successive birth 
at a significantly lower speed. However, the similar coefficients on parity 2 and the higher 
parities suggest the speed does not change much after parity 2. In fact, coefficients on Parity 
3-6 are even larger than the coefficient on Parity 2 in columns 1 and 2, which demonstrates a 
rising hazard of birth with parity, starting from parity 2. The positive hazard ratios suggest the 
fact that women who are more fecund have greater birth hazards (Clark and Cummins 2019a). 
After conditioning on the lineage fixed effects in columns 3 and 4, the difference between 
coefficients on parities 2 to 6+ becomes smaller. The results indicate that birth spacing (after 
parity 1) did not become longer with the increasing stock of sons, which also provides evidence 
for the absence of parity-dependent birth spacing in the five lineages.34 The findings in this 
present chapter is similar to the English pattern revealed in Wrigley et al. (1997), where they 
also argue that “[b]irth interval lengths changed very little between parities 2 and 5.” 
In terms of the relationship between birth spacing and mother age, the result is consistent 
with the age-specific marital fertility rates in the five lineages shown in Figure 2.3. Mothers at 
age groups 25-29 and 30-34 always experienced higher fertility rates than mothers at other age 
groups, which is also confirmed by the shorter birth spacing for mothers at these two age groups.  
Similar to the previous results on early stopping, the results here are also robust to potential 
data bias. The lack of daughters in the model would only bias it towards finding more delay in 
the next conception. Even with the possible bias, the model cannot find evidence of parity-
dependent longer spacing.   
  
 
34 I also follow the method used in Cinnirella et al. (2017). I report the results in Table 2.B3 in Appendix 2.B. The 
stratification creates strong negative effects of Parity on the hazard of birth. However, Clark and Cummins (2019a) 
have already proved that the presence of parity-dependent control found by the mother level stratification model 
is simply “an artifact of the empirical model”. 
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Table 2.6 Parity-dependent birth spacing, with no stratification and stratification by cohort and 
lineage 
 Hazard of a Birth 
 
 Cohort FE Lineage FE 
Cohort and 
Lineage FE 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 

























































































Number of Subjects 9,691 9,691 9,691 9,691 
Notes: 1. “Parity 6+” includes parity 6, 7 and 8. Parity 1 and mother age group 20-24 are the reference groups. 2. 




Figure 2.6 Parity hazards, with and without stratification by cohort and lineage 
Notes: 1. Values are the hazard ratios presented in Table 2.6. 2. Error bars indicate 95% confidence intervals. 
 
2.5 Discussion  
The extensive literature on historical fertility in both the Chinese and the Western context 
allows me to compare my results from the five lineages with other results, in order to better 
understand the marital fertility levels in imperial China. This section compares the results of 
this chapter with other historical fertility studies, within China and with the West, especially 
Western Europe, followed by a brief discussion about the “natural” and “controlled” fertility. 
 
2.5.1 Comparison within China and with the West 
Many scholars have already estimated Chinese marital fertility in historical times. I find a 
similar level of marital fertility between the previous demographic studies and my study, as 
presented in Table 2.7 and Figure 2.7. Although the Zhou, the Zha, and the Gu had relatively 
lower rates, the Que and the Huang lineages had identical marital fertility rates with Ts’ui-jung 
Liu’s estimation of other lineages in South China, and also the estimation of North China’s 
rates by Lee and Wang. Two higher calculations were provided by Wolf (1984) and Telford 
(1995), but they were still lower than 8.42, the standard natural marital fertility rate estimated 
Stratified by lineage Stratified by both
Raw Stratified by cohort






















by Louis Henry (1961), though the estimate of Telford was exceptionally higher than the other 
ones.35 
 
Table 2.7 Total marital fertility rates in China in previous studies 
Time period Region TMFR 
1620-1830 Zhejiang (Huang) 5.95 
1680-1920 Zhejiang (Que) 6.07 
1680-1920 Zhejiang (Zhou) 3.76 
1650-1860 Zhejiang (Zha) 3.71 
1620-1890 Jiangsu (Gu) 4.09 
1296-1864 Hunan (Li) 5.98 
1517-1877 Jiangsu (Zhu) 5.80 
1462-1864 Anhui (Zhao) 6.11 
1520-1661 Anhui 8.21 
1700-1890 Beijing 5.3 
1774-1873 Liaoning 6.3 
1929-1931 22 Provinces 6.12 
1896-1927 7 Localities 7.03 
Sources and notes: The first five TMFR are the author’s own calculation. Hunan, Jiangsu, and Anhui (1462-1864): 
genealogical studies by Liu (1995, p. 99), the Li lineage in Shaoyang County, Hunan Province, and the Zhu lineage 
in Jiangdu County, Jiangsu Province; Anhui (1520-1661): a total marital fertility rate in 39 genealogies studied 
by Telford (1995, Table 3.1, p.51); Beijing and Liaoning: Lee and Wang (1999a, Table 6.1), by using genealogical 
records of royal family in Beijing, and the register records in rural Liaoning); 22 Provinces: Barclay et al. (1976, 
Table 5); 7 Localities: Wolf (1984, Table 10). The data of 22 Provinces used in Barclay et al. comes from the land 
utilization survey conducted by John Lossing Bank and the research team in Nanking University in 1929 to 1931. 
The seven localities of Wolf’s research are Beijing, Fujian, Zhejiang, Jiangsu, Shandong, Shanxi, and Sichuan.   
 
35 Telford (1995) studied 39 genealogies in Tongcheng County; all of the 30 total marital fertility rates that he 
showed were above 6.7, with only one exception, the Huang lineage, which was 5.77 (the highest one was 9.56). 
Liu (1995) analyses the Zhao lineage also in Tongcheng County, and reported the TMFR as 6.11. Although Liu 
did not include a 25 per cent infant mortality rate and a 10 per cent male-birth under-registration rate as Telford 
did, and although they looked at different periods, more research on Anhui Province needs to be done to account 
for the great difference. 
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Figure 2.7 Age-specific marital fertility rates in China 
Sources: Huang, Que, Zhou, Zha, Gu: authors’ own calculation; Hsu and Shen lineages, Liu (1985, Table 2.9); 
22 Provinces: Barclay et al. (1976, Table 5); 7 Localities: Wolf (1984, Table 10), and Wolf interviewed 580 
women born in 1896-1927; Taiwan: Wolf (1984, Table 7). 
 
The marital fertility rates in premodern China were comparable, or in most cases, much 
lower than the rates in pre-transitional Western Europe. Table 2.8 and Figure 2.8 show the age-
specific marital fertility in the five lineages and four North-western European regions. Because 
of the late marriage pattern in North-western Europe, the data of its age-specific marital fertility 
start from the age group 20-24, while the data of the fertility of the five Chinese lineages start 
from the age group 15-19. As shown clearly in the table and the figure, the age-specific marital 
fertility rates in the five lineages from 1800 to 1829 are much lower than those of the four 
North-western European regions in the similar periods.  
It is also worth mentioning that not only were the amplitudes of marital fertility in China 
and in the West different, but also the shapes of the curves (Figures 2.7 and 2.8). In a pre-
modern North-western European population, the marital fertility of the age group 20-24 was 
always the highest, declining afterwards. However, the five Chinese lineages studied in the 
chapter, and also studies of Liu, Telford, and Lee all show that the age group 25-29 always has 
the highest marital fertility rates, and that marital fertility declines after leaving the age group 




























































































Zhou Lineage (1750-1799) 
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Table 2.8 Age-specific marital fertility (rates per 1,000 women-years) 
Source: The rates of England, Sweden, Southwest France, and Werdum are from Wrigley (2004), Poverty, 
Progress, and Population, Table 15.1, p. 400. 
 
 
Figure 2.8 Age-specific marital fertility, England, Sweden, Germany, France, and China 
Source: Estimates from Table 2.8.  
 
2.5.2 A “natural fertility” or a “controlled fertility” regime? 
The martial fertility pattern in China was unique. The results in this chapter shows that the 






































15-9 20-4 25-9 30-4 35-9 40-4 45-9 20(15)-49 
England (1800-24) . 425 381 311 255 142 19 7.67 
Sweden (1801-50) . 456 374 315 237 130 25 7.69 
Southwest France (1720-89) . 410 359 336 257 141 20 7.62 
Werdum (pre-1850) . 449 376 322 256 118 17 7.69 
Huang (1800-29) 90 305 308 244 212 98 28 5.98 
Que (1800-29) 107 251 227 220 187 119 19 5.65 
Zhou (1800-29) 45 196 226 145 91 61 22 3.93 
Zha (1800-29) 40 184 199 187 147 62 9 4.14 
Gu (1800-29) 41 186 217 165 169 78 13 4.35 
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combination makes imperial China hardly fit into either the “natural fertility” or the “controlled 
fertility” regime that Henry (1953) establishes. 
In fact, Henry’s (1961) identification of the two categories suggests that the difference 
between them does not lie in the level of fertility rates, but in the existence of parity-dependent 
controls. Provided that deliberate stopping and spacing were not practised, fertility should be 
defined as “natural fertility” (Knodel 1983, see Table 2.9 in this chapter). According to the 
criteria, Ming-Qing China should belong to the “natural fertility” regime. However, the 
moderate fertility level itself still implied that Chinese historical fertility was not completely 
“natural”. There must be some limits practised to achieve the low rates, despite the fact that 
the couples did not limit family size deliberately.  
 
Table 2.9 Natural and controlled fertility as defined by the occurrence of parity-dependent 
controls 
  Deliberate stopping 
 
Deliberate spacing Absent 
Without intent to 
limit family size 
With intent to limit 
family size 
Absent natural fertility ambiguous controlled fertility 
Without intent to 
limit family size natural fertility ambiguous controlled fertility 
With intent to limit 
family size ambiguous ambiguous controlled fertility 
Source: Knodel 1983, Chapter 3, Table 1. 
 
Some studies point out the important role that the traditional culture played in lengthening 
birth intervals, which effectively limited marital fertility. For instance, because of the tradition 
of arranged marriages and minor marriages (marriages between preadolescent boys and adult 
females) in pre-modern China, the lack of passion between couples and the big age gaps 
between young husbands and elder wives both led to long birth intervals (Rindfuss and Morgan 
1983; Wolf 1984). The traditional belief that longer breastfeeding was beneficial and healthy 
to both infants and mothers also lengthened the intervals (Hsiung 1995). Lee and Wang (1999a, 
pp. 90-92) argue that the longer spacing was derived from the traditional health and 
reproductive culture. Influenced deeply by Confucianism, Taoism, and Buddhism, the Chinese 
believed that having excessive sexual activities was unhealthy, so that they strictly regulated 
sexual activities.  
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Moreover, another culture-related factor, the practice of remarriages and concubinage, 
would also reduce the frequency of sexual activities for wives, and thus limited the marital 
fertility rates to some degree. Lee and Wang (1999, p.76; Wang et al. 1995) study the Qing 
nobility and point out that, “[m]ost polygynous men apparently slept with only one wife at a 
time, regardless of the total number of wives…As a result, adding one wife increased male 
fertility by only one child.” From the perspective of the wives and concubines, this also 
suggests that the practice would reduce the frequency of their sexual activities, and thus limited 
the marital fertility rates to some degree.  
 
 
Figure 2.9 Age-specific marital fertility rates of females with different status in marriages, 
the five lineages 
 
Although the proportion of “polygynous men” in my lineage sample was not as high as that 
in Lee and Wang’s Qing nobility sample, the practice was not rare in my sample.36 Therefore, 
to quantitatively support this cultural factor, I divide all the females into three groups based on 
their husbands’ marital status and estimate the age-specific and total marital fertility rates by 
group. Group 1 contains 5,929 females were the wives whose husbands only married once in 
their lifetime. Group 2 includes 879 females were the first wives whose husbands married more 
than once. These females usually died at an early age or failed to have a son, which gave 
 
36 Within the total population of married males in the five lineages, 8.94% of married males in the Huang lineage, 
4.67% in the Que lineage, 14.32% in the Zhou lineage, 10.27% in the Zha lineage, and 7.68% in the Gu lineage 
married more than once. 
Group 1 TMFR = 5.21
Group 2 TMFR = 3.40

































sufficient reasons for their husbands to remarry.37 Group 3 includes 959 females who were 
either wives of their husbands’ remarriages or concubines. In other words, females of Groups 
2 and 3 shared their husbands with other women either consecutively or simultaneously, while 
females of Group 1 did not.  
The results are shown in Figure 2.9. It demonstrates the different fertility patterns of the 
three groups. Females in Groups 2 and 3 had significantly lower fertility rates than the females 
in Group 1. The results make sense, considering the relatively shorter time that women in 
Groups 2 and 3 could accompany their husbands than women in Group 1. Although Group 1’s 
TMFR was not high in historical standard either, the constant remarriages of males and the 
polygamy practice played an important role in limiting the number of births a married female 
would have. 
In sum, Henry’s classification of fertility is still a useful tool to describe different types of 
historical fertility. However, because he proposed it mainly based on a sample that consisted 
of European countries, applying it to non-European ones would be arbitrary sometimes. As 
mentioned in Saito (1996), “the ways in which a demographic regime operated were culture-
bound”. Considering the marriage system and reproductive culture in imperial China was 
distinctly different from the European ones, it makes sense that China’s pattern could not 
perfectly fall into either category. With more detailed studies on historical fertility of non-
European regions in the future, a more accurate and detailed classification could be created to 
enrich our understanding of human fertility at a global scale.  
 
2.6 Conclusion 
By exploiting a new genealogical dataset of five lineages in southeast China, I re-examine the 
historical marital fertility pattern in China. The chapter invalidates the Malthusian view on high 
fertility in pre-modern China by showing relatively low marital fertility rates in the five 
lineages, especially in the Zhou, the Zha, and the Gu lineages. Meanwhile, the chapter 
vindicates the traditional view that fertility was not deliberately limited in pre-modern China, 
by providing evidence of the absence of two effective parity-dependent fertility controls in the 
five lineages.  
  
 





2.A Selection bias and survivor bias of the genealogical data for Chapter 2 
Selection bias. To examine the selection bias, the proportion of degree holders and individuals 
with specific records of identity and social status is used as a measure in this chapter to show 
how representative the people recorded in genealogies can be. In all of the three ordinary 
lineages, the proportion of degree holders in the national civil service examination is not high 
in any generation (Table 2.A1). Moreover, in the 1,710 male members in Huang, only 19 
people (1.1 per cent) have records on identity, described by phrases as “being erudite and 
eloquent”, “being a celebrity in the town”, etc., and 193 people in the 1,059 male members in 
Zhou have identity records, which only accounts for l8.2 per cent of the male population. These 
two proportions, together with the results showed in Table 2.A1, prove the genealogies are 
representative of the general population in the county. For the Zha lineage, the proportion of 
degree holders is much higher, 15.6 per cent of a total male population of 3,785, and with a 
nearly similar proportion of degree holders in each generation.  
Survivor bias. If the effect of survivor bias is significant, then the later generations in the 
lineage should have many more achievements than the previous generations had. From the 
results of the five lineages (shown in Table 2.A1), I find no sign of survivor bias: in all the five 
lineages, the proportion of degree holders in the last generation(s), is not higher than the 
proportions in the previous generations (except for the Zha lineage with a little higher 
proportion in the last six generations than in the six previous generations); they are also all 











% of all males in 
the generations 
Huang 1st-5th 0 0 0 2.4% 
6th-10th 0 1 1 0.29% 
11th-15th 0 3 3 0.26% 
Total 1st-15th 0 4 4 0.26% 
Que 1st-10th 0 0 0 0 
11th-15th 0 11 11 1.1% 
16th-18th 0 86 86 3.9% 
19th-20th 2 52 54 2.3% 
Total 11th-20th 2 149 151 2.7% 
Zhou 1st-5th 0 2 2 15.3% 
6th-10th 6 7 13 9.6% 
11th-15th 3 7 10 3.4% 
16th-20th 0 7 7 5.7% 
21st-25th 1 18 19 4.8% 
Total 1st-25th 10 41 51 4.8% 
Zha 1st-6th 2 4 6 9.5% 
7th-12th 18 137 155 15.0% 
13th-18th 44 387 431 16.0% 
Total 1st-18th 64 528 592 15.6% 
Gu 17th-21st 10 7 17 16.2% 
22nd-26th 13 12 25 3.5% 
27th-31st  4 24 28 1.5% 
32nd-36th 4 74 78 1.0% 
 37th-44th 0 25 25 0.4% 
Total 17th-44th 31 142 173 1.0% 
Note: “Upper rank” degree holders are the candidates who passed the national-level and the provincial-level civil 
examinations, including jinshi, juren, and gongsheng. “Lower rank” degree holders are the candidates who 
passed only the county- or prefecture-level civil exams, including the guoxuesheng, taixuesheng, lingsheng, 
fusheng, and zengsheng, xiangsheng and yisheng. 





2.B Robustness checks for Chapter 2 
2.B.1 Infant mortality rates  
The 25 per cent and 20 per cent of infant mortality rates in ordinary families and elite families 
used in the chapter could overestimate or underestimate the situation in China. I choose to 
include different infant mortality rates for the ordinary families and the elite families to indicate 
a possible boundary of marital fertility rates in the five lineages. The results are shown in Table 
2.B1 and Figure 2.B1.  
 
Table 2.B1 Total marital fertility rates adjusted by different infant mortality rates in the five 
lineages 
  Total marital fertility rates 
Lineage Periods 15% 20% 25% 30% 35% 
Huang 1620-1830 . 5.71 5.94 6.19 6.42 
Que 1680-1920 . 5.83 6.07 6.32 6.56 
Zhou 1680-1920 . 3.61 3.76 3.91 4.06 
Zha 1650-1860 3.56 3.71 3.87 4.02 . 




          
 
Figure 2.B1 Total marital fertility rates adjusted by different infant mortality rates, the five 
lineages, 1620-1920 





























































































B.2 A case study on Rosny-sous-Bois 
 
 
Figure 2.B2 Marital fertility rates in Rosny-sous-Bois, pre 1800 




Figure 2.B3 Index of sons and index of births, Rosny-sous-Bois, pre 1800 





































































































2.B3 Parity-dependent birth spacing  
Table 2.B2 Parity effects on having a successive birth, logistic regression 
 Dependent Variable:  
Having a successive birth in a given year 
 (1) (2) (3) 


































































Controls    
Birth cohort FE N Y Y 







Observations 75,529 75,529 75,529 
Pseudo R2 0.087 0.088 0.093 
Notes: 1. The coefficients are the odds ratio for the logistic model. 2. Robust standard errors are in parentheses, 




Figure 2.B4 Predicted probability of having a successive birth in a given year with a given 
parity 
Notes: 1. Values are the average adjusted predictions, the expected probability at each parity are calculated by the 










































Table 2.B3 Parity-dependent birth spacing, stratification by mother 
 
 Hazard of a Birth 
 
Mother FE 
Cohort, Lineage,  
and Mother FE 
 (1) (2) 












































Number of Subjects 9,691 9,691 
Notes: 1. “Parity 6+” includes parity 6, 7 and 8, and parity 1 group and mother age group 20-24 are the reference 






Chapter 3  
 





This chapter uses the genealogical records of 36,456 men to test one of the fundamental 
assumptions of the Malthusian model. Did higher living standards result in increased net 
reproduction? An empirical investigation of China between 1350 and 1920 finds a positive 
relationship between social status and fertility. The gentry scholars, the Confucians, produced 
three times as many sons as the commoners. The positive relationship is also robust to a set of 
individual- and family-level socio-economic factors, including fathers’ and brothers’/cousins’ 
social outcomes. However, the strong social gradients disappear once I control for the number 
of marriages. Increased marriages among upper-class males drove reproductive success.  
 
3.1 Introduction 
Since the time of Malthus, economic historians have long been preoccupied with the 
relationship between economic growth and population growth. One of the fundamental 
assumptions behind the unified growth theory is that improved living standards lead to faster 
population growth. In the Malthusian epoch, income increase led to fertility increase and 
mortality decrease; thus, improved living standards lead to higher net reproduction. The 
growing proportion of the rich, together with a quantity-quality trade-off of children, led to the 
increase of human capital and finally triggered the fertility transition and modern economic 
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growth (Galor and Moav 2002; Galor and Weil 2000; Willis 1973; Becker, Murphy, and 
Tamura 1990; Galor 2011). 
Empirical evidence from pre-modern England supports this reasoning. Clark and Hamilton 
(2006) analyse more than 2,000 wills in England in 1585-1638 and find a “survival of the 
richest” story, that the number of descendants of the richest testators was twice that of the 
poorest. Boberg-Fazlic, Sharp, and Weisdorf (2011) also find a positive relationship between 
social class and fertility in the family reconstitution dataset of England. However, after 
including the rates of childlessness and celibacy, de la Croix, Schneider, and Weisdorf (2019) 
find that the same dataset suggests a somewhat different story –it was the middle class, rather 
than the rich, that had the highest reproduction rate. In addition to the evidence from England, 
a study by Bandyopadhyay and Green (2013) also shows a positive link between income and 
reproduction in colonial India. 
The positive correlation between living standards and fertility has also changed over history 
(Skirbekk 2008; Cummins 2009). After extending the English probate data to cover a more 
extended period starting in the sixteenth century, Clark and Cummins (2015b) reveal that the 
higher net fertility of the rich did not remain stable over the entire pre-transitional period: a 
rapid decline in net fertility occurred first in the middle and upper classes as early as 1780, 
after which the lower class gradually caught up with the fertility level of the rich. 
While classical research has worked on macro-population trends in the Chinese context for 
the same period (Ho 1959; Perkins 1969), research has also examined the effects of socio-
economic factors on population growth. Harrell (1985) first examines the rate of population 
growth across generations at the household level by using genealogical data and observe much 
higher rates in wealthy segments than in poor ones within the same lineage. Telford (1995), 
similarly, uses genealogical records to test the relationship between fertility and population 
growth and find that the husband’s status was a key variable in accounting for the population 
growth in 1520-1661. Similarly, Song, Campbell, and Lee (2015) analyse the farming 
population in Liaoning and the imperial lineage in 1725-1875 and find that patrilineages with 
high-status founders survived longer than those with low-status founders.  
In terms of research on individual fertility outcome, Shiue (2017) explores genealogies in 
Anhui Province to test the child quantity-quality trade-off in Qing China and notes a negative 
relationship between sons’ education and fathers’ fertility before the nineteenth century. Chen, 
Lee, and Campbell (2010) study the official and unofficial immigrants to Shuangcheng County 
in Northeast China from 1866 to 1907 and reveal a positive relationship between household 
landholdings and female marital fertility, but an uncertain relationship between a husband’s 
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occupation and a wife’s likelihood of having a registered son. Che and Cao (2011) conclude 
the same from using the genealogical records and land contracts of the Que lineage in Zhejiang 
Province after 1700 to test the effects of landholdings on fertility.  
To join the discussion on the transition from Malthusian stagnation to modern economic 
growth from the demographic perspective, this chapter examines the status differences in 
China’s fertility pattern. This chapter uses a range of quantitative tools to explore the 
relationship between status and fertility in a new dataset comprising of Chinese genealogies, 
which contains 36,456 males from six lineages between 1350 and 1920. Seven levels of social 
rank are used to measure social status, and the number of sons who survived infancy is used as 
a measure of net fertility.  
The results demonstrate a positive association between social status and net fertility: 
climbing up the social ladder would increase the number of sons that a male produced. The 
unconditional status-fertility relationship shows that an elite of the highest rank in the sample 
(rank 7) could be expected to have three times as many sons as a commoner (rank 1). The 
positive feedback is still significant after conditioning on other individual-level and family-
level factors that could affect male reproduction, including human capital, birth order, out-
migration, birth cohort, and lineage fixed effects.  
Controlling further for the number of marriages an adult male had, however, reduces all the 
fertility gradients. Males in ranks 2 and 4 retain their advantages in reproduction, but promotion 
from rank 1 to ranks 2 or 4 could bring about only a modest increase in net fertility; moreover, 
the net fertility of males in ranks 5-7 is no different from that of commoners. While restricting 
the sample to married males only, the coefficients on all ranks higher than 1 regain statistical 
significance, but the number of marriages still remains to be a crucial factor. The weakened 
effect of social status suggests that social status considerably increased a man’s marriage 
chances and the number of his wives, and thus impacted on the number of sons.  
I then move to analyse the key mechanism, the number of marriages. High social status 
males, in general, had more marriages over their lifetime than commoners had. A rank 2 man 
had 30 per cent more marriages than a commoner, and a rank 7 man had 70 per cent more.  
I also examine the effects of kin networks on an individual’s fertility and marriage outcomes.  
After conditioning on the social outcomes for fathers and brothers/cousins, the individual’s 
own social rank and number of marriages are still the key determinants of his fertility outcome. 
Moreover, the kin group effects on marriages were different in lineages with a low proportion 
of gentry-scholars and ones with a high proportion of gentry-scholars. With institutional access 
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to lineage joint properties in wealthy lineages, the social ranks of fathers, brothers, and cousins 
played a less significant role than they did in common lineages. 
This chapter contributes to the previous literature by rigorously testing an old but 
fundamental question: whether higher living standards could result in increased net 
reproduction in a Malthusian economy. It showcases a new individual-level dataset and 
provides solid evidence on the social gradients in fertility in China from 1350 to 1920. Chen et 
al. (2010) and Song et al. (2015) both touch upon similar research questions, but the periods 
that they cover are mid-Qing and late-Qing, and their sample populations are different from 
the common population residing in China Proper. Shiue (2016, 2017) uses genealogical records 
to demonstrate the historical fertility in China too, but what she shows is an intergenerational 
relationship between parental fertility and child outcome, rather than status-fertility 
relationships within the same generation. 
Besides, my research compares the fertility patterns in the common lineages with those in 
the elite lineages and points out the different effects that kin networks exerted on individual 
fertility outcomes in both common and elite lineages. Given the common extended family 
structure in imperial China, previous studies have already emphasized that family background 
and kin networks played an important role in individual demographic and social outcomes (see 
for example, Wolf and Huang 1980; Lee and Campbell 1997; Campbell and Lee 2003, 2008; 
Shiue 2019; Jiang and Kung 2020). The present research takes the further step of comparing 
its role in lineages of different type.  
The rest of this chapter is structured as follows. Section 3.2 introduces the historical context 
of social stratification in imperial China. Section 3.3 and 3.4 outline the genealogical data and 
the methodology. Section 3.5 presents the status-fertility relationship, and section 3.6 reports 
the robustness of the results. Section 3.7 concludes.  
 
3.2 Background 
3.2.1 Social classification and keju in Ming-Qing China 
The traditional way of describing the social hierarchy of imperial China is to refer to the 
occupation structure of the time. Confucian social theory divided the male population into two 
main classes: the elite class, which was mainly composed of gentry-scholars, and the 
commoner class, which contained peasants, artisans, and merchants (Brook 1990, p.28). A 
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Chinese man in the Ming and Qing dynasties would be lucky if he was blue-blooded, but even 
if he was not, he still had a chance of joining the nobility by passing the keju exams.  
Keju (Chinese imperial examination system) was one of the most long-standing national 
civil service examination systems in the world. The system was initiated around 600 A.D. and 
abolished in 1905. During the Ming-Qing period, the format of the exam changed for several 
times, but at its centre was always writing essays based on the quotations from the Confucian 
classics.38  
The system contained three main levels of exams and three corresponding academic degrees. 
A pass at the lowest – county or prefectural – level would earn one the degree of shengyuan. 
After qualifying with another exam, a shengyuan could then take the provincial-level exam, 
and if successful would become a juren. The juren from all over the country would be eligible 
to travel to the capital city for the national-level exam, in which the outstanding performers 
would be awarded the jinshi degree39 As Ho (1962, pp. 26-27) puts it, becoming a jinshi 
“automatically placed a person in the middle stratum of the officialdom”, and earning the 
intermediate juren degree “entitled a person to an eventual minor official appointment”.  
Only a small fraction of the many shengyuan could pass at the provincial level and the final 
national level of the exam.40 A shengyuan degree could not substantially change a commoner’s 
life, but the two higher degrees could. Being a juren or a jinshi brought the degree holder not 
only a position in the government, but many other kinds of benefits and advantages.41 Hence, 
the massive improvement in social status and living standards, together with the inheritable 
nature of academic degrees and official positions, for centuries created a strong motive for 
Chinese males to climb the social ladder by attending keju.42 
Keju changed the gentry-scholar class from “men of good birth to men of culture” (Elman 
2000, p.14) and transformed China into a meritocracy to a certain degree.43 Theoretically 
 
38 See Elman and Woodside (1994, pp.114-121) for the changing format of the exam during the Ming and Qing 
dynasties.  
39 See Miyazaki (1981) for a more detailed introduction to the keju.  
40 Chen, Kung, and Ma (2020) calculate the passing rates of the exams and find that “at each exam about 1,241 
juren would be selected out of 20,600 shengyuan, and about 220 jinshi would be selected out of 1,250 juren”. 
41 A famous story about Fan Jin, a man who lived during the Ming dynasty, clearly presents the great changes in 
economic and social status that a juren degree could bring to the poor. After receiving the juren degree, Fan was 
immediately offered large houses and lands by local officials and merchants who wished to gain his protection 
(Ho 1962, pp.42-43). 
42 Although the sons and the grandsons of gentry scholars were more likely to earn the degree of juren or jinshi, 
the fact that nearly half the juren and jinshi holders were from commoner families, which suggests the popularity 
of taking keju exams among commoners (Ho 1962, pp. 114-116). Among the holders of the shengyuan degree, 
we can find a higher proportion of candidates from commoner families. 
43 This meritocracy was unique, since merit was mainly defined as mastery of the Confucian classics, rather than 
of administrative and management skills (Mokyr 2016, p. 303). 
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speaking, a commoner from an ordinary family would have as fair a chance of sitting for the 
exam and entering the state bureaucracy as the son of a gentry-scholar family. Ho (1962, pp. 
114-116) finds that in the Ming dynasty, about 47.5 per cent of jinshi (the highest keju degree) 
were from commoner families which in the past three generations had no degree holders, and 
2.5 per cent of them were from families which had only shengyuan but no higher degree holders. 
These two percentages changed in the Qing dynasty to 19.1 per cent and 18.1 per cent, 
respectively. In general, Ho’s estimates imply high social mobility in the last two imperial 
dynasties. However, recent studies on social mobility in China also suggest the important role 
that family background played in determining social outcomes (Campbell and Lee 2003; Shiue 
2019; Jiang and Kung 2020). Given the time and financial resources needed for males to take 
the exams, those who were from scholar-officials’ families would be more likely than others 
to be in the running.  
 
3.2.2 Incentives to reproduction in Ming-Qing China 
Mencius, the greatest Confucian philosopher second only to Confucius himself, believed that, 
“There are three things which are unfilial, and to have no posterity is the greatest of them.”44 
His belief has deeply influenced the Chinese for two millennia, and in traditional China 
ensuring male heirs undoubtedly becomes the priority of the Chinese males. This strong 
incentive to beget sons has also been documented extensively in the literature.  
Tawney (1932, p. 104) in his book on Chinese land and labour, also wrote that “sentiment, 
hallowed by immemorial tradition, [made] it a duty to have sons.” As Waltner (1990, p.2) 
describes, in traditional China, “[r]eproduction was not seen as a matter of simple biology. 
Offspring were granted as a reward and withheld as punishment, not only in response to the 
acts of the individual concerned, but in response to the acts of his ancestors as well.” Mallory 
(1926, pp.88-92) also comments that the pursuit of sons was an intrinsic element of “Chinese 
habit and doctrine”, and also argues that ancestor worship was one of the strongest ways to 
explain the vigour of the pursuit. Wolf and Huang (1980) observe that even a poor farmer in 
rural Taiwan in the late nineteenth century “had to consider his duty to his forebears…and had 
to produce at least two sons.”  
 
44 The original Chinese text of this sentence is, “不孝有三，无后为大”. The English translation is quoted from 
the Chinese Text Project. URL: https://ctext.org/text.pl?node=1696&if=en. 
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From the lineage perspective, providing sons is not only important ritualistically, but also a 
pragmatic obligation because it relates to the survival of the lineage. Traditional Chinese 
society is a typical patrilineal society where lineages were traced only through male family 
members; thus, a lack of sons in one generation would be viewed as an extinction of the entire 
bloodline (Almond, Edlund, and Milligan 2013). Since for every lineage, “the continuity and 
growth of the patriline was the overriding focus of family strategies” (Song et al. 2015), every 
male family member in the lineage, whether rich or poor, high-social-status or low-social-status, 
was equal in terms of fulfilling his family duty by providing sons for the lineage.  
 
3.3 Data 
3.3.1 The sample: genealogical books of six Chinese lineages 
In Shiue’s three most recent works (2016, 2017, 2019), she exploits the genealogical data of 
several lineages in Tongcheng County, Anhui Province, Southeast China. In this chapter, I also 
focus on Southeast China, but on two neighbouring provinces of Anhui, Zhejiang and Jiangsu.  
I transcribe and construct a sample containing detailed individual information about six 
lineages from 1350 to 1920.45 A total of 41,407 male mini-biographies appeared in these 96 
volumes of genealogical books. Records of all six lineages start before 1400. Since this chapter 
is concerned with the Ming and Qing dynasties, I exclude from the sample males born before 
1350 and after 1920. Besides, as the time of the last compiling of the Huang, Gu, and Zhuang 
genealogies took place before 1900, I also eliminate males from the last few generations in the 
three lineages whose fertility records are incomplete. My criterion is also whether or not the 
compilers recorded a mini-biography as an incomplete one. If the compilers were unable to 
record accurate details, especially information on the number of sons, they would mark a mini-
biographies with the phrase “failed to trace the information” (shixiu, 失修 or shikao, 失考). 
After this process of elimination, the sample contains information on 36,456 males in total.  
Of the 36,456 males, 23,098 had explicit birth date records. With these records, I can impute 
an approximate birth cohort for the relatives of these males who had no birth year recorded. 
Finally, I manage to classify 31,197 males into twelve birth cohorts, starting with a “pre-1400” 
cohort, ending with a “post-1900” cohort, and with ten 50-year-long cohorts in between.   
 
45 See Section 1.4 in Chapter 1 for a detailed introduction to the six lineages and the region.  
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3.3.2 Status records in the genealogical books 
Social status in imperial China was primarily determined not by the usual determinants of a 
man’s status in European societies, such as inherited wealth and landed estates, but by 
academic degrees earned through keju exams (Ho 1962, p.40).  
Detailed keju results in the genealogy of every lineage make comparisons between lineages 
possible.46 Table 3.1 lists a detailed classification of the social levels cited in this chapter. 
Based on the hierarchy of keju and also the bureaucratic system, the classification includes 
three broad classes and seven social ranks. Both the non-gentry and the near-gentry classes 
include males without an academic degree, but the near-gentry males, at least, had other non-
keju status indicators. The gentry group includes all the degree holders and males who managed 
to attain official positions. Ranks 3 and 4 represent all the lower degree holders who failed to 
obtain office after earning the degree. They are the lower-class in the gentry group. A male 
from rank 5 could be a lowest-ranking employee in the bureaucratic system, a prospective 
official who was in the waiting list for an official position, or a middle-class gentry-scholar 
who failed to obtain office. Ranks 6 and 7 denote the upper-class gentry-scholars. In the present 




46 One of the concerns regarding the status records in the genealogies is that the compilers might incline to 
exaggerate the status records of their family members. Thanks to the generous help from the Lee-Campbell 
research group (Ren et al. 2016; Campbell et al. 2019), I manage to match thirty-one officials from the Zha 
genealogies to Jin Shen Lu (the Qing China Government Employee Records,缙绅录). I find their records of 
official positions in the two types of sources are the same, proving that the status records in the genealogies are 
reliable. I also thank the institutions, including HKUST, that provided them with the funding, HK RGC GRF 
16601718: Family Background Influences on the Appointment and Career Mobility of Qing Officials with 
Examination Degrees. PI. 2018-2021, which made the database could be accessible to the public. 
47 Esherick and Rankin (1990, p.2) point out that the Chinese gentry class embodied the Confucian culture. The 
word “Confucian” in this chapter refers to the literate men who were deeply influenced by Confucian ideology 
and who acquired either rudimentary or comprehensive knowledge of the Confucian classics. In traditional China, 
the first book that every child would ever read is the Three Character Classic (三字经), and it is a book which 
expresses and teaches Confucian morals and ethics. “Confucian” here bears no religious meaning. After all, 
Confucianism has never been a “religion” in the Chinese context.  
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Table 3.1 Classification of social ranks 
Rank Description Count Per cent 
Non-gentry   
1 No status 
34,555 94.79% 
1 Honoured by later generations with poems or discourses  
Near-gentry   
2 Literate and educated but without a degree (teacher in the 
village school or editor of genealogical books) 
233 0.64% 2 Lineage chief; donor to the lineage and the county 
2 Given an award by the emperor for having Confucian 
virtues  
Gentry    
3 Lower degree holder (Normal shengyuan) 387 1.06% 
4 Students at the Imperial Academy (taixuesheng, 
guoxuesheng); civil shengyuan (lingsheng, zengsheng, 
jiansheng) 
623 1.71% 
5 Clerks (wei’ruliu); prospective officials (houbu) 
245 0.67% 5 Intermediate degree holders (juren, gongsheng), without 
official position  
6 Low-ranking civil official (bureaucratic strata 8 and 9), 
with lower degree 
333 0.91% 6 Intermediate degree holder, with an official position; 
medium-ranking local official (bureaucratic strata 4 to 7); 
low-ranking court official 
7 Higher degree holder (jinshi); high-ranking local official 
(bureaucratic strata 1 to 3); medium-ranking court official  
80 0.22% 
7 High-ranking court official; jinshi with an official position  
7 Top-level post in the state bureaucracy  
Sources: Ho 1962, Chapter 1; Telford 1995, p.92, Appendix 3A; Shiue 2017, p. 364, Table 1. 
Notes: There were nine main ranks in the bureaucracy of Ming and Qing China, the lowest being the ninth and 
the highest the first. Ho (1962, pp.24-46) divides the nine ranks into three strata. The highest stratum included 
officials of the first, second, and third ranks; the middle stratum consisted of all the officials from the fourth rank 
to the seventh rank; and the lowest stratum were officials of the eighth and ninth ranks. 
 
3.4 Methodology 
Here I describe the empirical methods. Given that the outcome of interest is an over-dispersed 
count variable (mean = 1.13, variance = 1.85), I mainly used the negative binomial regression 
based on: 
 
𝑆𝑖 = 𝛼 + 𝜌𝑅𝑎𝑛𝑘𝑖 + 𝛾𝑀𝑎𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑖 + 𝑊𝑖𝛽 + 𝑖 ,         (1) 
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where S is the recorded number of sons that a male produced, i denotes male individuals who 
survived to adulthood, α is the constant, and Rank is a set of categorical variables ranging from 
1 to 7 that measure the males’ social ranks as expressed in Table 3.1. Marriage is the total 
number of marriages the male had, including both marriages in sequence (wives non-
concurrently) and concurrent marriages (wives and concubines at the same time). W denotes 
the independent variables that would be successively controlled for, including the male’s 
human capital, whether he was the first son or the only son in his family, whether he migrated 
out of his village, whether he reached adulthood, the number of brothers he had, the social 
ranks of his father and brother/cousin, his birth cohort, and the lineage that he belonged to. 𝛽 
represents the set of respective coefficients for these variables.  is the error term. 
Table 3.A1 in Appendix 3.A presents the summary statistics of the variables. Figure 3.1 
shows the distribution of observations of each social rank in the six lineages and the distribution 
of observations of each social rank over time.  
 
Figure 3.1 Rank distribution by lineage and century 









































3.4.1 Description of variables 
Number of sons. This is the dependent variable in the model. To measure net reproduction, I 
used the recorded number of sons per male, which equals the number of sons who survived 
infancy.  
The two main reasons for this choice are as follows. On the one hand, all daughters, and 
sons who died in infancy are under-recorded in genealogical books. On the other, Clark and 
Cummins (2015b) employ this kind of male-relative fertility measure to examine fertility in 
England by using probate records. Though it differs from the conventional female-relative 
fertility measures, as they acknowledge, “there is no conceptual reason not to treat this measure 
of fertility as a valid measure of long-run fertility changes” (Clark and Cummins 2015b).  
Social ranks. Social status is the key variable in the model. The classification of social ranks 
is presented in Table 3.1.  
Number of marriages. The marriage system in imperial China was a system between 
monogamy and polygamy where men were officially allowed to have only one wife at a time 
but multiple concubines at the same time. Whilst concubines were inferior to wives in status, 
their children were considered legitimate and therefore were recorded in the genealogies. Still, 
the data suggests that having concubines was more of an upper-class privilege than universal 
practice. In my lineage sample, 3,049 males (8.36%) married more than once, and only 509 of 
them had concubines (where the wives of the remaining 2,540 men were the result of 
consecutive marriages).48  
The number of marriages is treated as a continuous predictor because the main incentive 
for Chinese men to marry again was to produce more sons. Hence, every one-unit change in 
the number of marriages should bring the same amount of change in the number of sons. 
However, as a robustness check, I also show the results of treating the number of marriages as 
an ordinal variable in Section 3.6.4. 
Zi and Hao. I use the two dummies to measure human capital, which cannot be fully 
captured by the keju-related social ranks. Zi (courtesy name, 字) and hao (pen name, 号) are 
two types of particular name that show respect and a higher level of literacy; they were used 
widely among literate people in traditional China. Males were given zi by their fathers or their 
teachers when they turned twenty sui, which is approximately equivalent to nineteen years old. 
 
48 This proportion of remarriage is comparable to the findings from previous genealogical studies. Liu (1995, p. 
105) reports the proportion of remarried men in her sample which ranged from 8.4% to 26.1%. In Telford (1992, 
p.27, Table 2), 580 (6.99%) of the sample had more than one wife.  
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Hao was the pen name that a highly educated male would give himself and always use when 
he was writing in either prose or poetry.  
Father effects and brother/cousin effects. I condition on the social ranks of the male’s kin 
group to identify the effects of his attained social rank on fertility. I test three types of kin 
relationship, namely, father, brother, and first cousin-brother. In terms of the father effects, I 
include in the model the number of brothers that a male had and his father’s social rank. 
Regarding the brother/cousin effects, I control for the highest social rank achieved among his 
brothers’ and cousins’ social ranks. In addition, I include a dummy Brother Dummy to indicate 
whether the highest social status was achieved by his brother or his cousin in order to 
distinguish the brother effects from the cousin effects.49 
First-born. Following traditional Chinese practice, a first-born son is usually expected to 
take greater responsibility than his younger brothers in family events and maintaining the 
patriline. I use the dummy to indicate whether the male was the first-born (or the only) son in 
his family of origin.50  
Out-migration. Out-migration is a dummy used to control for a possible omission of 
information because the individual concerned was away from home. It equals one if the 
individual was out of the village and never came back, or if he was removed from the lineage 
due to disobedience to family rules. In these cases, genealogy compilers were unable to acquire 
updated information, which caused an inevitable gap between the actual number of sons and 
the recorded number of sons. 
Survival to adulthood. Lifespan affects fertility. Since less than one-third of the males in 
the genealogies had a complete set of vital statistics, the lifespan of most of the sample cannot 
be conjectured. However, males who failed to survive to adulthood (nineteen-year old) are 
specially marked in their mini-biographies; 3,218 males were thus marked. I condition on 
Survival to adulthood by either excluding these males or including the variable in the model to 
control for the strong negative impact of a short lifespan on fertility.  
Birth cohort. I control for the time fixed effects on net reproduction and social ranks by 
including a set of birth cohorts in the model. I group the males into twelve half-century-long 
birth cohorts as discussed in Section 3.3.1.  
 
49 I consider only the male’s first male cousins, the male cousins who had the same grandfather as the male of 
interest.  
50 Such “demographic privilege” enjoyed by the first-born has been demonstrated before in China (Lee and 
Campbell 1997; Li and Zhen 2015). 
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Lineage. Because of the varying amounts of resources that common lineages and elite 
lineages could access, along with some other family-related biological and cultural 
characteristics, lineage fixed effects are also included.  
 
3.4.2 Selection biases 
The foremost concern in using genealogical records is with the quality of the data. The 
continuing editing and compiling of genealogies ensure their reliability. Every lineage 
formulates clear rules for compiling genealogies; one common rule is that family members 
should compile the genealogy every sixty years (or every three to five generations). The 
interval between two large-scale compilations of the six lineages is on average shorter than 
sixty years. During the interval, family members would record all the changes in the lineage in 
handwritten caopu (draft books, 草谱). Yet, as Harrell (1995, p.5) reminds us, “…genealogies 
are compiled for ritual rather than demographic reasons”; hence, the voluntary selection in 
genealogies could bias the test towards finding spurious fertility gradients.  
One inevitable bias is the omission of daughters and children who died in infancy.51 Many 
genealogical studies show that the inclusion of individuals in the genealogies was mainly on 
ritualistic considerations (Harrell 1995; Shiue 2016). In traditional Chinese culture, all men 
were ritualistically significant, and so were their wives, in that they produced the descendants 
for the family. Daughters were not significant because once they married they were no longer 
members of their original family. Children who died in infancy were also insignificant as 
regards the continuation of the family line. The incomplete records of gross fertility limit this 
chapter, then, to examining the male descendants who survived infancy, and I use this sons-
only net fertility to measure net reproduction. In order to record the patrilineal history, the 
essential information for inclusion in the genealogical books is the number of sons who 
survived infancy that each male family member produced, and this would not be affected by 
the male’s social status. Similarly, the number of marriages is also a ritualistically important 
type of information, and thus would not be omitted in any case.52  
 
51 Only 9,636 daughters were recorded in the sample, compared with 41,145 sons. 
52 In the preface of the Zha genealogies, it states that if a female is betrothed to a male family member, either 
married or not married, and either divorced or remarried, she should be recorded in the male’s entry (“配氏未婚
书，聘再娶书，继明正嫡也，或所娶非吾族匹书，娶氏没其姓不正其为配也续非以礼聘书，娶某氏不予
其为继也，夫亡弃子他适者书…妾书…”).   
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Although every male, whatever his wealth and status, was qualified in the rituals of ancestor 
worship, the records may still have been biased towards high-status males, causing the 
omission of records of low-status males. On the one hand, the representation of different social 
ranks in the sample suggests that the compilers did not exclude low-status males from the 
genealogies. According to Chang’s estimates (1955, p. 114), before 1850, the percentages of 
gentry-scholars in total population were about 1.3% in Jiangsu Province and 1.4% in Zhejiang 
Province; after 1850, the percentages increased to 2.5% and 5.0%, respectively. About 95% of 
the male population in the sample were commoners, and less than 2% of the males held office 
during their lifetime. I also compared the proportion of degree holders and civil officials in my 
sample with the proportion in the Tongcheng sample studied in Shiue (2017, Table 1). 
Applying the status classification used in this chapter to the Tongcheng sample, 90.53% of the 
8,892 males were of rank 1, 1.75% of them were of rank 2, and 7.72% of them were of ranks 
3-7. This distribution of different ranks is comparable with the distribution of my lineage 
sample (see Table 3.1). 
On the other hand, systematic under-reporting of the birth and death years of the low-status 
males is evident. High-social status and more fecund males are more likely to be recorded with 
their birth and death years than the low-status and heirless males (Table 3.A2).53 Therefore, the 
exclusion of males without complete life statistics would strongly bias the results. To overcome 
this bias, I either include the variable “survival to adulthood” or exclude the males who failed 
to reach adulthood to control for the effects that a short lifespan had on net fertility. 
Nevertheless, as a robustness check I also run the model with the control of the accurate 
lifespan (see Section 3.6.2).  
 
3.4.3 A reverse causality problem 
If having more sons can increase a father’s social status, there is a risk of reverse causality. 
Although sons were forbidden to inherit keju-related status from fathers, one practice in 
imperial China was for the Emperor to reward the father of a high-ranking official with an 
official position or an honorary title to acknowledge the official’s outstanding performance.  
 
53 To test the selection for recording complete vital statistics in genealogical books, I run a Logistic regression in 
this form: 
𝐷𝑖 =  𝛼 + 𝜌𝑅𝑎𝑛𝑘𝑖+𝛾𝑆𝑜𝑛𝑖 + 𝑊𝑖𝛽 + 𝑖 ,             (4) 
 
where D is a dummy variable that indicates whether the male had: 1) a record of his birth date; 2) a complete 
record or his birth and death dates. The other notations are as in Equation (1). The results of the Logistic regression 
are presented in Table 3.A2. 
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In the sample, twenty-five males were rewarded with titles of honour because of their sons 
or grandsons. Eighteen of them received this reward posthumously, and the social ranks and 
fertility that they attained were unaffected by it. The remaining seven males were rewarded 
with these honorary positions while they were still alive, but because the genealogies did not 




3.5.1 Baseline results 
I first report the descriptive evidence on the relationship between social status and fertility. As 
shown in Figures 3.2 and 3.3, 44.11% of all the males (39.13% of the males who reached 
adulthood) failed to produce any son, and most of these heirless men were from the rank 1 
group.54 The average number of sons for men of rank 1, men of ranks 2-6 and men of rank 7 
are about one, two, and three, respectively. 
 
 
Figure 3.2 Distribution of the recorded number of sons, all males 
Source: The lineage sample. 
 
 
54 Many of these men could have had un-recorded daughters, so the proportion of childless men would have been 

















Figure 3.3 Proportion of the heirless by rank 
Note: The value in each bar shows the mean number of sons by rank.  




Figure 3.4 Proportion of the unmarried by rank 
Note: The value in each bar shows the mean number of marriages by rank.  
Source: The lineage sample. 
 
 
As Figure 3.4 shows, the high proportion of men without heirs is primarily due to 
bachelorhood. 29.98% of the males in the sample remained single all their lives, and 23.78% 





















Status With at least one heir Without an heir
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holders.55 For males of the near-gentry and gentry classes, the average number of marriages is 
greater than one, and all the rank 7 males succeeded in marrying at least once.56  Of the 25,125 
married males, 5,261 (20.61%) produced no sons.57  
To rigorously show the social gradients in fertility, I report the results of Equation (1) in 
Table 3.2 under the OLS regression (columns 1 to 3) and the negative binomial regression 
(columns 4 to 6). Figure 3.5 plots the unconditional rank effects by showing the predicted 
number of sons by social rank calculated by the negative binomial results of the males who 
survived to adulthood and the married males in columns 5 and 6.  
The results of the two models are closely comparable. All the “rank” coefficients are 
statistically and quantitatively significant, and the rank effects are mainly linear, as also 
displayed in Figure 3.5, with only relatively lower rank 5 coefficients. Moreover, given that 
only 1 per cent of the ranks 2-7 males failed to survive to adulthood and 98.1 per cent of them 
were married, the predicted results for them shown in the two plots in Figure 3.5 are basically 
the same.  
In general, higher social ranks did translate into more recorded sons. The OLS coefficients 
in columns 2 and 3 suggest that the predicted number of sons of a rank 1 male who survived to 
adulthood was 1.18, and that of a married rank 1 man was 1.56. Men of ranks 2-6 could be 
expected to have about two sons. Rank 7 had the largest positive effect, and a rank 7 male was 
expected to have about three sons. 
The reason for the lower rank 5 coefficients in all models lies in the fact that all the rank 5 
males were in a difficult situation. Of the 245 males in rank 5, 139 of them were prospective 
officials, who were waiting for vacancies in the positions for which they were hired; 92 of them 
were the lowest-ranking employees in the bureaucratic system; the last 14 of them were median 
degree holders who failed to get an official position. Although the social status of rank 5 males 
was higher than that of males in ranks 3 and 4, they were tied to the bureaucratic system and 
had no any additional monetary benefits for their status. In contrast, for the males of ranks 3 
 
55 This proportion of the unmarried is also comparable with those reported in other genealogical research. Telford 
(1995, pp.76-77, Table 3.5) notes the proportions of the unmarried in 41 lineages in Tongcheng in 1520-1661, 
which ranged from 8.09% to 38.06%, with an average of 22.10%. 
56 Chinese genealogical books record only legitimate births, but illegitimate births (out-of-wedlock births) were 
rare in China. Lee and Wang (1999a, p. 88, p.161, and p. 188) mention that in the historical population of China 
the share of illegitimate births was nearly zero. Bastardy existed, as shown in Sommer (2015), but only among 
extremely poor people. 
57 The percentage of married males without heirs shown in Telford (1995, pp.76-77, Tables 3.2 and 3.5) and in 
Liu (1995, pp.102-105, Table 4.3) are both around 20%.  
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and 4, having received a low-level degree, often chose not to waste more time on the highly 
competitive keju exams and made a career shift out of government service. 58 
 
Table 3.2 Unconditional Status-Fertility Relationship 
 Dependent Variable:  
 Number of Sons 
 (1) (2) (3)  (4) (5) (6) 
 OLS  Negative Binomial 
 All males Adults Married  All males Adults Married 









































































































N 36,456 33,238 25,526  36,456 33,238 25,526 
R2/Pseudo R2 0.035 0.032 0.019  0.008 0.008 0.005 
Notes: 1. Rank 1 is the reference group. 2. Robust standard errors are in parentheses 3. Coefficients in columns 4 
to 6 are incidence rate ratios (IRR) for the negative binomial model. The original coefficients are shown in square 
brackets. 4. *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01. 
  
 
58 Brook (1990, p.31) mentions several examples of lower degree holders, such as gongsheng and shengyuan, who 




Figure 3.5 Unconditional status-fertility relationship, males who survived to adulthood and 
married males 
Notes: 1. Values are the average adjusted predictions, the expected number of sons at each level of rank calculated 




3.5.2 Status-fertility relationships conditioned on socioeconomic factors 
To further examine the status-fertility relationship, I include in the analysis the set of 
socioeconomic covariates that could also affect net reproduction. In this section and also in the 
following analyses on fertility, I exclude all the males who died before adulthood and focus 
only on the males who survived to adulthood.  
    Table 3.3 details the status-fertility relationships conditioned on the set of control variables. 
As columns 1 and 4 show, if conditioned on birth cohort and lineage fixed effects, whether a 
male was first-born, and whether he out-migrated, the relationships are all similar to the 
unconditional relationship shown in Table 3.2.  
Controlling for human capital and marriages noticeably reduces the effects of Rank. When 
controlling for zi and hao in columns 3 and 6, all the rank gradients decline, but they remain 
statistically significant, and the scale of the decline is modest. A rank 7 male could still have 
been expected to have about twice as many sons as a rank 1 male had.  
Comparing the results in column 6 and column 7 clearly illustrates that the number of 
marriages is the key mechanism through which social status could increase the number of sons. 
The two plots in Figure 3.6 provide a stark contrast between the two sets of rank effects. Before 
including the number of marriages (column 6), the rank coefficients are all significant and large. 
Adults Married

























Ranks higher than 1 were expected to increase the number of one’s sons by about 35 per cent 
to 87 per cent.59 After including the number of marriages, only ranks 2 and 4 still hold statistical 
significance and positive effects on the number of sons, yet these ranks would have increased 
the expected number of sons by only about 18 per cent and 12 per cent, respectively (column 
7). The overly wide confidence intervals of the coefficients on ranks 5-7 prevent me from 
identifying any appreciable effects of rank. The dramatic decline of the effects of Rank shows 
that the men in ranks 5-7 also had more surviving sons than the non-gentry men had, but they 
did so primarily by having more marriages.60  
In column 8, I restrict the sample to married men who reached adulthood. Compared to the 
results in column 7, the number of marriages is still a strong factor in increasing net fertility, 
but social status also contributes a great deal. Men of a social rank higher than 1 were more 
likely to have more sons than rank 1 men did (about 20 per cent more for ranks 2 and 4, about 
10 per cent more for ranks 3 and 5, 27 per cent more for rank 6, and 54 per cent more for rank 
7).  
This pattern is unclear in column 7 because the substantial difference in the likelihood of 
getting married between rank 1 men and ranks 2-7 men makes Marriages a much stronger 
variable than Rank. When focusing on married men only, it is clear that, with higher socio-
economic status, the men from ranks 2 to 7 could leave more surviving sons per marriage than 
the rank 1 men, a pattern also suggested by Clark and Hamilton (2006) for the pre-modern 
English society. Moreover, the coefficient on Marriages decreases in size in column 8, but still 
remains a strong factor that determines the number of sons. 
 
 
59 If the findings are driven by the fact that the number of commoners’ sons was under-recorded, the positive 
feedback between social status and number of sons would not change after controlling for marriages, since the 
number of sons per wife among commoners should still be lower than in their high-status counterparts. The similar 
net fertility at each level of rank shown in the left plot of Figure 3.6 confirms that the findings are robust to this 
potential bias.   
60 According to Arthi and Fenske (2018), polygamy in Nigeria increased child mortality. I use my sample to test 
the relationship between the number of father’s marriages and the son’s chance of dying before adulthood, and 
find no positive relationship.  
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Figure 3.6 Rank effects before and after controlling for the number of marriages. 
Notes: 1. Values are the average adjusted predictions, predicted number of sons of males who survived to 
adulthood at each level of rank, of the models shown in column 6 and column 7 of Table 3.3. 2. Error bars indicate 
95% confidence intervals.  
Controlling for marriages Without controlling for marriages
























Table 3.3 Estimating the recorded number of sons of males who survived to adulthood, negative binomial regression 
 Dependent Variable: Number of sons 
 (1) (2)  (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
        Married males 
































































































Marriages  2.291*** 
(0.035) 






Zi   1.429*** 
(0.022) 






Hao   1.350*** 
(0.031) 


























Controls         
Birth cohort FE Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 

















N 28,181 28,181 28,181 28,181 28,181 28,181 28,181 21,235 
Pseudo R2 0.035 0.102 0.044 0.036 0.102 0.045 0.106 0.043 
Notes: 1. Rank 1 is the reference group. 2. Only males who survived to adulthood are included. 3. The coefficients in the table are IRR. 4. Robust standard errors are in 
parentheses. 5. *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01.
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3.5.3 Effects of kin network on individual fertility outcome 
I then account for the effects of extended families and kin networks on an individual’s fertility 
outcome by controlling for fathers’ effects, brothers’ effects and cousins’ effects. Table 3.4 
reports the results, and standard errors are clustered by household (defined by father). 
As shown in columns 1 to 2, before controlling for the individual’s own socio-economic 
characteristics, having a father or a brother who had a social rank higher than 1 would 
significantly increase the male’s fertility outcome. In column 3, I include the cousins’ effects. 
The coefficients are much the same as those in column 2, and although the Brother Dummy is 
not statistically significant, it is very close to 1. These findings imply that having either a 
brother or a cousin of high social rank had similar positive effects on the number of sons that 
a male could have.  
In columns 4 to 6, I control for the fathers’ effects and brothers’/cousins’ effects together 
with the individual’s own characteristics. After controlling for the individual’s own 
characteristics, the coefficients on fathers’ and brothers’/cousins’ social ranks changed 
fundamentally. Unexpectedly, the results in columns 4 to 6 show that the coefficients on 
father’s ranks 5 to 7 are all smaller than 1, which suggests that if a male’s father were an office 
holder, he would be more likely to have fewer sons than a male whose father was a commoner. 
However, if his father was a lower degree holder (rank 3), he would have 10 per cent more 
sons than a male whose father was of rank 1 would have (columns 5 and 6). The coefficients 
on brothers’/cousins’ ranks also decline greatly, and only ranks 3 and 4 still retain the statistical 
significance. In general, as demonstrated by the prior literature (see, for example, Lee and 
Campbell 2003; Jiang and Kung 2020), although the social outcomes of the individual’s kin 
group were also positively correlated with the individual’s social outcome in the six lineages 




Table 3.4 Effects of kin networks on fertility, negative binomial regression 
 Dependent Variable: Number of Sons 
 (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) (5) (6) 
 



















         
    Rank 2 1.421*** 
(0.083) 






    Rank 3 1.439*** 
(0.073) 






    Rank 4 1.493*** 
(0.054) 






    Rank 5 1.258*** 
(0.083) 






    Rank 6 1.284*** 
(0.066) 






    Rank 7 1.837*** 
(0.116) 








         






































































         





































Table 3.4 Continued 
 (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) (5) (6) 
 




 Kin networks 
         Married 












Controls          
Firstborn Y  Y  Y  Y Y Y 
Out-migration Y  Y  Y  Y Y Y 
Birth cohort FE Y  Y  Y  Y Y Y 













N 28,094  21,653  24,756  24,756 24,756 18,618 
Pseudo R2 0.032  0.032  0.031  0.036 0.105 0.043 
Notes: 1. Rank 1 is the reference group. 2. Males included are all males who survived to adulthood. 3. The 
coefficients in the table are IRR. 4. Robust standard errors are in parentheses, clustered on fathers. 5. *p<0.1; 
**p<0.05; ***p<0.01. 
 
On the one hand, the coefficients on the individual’s rank, human capital, and number of 
marriages in columns 4 to 6 in Table 3.4 are all similar to those in columns 4, 7, and 8 in Table 
3.3, indicating that the previous status-fertility relationships for the adult males and the married 
males are robust to kin network effects, and the number of marriages is still the main 




61 Moreover, I test the impacts of different ranks on individual net fertility within the same household. I use 
differences in net fertility between brothers to see if the ranks they attained still had an effect on the number of 
sons, despite family background. I run the following model to test the relationship between the difference in 
attained social ranks and the difference in net fertility between brothers:  
 
𝐷𝑖𝑓_𝑆𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑝 = 𝛼 + 𝜌𝐷𝑖𝑓_𝑅𝑎𝑛𝑘𝑝 + 𝛽1FatherRank𝑝 + 𝛽2BirthCohort𝑝 + 𝛽3Lineage𝑝 + 𝑝,           (5) 
 
where Dif_Sons is the variable indicating the difference in the number of sons that two brothers had, and Dif_Rank 
equals the difference in the social ranks of the two brothers. p denotes the pair of brothers. I also control for the 
father’s social rank, the birth cohort of the brothers, and the lineage they came from. Table 3.A4 in Appendix 3.A 
reports the results. The results indicate that the difference in the net fertility of two brothers came from the 
difference in their attained social ranks, which supports the results shown here. 
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3.5.4 Number of marriages as the key mechanism through which social status impacted 
on fertility  
The results from the previous sections identify the number of marriages as a key mechanism 
through which social rank impacted on net fertility. This section substantiates this status-
marriage relationship.  
 
Table 3.5 Distribution of number of marriages by rank  
 
Rank 1 Ranks 2-7 
N % N % 
Number of total marriages,  
all males 
0 10,894 31.53 36 1.89 
1 21,237 61.46 1,240 65.23 
2 2,134 6.17 466 24.51 
>2 290 0.84 159 8.36 
Total 34,555 100.00 1,901 100.00 
Number of remarriages,  
married males only 
0 21,437 90.60 1,416 75.92 
1 2,003 8.47 368 19.73 
>1 221 0.93 81 4.34 
Total 23,661 100.00 1,865 100.00 
Number of concubines,  
married males only  
0 23,394 98.87 1,623 87.02 
1 248 1.05 197 10.56 
>1 19 0.08 45 2.42 
Total 23,661 100.00 1,865 100.00 
Notes: 1. “Remarriage” means marriage after the death of the previous wife. 2. “All males” in the table includes 
males who died before adulthood. Of the 3,218 males who failed to reach adulthood, 193 were married. 
 
The marriage patterns of different social ranks shown in Table 3.5 demonstrate an unequal 
Chinese society. Only 8.36% of males in the sample married more than once. In contrast to the 
English elites in the eighteenth century, who had high rates of celibacy and childlessness (de 
la Croix et al. 2019), the gentry class in imperial China was very likely to get married. Of the 
commoners who had more than one wife, most remarried only after their first wife died early 
or failed to produce male heirs. Many more were incapable of marrying again and died without 
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heirs.62 Higher-social-class males were less constrained, on average, to have more concubines, 
even if their first wives had already given birth to sons.  
The descriptive results suggest two strong correlations: first, between social ranks and 
marital status, and second, between social ranks and the number of marriages. Therefore, I first 
run a logistic regression in the form of Equation (2) to identify the effects of social ranks on 
the likelihood that a male could get married at least once in his lifetime. Then, as the number 
of marriages is also a count variable (mean = 0.80, variance = 0.40), I run a Poisson regression 
in the form of Equation (3):  
 
𝑀𝑎𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑒𝑑𝑖 = 𝛼 + 𝜌𝑅𝑎𝑛𝑘𝑖 + 𝑊𝑖𝛽 + 𝑖 ,           (2) 
 
𝑀𝑎𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑖 = 𝛼 + 𝜌𝑅𝑎𝑛𝑘𝑖 + 𝑊𝑖𝛽 + 𝑖 ,           (3) 
 
in which Married is a dummy that indicates whether the male was once married or not, and 
Marriage indicates the total number of marriages, and the other notations are as in Estimation 
Equation (1).  
The estimation results are shown in Table 3.6. Columns 1-3 report the logistic estimates, 
and columns 4-6 report the Poisson estimates. Columns 2 and 3, and columns 5 and 6 
demonstrate the different effects of social ranks in the two types of lineage, and the effects are 
also demonstrated in Figures 3.7 and 3.8. There are three noteworthy findings. First, a male 
would be more likely to be married and have more marriages if he achieved a social rank higher 
than 1, and his social status mattered more than all the other factors. Second, belonging to an 
elite lineage brought a higher probability of being married and more marriages to men of all 
social ranks than belonging to a common lineage did. Third, kin networks exerted a more 
powerful effect in common lineages than in elite lineages.  
In general, all the coefficients on individuals’ ranks in both models in Table 3.6 are strong 
and positive. The coefficients on ranks in column 1 confirm the implication carried in Section 
3.5.2 that achieving higher social status would substantially increase an individual’s odds of 
being married versus being single. The strong effect is especially evident for ranks 6 and 7. 
The results in column 4 suggest that rank 2 males could have an average 30 per cent more 
 
62 As Lee and Wang (1999a, p. 64) remark, “The shortage of women, exacerbated by the practice of polygyny and 
the discouragement of female remarriage, prevented a significant proportion of Chinese males in the past…from 
ever marrying.” This may largely account for the universality of adoption in pre-modern China mentioned in Lee 
and Wang (1999a, Chapter 7). Many males with no heir could not afford to marry again, so they would have 
chosen to adopt a brother’s son to continue their own family lines.  
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marriages than rank 1 males had, and rank 7 males could be expected to have nearly twice as 
many marriages as rank 1 males had. The social gradients decrease only slightly after I include 
the kin group effects.  
In the common lineages, higher social rank did not necessarily translate into a higher 
probability of getting married and a greater number of marriages. Being in the ranks 4 to 7 in 
the common lineages would carry a high probability of being married, but had a minimal effect 
on the number of marriages; males in ranks 2 married more times than males in other ranks did. 
Of the twenty-six males of ranks 6-7 in the common lineages, six married twice, and the others 
had only one marriage in all. Although the small sample size of the top-ranking males is not 
representative enough to justify a strong conclusion, the result suggests that, for the degree 
holders and office holders in the common lineages, having more marriages was not their 
primary strategy to achieve reproductive success. 
In contrast, the status-marriage relationship in the elite lineages is mainly linear. Although 
rank 3 men could enjoy a greater probability of being married than the men of ranks 4 and 5, 
averagely speaking, ranks 4 and 5 men were able to marry more times than men of rank 3 
(Figures 3.7 and 3.8). Rank 6 men could have 0.5 more marriages than rank 1 men, and rank 7 
men could have 0.7 more marriages, on average.  
Not only did the individual’s own social rank have different effects in the common and the 
elite lineages; the effects of kin group were also different. In the three common lineages, a man 
with a rank 4 father would have a significantly increased probability of marrying; having either 
a rank 2 or a rank 4 father could increase the number of marriages he could have, but only 
slightly. Having a brother or a cousin of higher rank than 1 was more beneficial: it would 
increase the individual’s odds of being married by a factor of 1.8 to 2.6, and the number of his 
marriages by about twenty per cent. In the three elite lineages, nearly all the coefficients on 
fathers’ social ranks in the two models are not significant. Moreover, having a rank 6 father 
would even decrease the probability that a man would get married. In terms of the 
brothers’/cousins’ effects, the men who had brothers or cousins of rank 4 were more likely to 
get married than men who only had brothers or cousins of rank 1. Having a brother or a cousin 
with a lower degree would increase the number of a man’s marriages by about fifteen per cent, 





Figure 3.7 Predicted probability of getting married, Estimation Equation (2), by lineage type 
Notes: 1. Values are the average adjusted predictions, the predicted probability of all males at different ranks of 
the models shown in column 2 (common lineages) and column 3 (elite lineages) of Table 3.6. 2. Shaded areas 
indicate 95% confidence intervals. 
 
 
Figure 3.8 Predicted number of marriages, Estimation Equation (3), by lineage type 
Notes: 1. Values are the average adjusted predictions, the predicted number of marriages of males who survived 
to adulthood at each level of rank of the models shown in column 5 (common lineages) and column 6 (elite 
lineages) of Table 3.6. 2. Error bars indicate 95% confidence intervals. 
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Table 3.6 Estimating the social gradients in the number of marriages (Logit and Poisson) 
 DV=Married (Logit)  DV=Marriage (Poisson) 
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Table 3.6 Continued 
 DV=Married (Logit)  DV=Marriage (Poisson) 















Controls        
Firstborn Y Y Y  Y Y Y 
Out-migration Y Y Y  Y Y Y 
Survival to adulthood Y Y Y  Y Y Y 
Birth cohort FE Y Y Y  Y Y Y 














N 27,187 9,123 18,042  27,187 9,123 18,064 
Pseudo R2  0.278 0.167 0.339     
Log pseudolikelihood     -26576.41 -8803.78 -17697.16 
Notes: 1. Rank 1 is the reference group. 2. Coefficients in columns 1-3 are odds ratios, and in columns 4-6 are 
incidence rate ratios (IRR). Robust standard errors are in parentheses, clustered on fathers. 3. Ranks 6 and 7 are 
combined in columns 1, 3, and 5 because everyone in rank 7 succeeded in marrying at least once and also because 
of the limited observations in the three common lineages. Ranks 5, 6, and 7 are combined together with rank 4 in 
column 2 because all the males of rank higher than 4 in the three common lineages were married. 4. Father’s ranks 
6-7, and brothers’/cousins’ highest ranks 6-7 are combined together also because of the limited observations in 
columns 2 and 5. 5. *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01. 
 
In Clark and Hamilton (2006), the nature of the probate records makes the role played by 
marriage unclear in the English case. In the Chinese context, the effects of marriages are clear. 
The number of marriages does most to explain the reproductive success of the Confucian elites 
in Ming-Qing China: high-ranking males, especially those from the elite lineages, were 
wealthier and thus able to marry more women to increase the number of their male descendants. 
Moreover, the social status that they attained, rather than the social status of their kin, played 
the determining role in affecting their marriage choices. 
Examining 3,119 cases between 1736 and 1896 recorded in the Qing Criminal Archive 
(xinke tiben, 刑科题本), Chen et al. (2018) find that the average bride price was 19.3 silver 
taels, and the annual wage for a farm worker in the Qing dynasty was about 3 to 5 silver taels. 
Zhao (1983, pp. 55-56) estimates that a farm worker in the Yangzi Delta could earn around 2 
to 5 silver taels in cash per year, and Pomeranz (2000, p. 95) supports this estimate. According 
to these estimates, the average farm worker in the Qing dynasty needed at least four years to 
save enough money to pay for a wife.  
If he were a Qing bureaucrat, he could earn much more than five taels a year. For the lowest-
ranking civil official, the annual income was about thirty-three silver taels, nearly ten times 
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greater than that of a peasant worker (Chang 1962; see Table 3.7). Middle- and high-ranking 
local officials could also receive a substantial amount of “yang-lien allowance” (integrity 
allowance, 养廉银) every year.63 The high annual income guaranteed that even a low-ranking 
officeholder could afford more marriages.  
 
Table 3.7 Annual regulated salary of Qing officials, by official rank 
Official rank Capital officials Local officials 
1 307.8 180 
2 256.5 150 
3 222.3 130 
4 179.5 105 
5 136.8 80 
6 102.6 60 
7 76.9 45 
8 68.4 40 
9 54.4 33.114 
Notes: 1. Official rank 1 is the highest rank and official rank 9 is the lowest.  2. Official ranks 1-7 capital officials 
and 1-3 local officials correspond to Rank 7 in the sample. Official ranks 8-9 capital officials and official ranks 
4-9 local officials correspond to Rank 6 in the sample.  
Source: Chang (1962, pp.35-36).  
 
Put more generally, a comparison between the effects of kin networks on fertility and on 
marriages shown in Tables 3.4 and 3.6 indicates first, that the effects of kin group were limited 
on both of the individual outcomes; second, that brothers and cousins caused stronger effects 
on individuals than fathers did. The effects were not as strong as we would expect in traditional 
Chinese society, where the extended family structure largely prevailed.  
Many previous studies view an individual’s marriage and reproduction as “a consequence 
of familial status and position” and “instruments of family policy” (Lee and Campbell 1997, 
p.23; Wolf and Huang 1980, p.57). It is true that family background contributed much to every 
family member’s demographic achievements, but it did not do so directly. As shown in Table 
3.A3 in Appendix 3.A, father’s social rank and brothers’/cousins’ social ranks contributed 
substantially to an individual’s social rank, which validates the point that ancestry, in other 
words, family background was one of the deciding factors that affect an individual’s social 
outcome in Ming-Qing China (Campbell and Lee 2003; Shiue 2019; Jiang and Kung 2020). 
However, the weak effects of the social outcomes of fathers, brothers and cousins shown in 
 
63 The integrity allowance was several times greater than the regulated salary. For example, a governor of Jiangsu 
Province (a second-ranking local official) could receive an integrity allowance as high as 12,000 silver taels, and 
a seventh-ranking local official in Zhejiang Province could receive an allowance somewhere between 500 and 
1,800 taels (Chang 1962, pp.12-13). 
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Tables 3.4 and 3.6 clearly indicate that the kin network was important, but it mainly affected 
an individual’s demographic outcome through two mechanisms, one of which was the 
individual’s social outcomes.  
Moreover, whereas some research also emphasizes that senior kin mattered more than kin 
of the same generation (see, for example, Campbell and Lee 2008), the present chapter shows 
a different pattern. Given the relatively short lifespan in the pre-modern era, fathers’ social 
outcome would contribute more to sons’ education outcome in their childhood and adolescence, 
but not so much to events once they were adults, such as remarrying. Therefore, as the social 
outcomes for kin of the same generation, those of brothers and cousins, would contribute more 
to individuals’ demographic outcomes. Within the patrilineal lineage structure, male members 
of the same generation would establish close and intimate associations with one another from 
birth, and thus would exert reciprocal positive effects when they achieved high social status. 
However, if two males were of the same rank, why could the one from the elite lineages 
marry more times than his common-lineage counterpart? This relates to the other mechanism 
through which kin network could take effect, the lineage fund practice. In Ming-Qing China, 
lineage was, for one thing, a combination of families who shared the same ancestor and the 
same surname, but it was also a combination of families who co-owned various types of 
property. In addition to compiling genealogical books, since the Song dynasty, another 
common practice in the lineages was “sequestering a portion of the patrimony of each 
generation as lineage trusts”, and most of the endowments were landed estates (Zelin 2009, 
2019). While most common lineages were not rich enough to own land, most elite lineages not 
only owned land but also used their profits from the landed estates in many other lineage 
activities, including the most important ancestor-honouring rituals and the education of boys 
in the lineage (Zheng 2001; Freedman 1958). Thus, males from elite lineages were enabled to 
marry by making use of the lineage fund and the high reputation attached to their family name, 
something their common-lineage counterparts could never afford.  
This institutionalized access to lineage resources also explains why in the elite lineages, 
father effects and brother/cousin effects were both not as significant as in the common 
lineages. 64  With the joint ownership of lineage properties in wealthier lineages, the 
transmission of material resources was not person-to-person and not exclusive to the next of 
 
64 However, the effects of kin network on the individual’s social outcome were stronger in the elite lineages than 
in the common lineages, especially if the father, the brother and the cousin had a high social rank (ranks 4-7). This 
may relate to the “tacit knowledge” or “cultural capital”, other than human capital itself, that high-social-ranking 
kin could transmit to individuals so that they could attain higher social status (Jiang and Kung 2020). This type 
of capital was hard to share around all the male members of the lineage; it was exclusive to the next of kin.  
 110 
kin, but was through channels organized by the lineage and shared by all male members.65 
Nevertheless, in less wealthy lineages, the lack of common properties constrained the 
transmission of resources to close kin. This may also account for the strong kin connections 
that Campbell and Lee (2008) find in a farming population in Northeast China, where most of 
the households are common ones. 
 
3.6 Robustness 
This section presents the robustness of the previous results to (1) sub-periods, (2) controlling 
for lifespan, (3) an alternative classification of social status, (4) categorizing Marriages as an 
ordinal variable, and (5) an alternative estimation model (the zero-inflated negative binomial 
model). Table 3.B1 in Appendix 3.B presents the summary statistics for the new variables used 
in this session. 
 
3.6.1 Social gradients in fertility over time 
Although the analysis accounts for the birth cohorts, it is interesting to ask whether the social 
gradients in fertility changed over time. I examine Equation (1) by four sub-periods, with 
results listed in Table 3.B2. Because only four rank 7 males were born during the nineteenth 
century, I combine ranks 6 and 7 in the period 1800-1920. 
The results by century in Table 3.B2 are largely comparable to those in Table 3.3. As we 
would also expect, after including marriages, most of the positive effects disappeared. Results 
in column 1 show that for males who were born before 1600, their human capital, rather than 
their social status, could explain much of their fertility difference. After 1600, however, the 
coefficients on social status are always significant before conditioning on marriages.  
The rank coefficients in 1800-1920 are much higher than those in 1350-1799, due to the 
low net fertility of rank 1 males in the nineteenth century. Owing to the Taiping Rebellion, a 
massive civil war in the late Qing period, the Lower Yangtze region experienced a dramatic 
population loss in the late 1850s and early 1860s (Cao and Li 2000; Li and Lin 2015).66 The 
conflict shortened the average length of men’s lives and thus decreased the average number of 
 
65 As discussed in Zelin (2019), “Household and tang assets were organic constructs. A male member of a kinship 
line did not need to do anything to partake of these assets. And any additions to the property of a household or a 
higher-level kinship association accrued to all members, whatever their participation in their accumulation.” 
66 Estimates suggest that the total population lost in China could have been more than 70 million (Li and Lin 
2015). In the six lineages, the Gu and Zhuang lineages suffered the most in these conflicts. Of all the Gu and 
Zhuang males with death year records, 845 died in 1860-1863, 810 of them being commoners. Figure 3.B1 shows 
the marked increase of deaths in 1860-70 in the two lineages. 
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sons they produced. The large coefficient on the number of marriages in the period 1800-1920 
can also be explained by this population loss.  
 
3.6.2 Additional control: lifespan 
A male’s lifespan could be a confounding factor that affected his fertility behaviour and his 
likelihood of remarrying. Using a sub-sample of 11,106 males who reached age 15 with full 
life records, I control for male’s age at death, and find an unaffected status-fertility relationship 
(Table 3.B3). I also demonstrate the social gradients in lifespan in Table 3.B4. Males of ranks 
2-7 did have longer lifespan than rank 1 males, but the effects of social status on lifespan are 
moderate.  
 
3.6.3 An alternative classification of social status 
The social gradients shown in Table 3.3 could be spurious because of the broad classification 
of social status. Therefore, I construct a more detailed classification containing twelve levels 
of status (see Table 3.B5) to check for the robustness of the one presented in Table 3.1. Table 
3.B6 reports the results of Equation (1) using the new social status variable. The main results 
are robust to the new classification. The results confirm those in columns 7 and 8 of Table 3.3. 
Status 5, 7, and 8, which altogether form rank 5, had the modest effects on fertility.   
 
3.6.4 Classifying Marriages as an ordinal variable 
Because the marginal effects of having one more wife for a single male and a married male 
could be different, I change Marriages into an ordinal variable, containing five wife groups (0, 
1, 2, 3, and 4+ marriages). The coefficients on the wife groups shown in Table 3.B7 also 
suggest that the number of marriages has a linear effect on the number of sons. The coefficients 
on ranks for married males are similar to the results shown in column 8 of Table 3.3.  
 
3.6.5 Zero-inflated negative binomial model: the excessive zero counts  
Because of the excess zeroes in the dependent variable, I apply the zero-inflated negative 
binomial regression to see if the relationship still held. Since having a wife is the prerequisite 
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for having a son, the number of marriages is used to predict the “always zero” in the model 
(Greene 1994; Lambert 1992).  
Table 3.B8 details the results. The number of marriages is a significant predictor of the 
membership in the “always zero” group. If a male were to have one more wife, the odds that 
he would be in the “always zero” group would decrease by a factor of 31.37 in column 1 and a 
factor of 37.44 in column 2. The coefficients on Rank in column 2 are also nearly the same as 
the ones in column 8 in Table 3.3.  
 
3.7 Conclusions 
Using detailed genealogical records of six Chinese lineages, this chapter reveals a positive 
relationship between net fertility and social status in Ming-Qing China. Overall, compared with 
the non-gentry class, the near gentry and the gentry classes were more likely to have more sons 
who survived infancy through having more marriage; this Malthusian mechanism continued to 
function until the end of the Qing dynasty. Kin networks were important, but they were 
important through affecting individuals’ social outcomes, rather than directly affecting 
individuals’ demographic outcomes. Since higher social status resulted in greater human 
capital and income in imperial China, this chapter provides empirical support for “survival of 
the richest”, or more precisely, “survival of the Confucians” in the Chinese context. 
Remarriages and the practice of polygamy made the primary strategy adopted by the Chinese 




Appendix 3.A Extra Tables and Figures for Chapter 3 
 
Table 3.A1 Summary statistics for Chapter 3 
Statistics N Mean Std. Min Max 
Number of sons 36,456 1.13 1.36 0 12 
Social rank 36,456 1.17 0.77 1 7 
Number of marriages 36,456 0.80 0.63 0 10 
Courtesy name (zi) 36,456 0.38 0.48 0 1 
Pen name (hao) 36,456 0.06 0.24 0 1 
Firstborn 36,456 0.50 0.50 0 1 
Out-migration 36,456 0.01 0.07 0 1 
Survival to adulthood 36,456 0.91 0.28 0 1 
Number of brothers 36,456 2.72 1.49 1 12 
Father social rank 36,456 1.30 1.03 1 7 
Brother social rank 27,318 1.29 1.01 1 7 
Brother/Cousin social rank 31,664 1.43 1.24 1 7 
Birth cohort 31,197 8.92 1.87 1 12 
Lineage 36,456 3.83 1.35 1 6 
Notes: 1. Number of zero counts in “Number of sons” is 16,189. 2. Number of zero counts in “Number of 





Table 3.A2 Logistic regression on the completeness of vital statistics  
  Dependent Variable: 
  
Having birth date record 
Having birth and death date 
record 




























Controls   
Firstborn Y Y 
Out-migration Y Y 
Survival Y Y 





N 36,456 36,456 
Pseudo R2 0.187 0.155 
Notes: 1. Coefficients are the odds ratios for the logistic model and robust standard errors are in parentheses. 2. 




Table 3.A3 Effects of kin groups on an individual’s social outcome 
 Dependent Variable: Rank 
 OLS  Poisson  
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Controls      
Firstborn Y  Y Y Y 
Out-migration Y  Y Y Y 
Survival to adulthood Y  Y Y Y 
Birth cohort FE Y  Y Y Y 










N 27,187  27,187 9,123 18,064 
R2/ log pseudolikelihood 0.337  -30702.81 -9807.61 -20870.82 
Notes: 1. Rank 1 is the reference group. 2. Coefficients in columns 2-4 are incidence rate ratios (IRR) and robust 
standard errors are in parentheses, clustered on fathers. 3. Ranks 6 and 7 are combined together in column 3, given 





Table 3.A4 Effects of differences in attained social ranks on differences in net fertility between 
brothers, OLS regression 
 Dependent Variable:  
 Difference in number of sons 
between brothers 
 (1) (2) 
Rank difference   
















































Controls   
Father ranks N Y 
Birth century Y Y 





N 24,988 24,950 
R-squared 0.020 0.020 
Notes: 1. Rank difference=0 is the reference group. 2. Robust standard errors in parentheses, clustered on fathers 





Appendix 3.B Robustness checks for Chapter 3 
 
Table 3.B1 Summary statistics of variables in robustness checks for Chapter 3 
Statistics N Mean Std. Min Max 
Age 11,344 50.02 17.61 1 105 
Age-squared 11,344 2811.61 1743.04 1 11025 
Status 36,456 1.23 1.18 1 12 
Birth century 24,988 5.13 0.99 1 7 
Difference in sons 25,861 -0.007 1.75 -9 11 
Difference in ranks 25,861 0.007 0.85 -6 6 
 
 
3.B.1 Social gradients over time 
 
 
Figure 3.B1 Frequency of death year in the Gu and the Zhuang lineages, 1600-1900 
Note: The figure plots only males whose death year is recorded.  
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Table 3.B2 Rank effects on fertility by sub-period, negative binomial regression 
    Dependent Variable:   
    Number of Sons   
  (1) (2) 
 
(3) (4)  (5) (6)  (7) (8) 
Birth period  1350-1599  1600-1699  1700-1799  1800-1920 
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Marriages   1.482*** 
(0.051) 










Controls             
Firstborn  Y Y  Y Y  Y Y  Y Y 
Out-migration  Y Y  Y Y  Y Y  Y Y 
Birth cohort FE  Y Y  Y Y  Y Y  Y Y 
Lineage FE  Y Y  Y Y  Y Y  Y Y 
















N  1,704 1,704  4,052 4,052  10,724 10,724  11,701 11,701 
Pseudo R2  0.050 0.083  0.031 0.062  0.022 0.084  0.046 0.127 
Notes: 1. Rank 1 is the reference group. 2. Only males who survived to adulthood are included. 3. The coefficients in the table are IRR. 4. Robust standard errors are in 
parentheses. 5. *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01. 
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3.B.2 Lifespan 
Table 3.B3 Lifespan effects on the number of sons, negative binomial regression 
 Dependent Variable: 
 Number of Sons 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 


























































































































Controls     
Fathers’ ranks N Y N Y 
Brothers’/cousins ranks N Y N Y 
Brother dummy N Y N Y 
Firstborn Y Y Y Y 
Out-migration Y Y Y Y 
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Table 3.B3 Continued 
 Dependent Variable: 
 Number of Sons 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Controls     
Birth cohort Y Y Y Y 









N 11,086 9,948 11,086 9,948 
Pseudo R2 0.098 0.100 0.105 0.107 
Notes: 1. Males who died after age 15 were selected for this sub-sample. 2. Rank 1 is the reference group. Age 
group 20-24 is the reference group in columns 3 and 4. 3. The coefficients are IRR. 4. Robust standard errors are 
in parentheses, clustered on fathers. 5.*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01. 
 
Table 3.B4 Social gradients in lifespan, negative binomial regression 
 Dependent Variable: 
 Lifespan 
 (1) (2) 
























Controls   
Firstborn N Y 
Out-migration N Y 
Survival N Y 
Birth cohort FE N Y 





N 11,323 11,323 
Pseudo R2 0.003 0.064 
Notes: 1. Rank 1 is the reference group. 2. The coefficients are IRR. 3. Robust standard errors are in parentheses, 




3.B.3 Alternative classification of social status 
 
Table 3.B5 Alternative classification of social status 
Status Count Percent Description 
1 34,555 94.79% No status; honoured by later generations with poems or prose 
discourses 
2 188 0.52% Literate and educated but without degree (teacher of the 
village or editor of genealogical books); lineage chief; donor 
to the lineage and the county 
3 487 1.34% Lower degree holder  
4 522 1.43% Students at the Imperial Academy  
5 34 0.09% Intermediate/high degree holder, but no official position  
6 66 0.18% Awarded by the emperor with official titles, with no 
academic degree  
7 120 0.33% Prospective officials 
8 91 0.25% Clerks; the lowest-ranking official, with no degree 
9 106 0.29% Low-/medium-ranking local official and low-ranking court 
official, with no academic degree record or normal and civil 
shengyuan degree 
10 128 0.35% Low-/medium-ranking local official and low-ranking court 
official, with the degree of studentship at the Imperial 
Academy 
11 82 0.22% Low-/medium-ranking local official and low-ranking court 
official, with intermediate/high degree 




Table 3.B6 Effects of status on the recorded number of sons, negative binomial regression 
 Dependent Variable: 
 Number of Sons 
 (1) (2) (3) 
   Married 


















































































Controls    
Firstborn Y Y Y 
Out-migration Y Y Y 
Birth cohort  Y Y Y 







N 28,181 28,181 21,235 
Pseudo R2 0.045 0.106 0.043 
Notes: 1. Status 1 is the reference group. 2. Males included are all the males who survived to adulthood. 3. The 




3.B.4 Marriages as an ordinal variable 
 
Table 3.B7 Effects of rank and wife on the recorded number of sons, negative binomial 
regression 
 Dependent Variable:  
Number of Sons 
 (1) (2) 
  Married males 
























Wife Group 0 0.0003*** 
(0.0002) 
 












Controls   
Zi Y Y 
Hao Y Y 
Firstborn Y Y 
Out-migration Y Y 
Birth cohort FE Y Y 





N 28,181 21,235 
R-squared/Pseudo R2 0.227 0.043 
Notes: 1. Rank 1 and wife group 1 are the reference groups. 2. Males included are all the males who survived to 




3.B.5 Zero-inflated negative binomial model 
 
Table 3.B8 Rank effects on the number of sons, zero-inflated negative binomial regression 
 Dependent Variable:  
Number of sons 
 (1) (2) 
























Marriages  1.133*** 
(0.013) 
Zi  1.126*** 
(0.016) 
Hao  1.211*** 
(0.025) 
Controls   
Firstborn N Y 
Out N Y 
Birth cohort FE N Y 














N 33,238 28,181 
Notes: 1. Rank 1 is the reference group. 2. Only males who survived to adulthood are included. 3. The coefficients 







The Darwinian and the Beckerian Trade-offs of Children 




This chapter uses the genealogical records of 36,456 males from six lineages in Ming-Qing 
China to investigate the reproductive success in a multi-generational model. I first test for a 
Darwinian trade-off between short-run reproduction and long-run continuity in bloodlines. The 
empirical results indicate that in the six lineages, high fertility could be transmitted across 
generations, and the optimal level of fertility was nine sons. I then examine the mechanisms of 
fertility transmission by analysing the presence of the Beckerian child quantity-quality trade-
off. Quality in sons are measured by two indicators: whether they could get married and 
whether they were literate. Because that the practice of offering sons for adoption induced a 
random variation in family size, I instrument family size with the adoption practice. The IV 
estimates find that having more brothers in 1600-1800 would reduce the probability that a male 
would be literate, and in 1800-1900 would make him less likely to marry. Nevertheless, it was 
not family size so much as father’s human capital that was of the central importance in affecting 
a son’s quality. 
                 
4.1 Introduction 
High fertility rates do not always translate into high rates of survival. David Lack (1954) first 
demonstrates the existence of regulations in a “natural population” of birds, stating that the 
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clutch size has been evolved to suit the largest number of surviving descendants. Later 
developing into the life-history theory in evolutionary biology, the trade-off between fertility 
and different biological traits with the aim of increasing the survival rate has long been studied 
by zoologists and biologists (Stearns 1989; Williams 1966, Chapter 6). Anthropologists and 
demographers, too, have examined different types of Darwinian trade-off within the human 
species. Their detailed studies on relationships between female fertility and offspring 
survivorship, parental fertility and next generation fertility, and the optimal level of fertility 
and long-run reproductive success have suggested different patterns in different societies (Hill 
and Hurtado 1996; Strassmann and Gillespie 2002; Borgerhoff Mulder 2000; Kaplan 1996; 
Kaplan et al. 1995).  
To ensure greater continuity in bloodlines, high survival in only one generation is not 
enough; most importantly, the reproductive success in one generation has to be transmitted 
across generations. Galor and Klemp (2014) address the question that how the fertility of 
ancestors affected the fertility of descendants by using the genealogical data of half a million 
residents over four generations in pre-industrial Quebec and find a hump-shaped relationship 
between fecundity and long-run reproductive success. They conclude that moderate fecundity, 
coupled with a higher level of education, was more conducive for the continuity of the lines of 
descent; the negative effects on survival of larger family sizes also suggest the presence of 
child quantity-quality trade-offs (Galor and Klemp 2014). The empirical findings also support 
their evolutionary growth theory that the survival pattern of the human species during the 
Malthusian epoch was shaped by the forces of natural selection and played a major role in the 
transition from Malthusian stagnation to sustained economic growth (Galor and Moav 2002; 
Galor 2011). 
Therefore, if high fertility could be transmitted across generations in pre-modern societies, 
what were the mechanisms through which parental fertility affected next generation fertility? 
A plausible mechanism is that the parents’ choices on their family size and their investment in 
offspring would significantly affect offspring’s quality, which would furtherly affect 
offspring’s demographic outcomes. Economists have studied this type of child quantity-quality 
trade-off since Becker (1960, 1981; Becker et al. 1990) first inserted fertility decisions into the 
economic analysis and argued that parents would sacrifice the number of children they could 
have for higher quality in the children they had. A considerable amount of empirical literature 
also tries to support or to challenge this Beckerian argument in both historical and modern 
times (see the examples of India: Rosenzweig and Wolpin 1980; of Thailand: Knodel, Havanon, 
and Sittitrai 1990; of Norway: Black, Devereux, and Salvanes 2005; of Prussia: Becker, 
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Cinnirella, and Woessmann 2010, 2012; of France: Diebolt, Mishra, and Perrin 2015; of 
England: Clark and Cummins 2019b; Klemp and Weisdorf 2019; of Brazil: Ponczek and Souza 
2012; of the USA: Tan 2019; of Korea: Lee and Park 2019).  
Shiue (2017) uses genealogical data from Tongcheng County, Anhui Province and tests the 
trade-off in Qing China, finding a negative relationship between family size and sons’ 
education before 1800 that disappeared afterwards.67 Song et al. (2015) also speculate that in 
the mid-Qing period, the child quantity-quality trade-off is a strategy that the high-status 
founders may have adopted to achieve continuity in their bloodlines.  
To contribute to the previous literature, I use a new genealogical dataset containing 36,456 
males to exploit the multigenerational associations in fertility in six Chinese lineages from 
1350 to 1920. I intend to show the reproductive success of Chinese males in a multi-
generational model by analysing the pattern and the mechanisms of fertility transmission. 
Because only patrilineal male descents are officially recorded in the genealogical books, this 
chapter focuses on all the male family members in the six lineages.  
I first test for the presence of the Darwinian trade-off by examining the optimal level of 
fertility for long-run reproductive success in the six lineages. I estimate the relationship 
between the number of sons and the number of male descendants in the three following 
generations that a male had to test whether high reproduction in the first generation could 
translate into high reproduction in the three that would ensue. The estimation results show that 
there was an optimal level of fertility for long-run reproductive success. A male had to have 
nine sons to have the most grandsons, great-grandsons, and great-great-grandsons.  
I then analyse the possible mechanisms through which parental fertility could affect next 
generation fertility. The adverse effects of high fertility on the continuation of the male line 
indicate that the six lineages may show Beckerian trade-offs between child quantity and quality. 
The family size of the first generation could affect the quality of the second generation, and 
thus affect the likelihood of the second generation to produce male descendants in subsequent 
generations.  
I use the number of brothers that a male had to measure completed family size, and I use 
two indicators to measure child quality. The first measure is whether the male could reach 
adulthood and have at least one marriage before he died. The logistic regression results reflect 
 
67 The evidence from contemporary China is conflicting. Qian (2005) and Li, Zhang, and Zhu (2008) both exploit 
the 1990 population census, but find a contradictory relationship between family size and children’s educational 
attainment. Liu (2014) finds a strong negative relationship between family size and children’s height. Rosenzweig 
and Zhang (2006) also find an extra child at lower parities would decrease the quality of all children in the family.  
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that the number of brothers possessed by a male could significantly increase the likelihood of 
his getting married; the positive relationship is more evident in 1600-1900, than in 1400-1600. 
Sons who were from larger families enjoyed a higher probability of entering into marriage, 
which was a prerequisite in traditional China for leaving male descendants.   
The second indicator is male literacy. Based on the literacy-related information recorded in 
the genealogies, 3,008 males in the sample are classed as “literate”. The logistic estimation 
indicates that, before conditioning on father’s and grandfather’s literacy, family size was 
positively correlated with sons’ literacy, but the positive effects disappeared after conditioning 
on the two variables. However, for the 1600-1800 period in particular, even after controlling 
for father’s and grandfather’s literacy, the positive correlation between family size and son’s 
literacy is still strong.  
Nevertheless, because of the potential endogeneity issue that both family size and son’s 
quality are affected by unobservable parental preference and household characteristics, 
establishing a causal relationship is challenging and the correlation may be biased. Therefore, 
I instrument the number of brothers a male had with whether the male lost brothers for adoption 
or not. The instrument is valid because the event negatively affected family size, and was not 
related to the father’s own preference, nor could it directly affect the male’s quality.  
The instrumental variable results indicate an uncertain relationship between family size and 
the likelihood that a son would marry, but there is a clear trade-off between family size and a 
son’s literacy: a male was about two percentage points less likely to be literate if he were to 
have one more brother. The negative effects of family size on literacy, again, are statistically 
significant for the 1600-1800 period only.  
The contradictory results between logistic and IV estimations show that the unobserved 
parental preference and household characteristics which positively correlated with a son’s 
marriage probability and literacy biased the coefficients of family size in the logistic regression 
towards the positive. However, for males born in the period 1400-1600, both estimation models 
suggest that family size was not related to a son’s quality.  
This chapter contributes to the previous literature in two ways. On the one hand, this chapter 
illustrates the story of reproductive success of Chinese males in a multi-generational model. It 
presents the first empirical evidence on the optimal level of fertility for long-run reproductive 
success in the historical Chinese context. On the other, by examining the fertility-marriage and 
the fertility-literacy relationships in an intergenerational model, I show that family size affected 
child quality in different ways. This chapter also provides a new instrumental variable that 
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could tackle the endogeneity issue in examining the relationship between child quantity and 
child quality.  
The rest of the chapter is structured as follows. Sections 4.2 describes the genealogical data. 
Section 4.3 introduces the empirical strategies and Section 4.4 reports the results about the 
long-run reproductive success and the child quantity-quality trade-offs. Section 4.5 is a 
discussion about the results, and Section 4.6 concludes. 
 
4.2 Data and main variables 
4.2.1 The lineage sample 
The primary data used in this chapter come from the genealogical books of six lineages in 
Southeast China; the sample includes 36,456 males born in the period 1350 to 1920. 
Genealogies of a lineage always record a family tree which includes all the male members, and 
a series of detailed entries for each male descendant in the family. The family tree and sons’ 
names recorded under the fathers’ entries enable us to link male family members easily across 
generations.  
Although the genealogical data are very useful in examining fertility and survival, they are 
not free from selection biases. The previous two chapters have presented detailed discussions 
about the selection biases in this sample. The main bias that would affect the empirical 
estimation in this chapter is the lack of information about daughters in the genealogies. Due to 
the strong preference for sons in imperial China, daughters are highly under-reported. The 
sample included 41,145 sons in total, but only 9,636 daughters. Given that the number of sons 
who survived infancy is completely recorded for every male’s entry, I use this number in the 
present chapter to measure fertility and family size.  
 
4.2.2 Dependent and independent variables  
In the main analysis of the optimal level of fertility, the dependent variable is the recorded 
number of grandsons, great-grandsons, and great-great-grandsons of the “ancestors” in the 
sample. “Ancestors” here denote the males whose male descendants of the four following 
generations were completely recorded in the genealogies. The independent variable in this 
analysis is the number of a male’s sons who survived infancy.  
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In the analysis that examines the child quantity-quality relationship, which is the 
mechanism through which parental fertility affected next generation fertility, the dependent 
variables are two dummy variables that measures two indications of quality in males, their 
marital status (Marriage) and their human capital (Literacy). The independent variable is the 
number of brothers who survived infancy that a male had, that is, the number of sons who 
survived infancy, both biological and adopted, that the male’s father had. In other words, the 
number measures the completed family size in terms of male births. 
Since the long-run reproductive success is measured in this chapter by the number of male 
descendants a male could have, the two variables indicate a male’s quality in terms of his 
capability of leaving male descendants. Both of the two quality measures are also closely 
related to the male’s parents’ investment on him. First, Marriage is considered a valid measure 
in this context, because entering into marriage is the prerequisite for males to have male 
descendants. The shortage of women in Ming-Qing China, caused mainly by female infanticide 
and polygamy, made the marriage market seriously unbalanced (Lee and Wang 1999a). A 
substantial proportion of males, especially males from impoverished families and low-social-
status males, failed to ever marry. Thus, the “quality” of the male largely determined whether 
he could marry or not. Second, Literacy matters because it largely determined the number of 
male descendants a male could leave. It is also commonly applied to measure human capital in 
pre-modern societies. 
Based on the social status records in the genealogies, I divide all the males in the sample 
into 15 levels of social status, and construct the variable Literacy based on their social status 
to measure their human capital (see Table 4.1).68 In the Ming-Qing period, education was 
closely related to social status and wealth, for education could bring people high social status 
and considerable wealth because of keju, the national civil examination system.69 The exam 
mainly tested candidates’ knowledge of the Confucian classics. All male commoners, including 
peasants, artisans, and merchants could attend the civil examinations, and academic degrees on 
three levels — shengyuan, juren, and jinshi — would reward those who could pass the 
 
68 The classification in Table 4.1 is different and more detailed than the one in Table 3.1, because the main criterion 
used in Table 4.1 is literacy rather than social status. Two people could share the same social status, but one of 
them was literate for sure, and the other was not. Another difference is that I add the ownership of Hao into the 
classification in Table 4.1.  
69 Keju was initiated in 600 AD and abolished in 1905. Its presence changed imperial China into a meritocracy. 
In the tenth century, Emperor Zhenzong of the Song dynasty (960-1276) once wrote “There is no need to buy 
farmland, for books will get you a position with a high salary;/ There is no need to build a house, for books will 
bring you a luxurious residence with golden walls.”  
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corresponding county-level, the provincial-level, and the national-level exams. Candidates 
who failed in the exams could also repeatedly re-take them. 
 
Table 4.1 Literacy and social status classification 
Sources: Ho 1962, Chapter 1; Telford 1995, p.92, Appendix 3A; Shiue 2017, p. 364, Table 1. 
 
Thus, I code all the schoolteachers, compilers of genealogies, keju degree holders, and 
office holders with 1 for Literacy. Besides, I also use the ownership of hao (pen name) to 
distinguish between the literate and the illiterate. Hao is a name that an educated male would 
give himself in imperial China when writing either prose or poetry. Males who owned hao but 
did not have a keju degree, official position, or any other formal qualification are also coded 
with 1. In total, 3,008 (8.4 per cent) of the males in the sample are considered literate. 
Literacy Status Count Percent Description 
0 1 33,320 91.39% No status 
1 2 1,281 3.51% Hao (pen name) owner 
0 3 78 0.21% 
Lineage chief; donor to the lineage and the county 
(without hao) 
1 4 80 0.22% 
Literate and educated but without degree (teacher of 
the village or editor of genealogical books) 
0 5 53 0.15% 
Awarded official titles by the emperor, with no 
academic degree (without hao) 
1 6 487 1.34% 
Lower degree holder (normal shengyuan and civil 
shengyuan) 
1 7 522 1.43% Students at the Imperial Academy (lower degree) 
1 8 34 0.09% 
Intermediate/high degree holder (juren, gongsheng, 
jinshi), but with no official position 
1 9 52 0.14% Prospective officials (houbu), with no academic degree 
1 10 67 0.18% Prospective officials (houbu), with degree 
1 11 92 0.25% 
Clerks (wei’ruliu); the lowest-ranking official (cong 
jiupin), without degree 
1 12 106 0.29% 
Low-/medium-ranking local official and low-ranking 
court official, without a degree, or with normal and 
civil shengyuan degree 
1 13 128 0.35% 
Low-/medium-ranking local official and low-ranking 
court official, with a degree of studentship at the 
Imperial Academy 
1 14 82 0.22% 
Low-/medium-ranking local official and low-ranking 
court official, with an intermediate/high degree 
1 15 77 0.21% 




4.3 Empirical strategy 
4.3.1 The Darwinian trade-off ： the relationship between fertility and long-run 
reproductive success 
4.3.1.1 The model 
To test the presence of the optimal level of fertility for long-run reproductive success, I apply 
a multigenerational model, following the methods in Kaplan et al. (1995) and Galor and Klemp 
(2014).  
The sample used in this analysis consists of 9,364 “ancestors” in the six lineages. Males 
with incomplete records of male descendants in the subsequent four generations are excluded.  
Because the number of grandsons (mean = 2.9, variance = 8.9), the number of great-grandsons 
(mean = 3.6, variance = 26.8), and the number of great-great-grandsons (mean = 3.9, variance 
= 61.1) are all count variables and over-dispersed, I mainly employ negative binomial 
regression to test the relationship between the number of sons and the number of male 
descendants in the following three generations based on the following equation: 
 
𝐷𝑒𝑠𝑐𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑎𝑛𝑡𝑠𝑖 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1𝑆𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑖 + 𝛽2𝑆𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑖
2 + 𝛿𝑃𝑖 + 𝑖 ,          (1)          
 
where Descendants is the number of male offspring that a male (Generation 1) had in the three 
generations after his sons’ generation (i.e. grandsons, great-grandsons, and great-great-
grandsons); i denotes male individuals. Sons is the number of sons that a male had, and Sons2 
is the square term of Sons.70 The reason for including Sons2 is that the relationship between 
Sons and Descendants may not be linear as suggested in previous research (Galor and Klemp 
2014). Too many sons in one generation may reduce each of the son’s survival chance. 
P is a set of control variables that would also affect the number of grandsons and the number 
of great-grandsons.  is the error term. If the optimal level of fertility did exist, a negative 𝛽2 
would be expected. Having more sons than the optimal number would lead to fewer male 
descendants in the following generations.  
 
 
70 I also employ OLS regression as a robustness check (see Table 4.A2 in Appendix). To better fit the OLS 
regression model, I log-transform Descendants, and, to keep all the zero observations, make the outcome variable 
used in the OLS model is ln (Descendantsi+1). 
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4.3.1.2 The control variables 
I condition on seven control variables in the model to establish the causal relationship between 
fertility and long-run reproductive success. 
Literacy and Marriages. In pre-modern China, education, wealth, and social status were 
closely related. The number of marriages that a male had was also positively associated with 
his social status and wealth. Thus, Literacy and Marriages are controlled for the effects of the 
male’s socio-economic characteristics on his long-run reproductive success.  
Firstborn. Based on the traditional Chinese culture, the firstborn son has to take the greatest 
responsibility for leaving male descendants, which would be positively related to the continuity 
of the bloodline.  
Survival to adulthood. Lifespan is closely related to fertility. Only about one third of the 
males in the genealogies had complete vital records, but males who died before adulthood 
would also be marked in the genealogies. Thus, I use the dummy Survival to distinguish males 
who could not reach their reproductive age from the other males.  
Out-migration. If a male were out migrated to another villages, it was hard for the compilers 
of the genealogy to update the information on him. I include Out-migration to control for the 
negative effect that this move could have on the number of male descendants recorded in the 
genealogy. 
Birth cohort and Lineage. The birth cohort and also the lineage that the male belonged to 
would have effects on his fertility and also on the continuity of the long-run succession of his 
bloodline. Of the 36,456 males in the sample, only 23,098 had birth year recorded. With these 
birth year records, I impute an approximate birth cohort for the relatives of these males who 
were not recorded with birth year. I classify 31,197 males into twelve birth cohorts, starting 
with a “pre-1400” interval (1350 to 1400), ending with a “post-1900” interval (1900-1920), 
and with ten half-century-long cohorts in between.  
 
4.3.2 The Beckerian trade-off: mechanisms through which fertility affected long-run 
reproductive success 
4.3.2.1 Baseline model 
I first run the logistic regressions based on the following equation: 
 
𝑄𝑢𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖 = 𝛼1 + 𝛽1𝐵𝑟𝑜𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑠𝑖 + 𝛿1𝑃𝑖 + 𝛾1𝑊𝑖 + 𝑖 ,          (2) 
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where Quality denotes the male individual’s quality, and i denotes male individuals. I use two 
indicators to measure quality, Marriage and Literacy. Marriage equals one if the male was 
married at least once, and Literacy equals one if the male was literate. 𝛼1is the constant. As the 
number of daughters is incomplete in the genealogies, I use Brothers to measure the quantity 
of children. It equals the number of brothers (including himself) in a male’s generation of his 
family of origin, in other words, the number of sons who survived infancy that his father had. 
P denotes the same set of control variables used in Equation (1), and W includes a set of 
other factors that would affect one’s marriage and literacy.  is the error term. If the trade-off 
existed, a negative 𝛽1 would be expected, because it represents that the parents choose between 
the quantity and quality of their sons.  
The additional control variables I condition on include the male’s lifespan, his father’s 
literacy and lifespan, and his grandfather’s literacy and number of sons. 
Lifespan and father’s lifespan. I follow Shiue’s (2017) model here by conditioning on the 
age at death of the male individual and also his father’s age at death to control for the health-
related factors that could affect the quality of the male. However, only about one third of the 
males in the sample had the age at death recorded. 
Father’s literacy. For each individual I control for the father’s literacy to reflect the socio-
economic characteristics of his family of origin.   
Grandfather’s literacy and Number of uncles. Moreover, I include the effects of the 
grandfather in the model to address the endogeneity issue. The major difficulty in establishing 
the causal relationship between family size and child quality is the omitted variable bias. The 
effects of unobserved household features and parental preference on child quantity and quality 
would obscure the existence or the absence of a child quantity-quality trade-off. In a male-
dominant society that values filial piety, the couple’s preference would be influenced by the 
husband’s parents’ decisions. Therefore, I control for the literacy of the grandfather of every 
male individual, and also the number of uncles that he had, in other words, the number of sons 
his grandfather produced, to partly tackle the endogeneity. Table 4.A1 in the Appendix reports 
the summary statistics of the sample.  
 
4.3.2.2 Instrumental variable model 
As mentioned before, the unobservable parental preference and household features that would 
affect both quality and quantity of children would bias the effects of family size on child quality. 
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To address the concern of omitted variable bias, I construct an instrumental variable based on 
the practice of offering sons for adoption. 
The custom of adoption has a long tradition in China. In a society that values filial piety 
highly, having a male heir to continue the bloodline is the priority for every male. However, 
not every male could fulfil the task; hence adoption between brothers and cousins was practised. 
The earliest official regulations on adoption are found in the Tang Code published in 653 A.D. 
(Chen 2017). There are also strict regulations on the sequence chain for adoption recorded in 
the Ming Code and the Qing Code. The article states that “The heirless male is allowed to adopt. 
The adoptee should be chosen on the basis of the degree of consanguinity, starting from his 
brothers’ sons, to his first cousins’ sons, to his second cousins’ sons, and finally to his third 
cousins’ sons. If then he still cannot find an appropriate boy to adopt, he is allowed to find a 
boy with the same surname who is a more distant relation of his”.71  
Given the significance of male heirs to the lineage, choosing an adoptee was not a simple 
negotiation between the two families involved, but a business of mutual concern that needed 
discussion and decision by the whole lineage. In some cases, the local magistrates had the final 
say on the adoptee (Wang 2016; Gao, Zhang, and Peng 2018). In an edict during the Hongzhi 
reign (1488-1505), it was written that “if the adoptee was of the same surname, the adoptive 
father’s kinsmen could not raise objections to the adoption”; another edict of the Jiajing reign 
(1522-1566) stated the warning again (Waltner 1990, p.55). An heirless male was not free to 
adopt whomever he pleased and his brother or cousin whose son was adopted had to accept the 
order to surrender a son for adoption and could not reject a lineage decision either.  
Another characteristic of the practice is that it was not a commercial transaction if the two 
involved males were close relatives. According to Wolf and Huang (1980, p.110), residents in 
Haishan, a small county in Taiwan, “did not ask compensation for a child taken by a recognized 
agnate”. There were cases that the father who surrendered a son would ask for a payment, but 
“adoption only became a commercial transaction when the parties were strangers or distant 
relatives who no longer observed the formalities of kinship” (Wolf and Huang 1980, p.110).  
In my sample, 18,927 males have biological sons, and 2,056 of them surrendered one or 
more sons. After transferring sons between families, 20,342 males have sons in total, and 2,188 
of them adopted one or more sons. Of the 41,145 sons, 2,280 in total are adoptees, and 2,255 
of them have clear records on both biological fathers and stepfathers. In terms of the 
 
71 The original Chinese article is “凡无子者，许令同宗昭穆相当之侄承继，先尽同父(衰)亲，次及大功、小
功、绍麻，如俱无，方许择立远房及同姓为嗣者”.  
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relationship between fathers and stepfathers, 1,457 (64.6%) of the 2,255 pairs are brothers, 493 
(22.2%) of them are first cousins. The rest 305 pairs are second cousins or more distant relatives, 
but they shared the same surname.  
Moreover, in my sample, the correlation between biological father’s literacy and the 
probability that he would surrender a son is positive, albeit relatively small (0.02), while the 
correlation between stepfather’s literacy and the probability that he would adopt a son is 
negative (-0.02). The results suggest that the adoption practice in traditional China was not a 
strategy that the poor families utilized to sell sons to the rich families for money or resources. 
Instead, it was more common that the rich families would surrender sons to the poor families 
to help them continue their bloodlines. 
A father would yield a son only if he was asked to do so by an heirless brother or male 
cousin. He could hardly predict that his brother or cousin would end up having no son and 
prepare for the adoption in advance. Thus, the variation that induced by the practice of adoption 
is a random shock to the family size. I then instrument the number of brothers that a male had 
by the exogenous variation induced by whether or not the male lost brothers to adoption.  
Therefore, having a brother who was put up for adoption is a valid instrumental variable 
because it was strongly correlated with the number of brothers a male had. It did not directly 
affect his quality as no money was involved in the practice, but only indirectly through the 
channel of the decreasing family size (see Figure 4.1 and Table 4.A3).  
A related concern is that if the son was adopted out in his adulthood, the actual effects that 
the changing family size had on the quality of his biological brothers, especially his elder 
brothers stayed in the family of origin would be negligible. Although the age of adoption for 
sons are not recorded in the genealogical books, Wolf and Huang (1980, pp. 211-212, Table 
15.4) show that in Haishan between the years 1906 and 1935, about two thirds of the adoptees 
were moved to the foster families by age 2, and nearly all of the adoptees were younger than 
age 10 when they were adopted out. Given the similar cultures in South China, I assume that 
most adoptees would be moved to the new families by age 10 in the six lineages, which means 
most of the adoptions would happen before or at least during the “quality” formation periods 
of the adoptees and also their biological brothers.   
Moreover, the intentions of the families involved do not matter in this situation, so losing 
brothers for adoption is not correlated with the error term. One might still worry that the fathers 
who were chosen to give up sons might share some intrinsic characteristics that correlated with 
the practice of adoption. In all the specifications of the IV estimation, I directly control for the 









Figure 4.1 The validity of the instrument variable 
 
Hence, I then instrument the number of brothers that a male had by the exogenous variation 
induced by whether or not the male lost brothers to adoption. It is worth noting that the sample 
in this part of the analysis excluded all the adoptees. I am not looking at families that were 
expanded because of adoption, but only at the families that experienced a decrease in family 
size and the unaffected families. I use an OLS regression and a Probit regression to estimate 
Equations (3) and (4), respectively,  
 
𝐵𝑟𝑜𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑠𝑖 = 𝛼2 + 𝛽2𝐴𝑑𝑜𝑝𝑡𝑂𝑢𝑡𝑖 + 𝛿2𝑃𝑖 + 𝛾2𝑊𝑖 + 𝑖 ,      (3) 
 
𝑄𝑢𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖 = 𝛼3 + 𝛽3𝐵𝑟𝑜𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑠̂ 𝑖 + 𝛿3𝑃𝑖 + 𝛾3𝑊𝑖 + 𝑖 ,         (4) 
 
in which the dummy AdoptOut equals one if a male individual had brothers who were adopted 
out, and it equals zero if none of his brothers was adopted out. Brothers still denotes the final 
family size. The other notations are as in Equation (2).  
 
4.4 Results 
4.4.1 The optimal level of fertility for long-run reproductive success 
The results of regressions based on Equation (1) show that there was a Darwinian trade-off 
between parental fertility and next generation fertility in the six lineages (see Table 4.2).72 The 
square term of Sons maintains the negative and statistically significant effects on fertility of 
the subsequent three generations in all columns in all three specifications, which indicates the 
 
72 I report the OLS results in Table 4.A2 in Appendix 4.A. 
Family size (x) Quality (y) Losing brothers (z)  
Unobserved parental preference  
and household characteristics ()  
 
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presence of an optimal level of net fertility for long-run reproductive success. The fitness for 
long-run survival would diminish beyond a certain level of fertility. 
Conditioning on all factors, if a male were to have one more son, his rate for the number of 
male offspring in generations 3-5 would be expected to increase by a factor of about 1.7 
(columns 7 to 9). Figure 4.2 shows the predicted number of grandsons, great-grandsons, and 
great-great-grandsons that a male in the sample could have at each level of fertility. The 
estimated optimal number of sons that a male should have if he wanted the greatest number of 
male descendants in the long run is nine.73  
As Figure 4.3 demonstrates, only 165 males (1.76%) from the “ancestor” sample had more 
than five sons. Therefore, for most of the sample, more sons could directly translate into more 
grandsons, great-grandsons, and great-great-grandsons. The result is different from the findings 
of Galor and Klemp (2014) in Quebec from the sixteenth to the eighteenth centuries, where the 
optimal level of fertility was below the population median. Although the optimal level of 
fertility is beyond the fertility of the majority in the six lineages, fertility still retains a hump-
shaped effect on long-run survival, which suggests that larger family size had an adverse effect 
on child quality which in turn could negatively affect the long-run reproductive success. 
Moreover, the statistically significant coefficients on Literacy in columns 7 to 9 also 
indicate that literate males could leave more male descendants than illiterate males could in 
subsequent generations. In the previous chapter, I demonstrate that if a male were of higher 
social status, in other words, if a male were literate, he could be expected to leave more sons 
than an illiterate male. The coefficients on Literacy in this chapter substantiate this positive 
effect one step further. The literacy of a male could affect not only his fertility, but also the 
fertility of at least the next two generations. The persistent effect of human capital shown in 
the six lineages also validates what Song et al. (2015) find in North China from 1725 to 1875 




73 Figure 4.2 also shows overly wide confidence intervals for the predicted numbers of great-grandsons and great-
great-grandsons at high fertility levels (8-12 sons). It is due to the very limited observations (22 males had more 
than 7 sons in total) and great variations in the number of great-grandsons and great-great-grandsons they had. 
For example, 2 of the 22 males ended up with having no great-grandsons and 3 of them had no great-great-





Figure 4.2 Predicted number of male descendants in the three generations at each level of 
fertility, unconditional relationship 
Notes: 1. The predicted values are calculated from the results in columns 1-3 of Table 4.2. 2. The shaded area 





Figure 4.3 Distribution of number of sons of the “ancestors” in the sample 






























Table 4.2 The effects of Sons on the number of male descendants for males born from 1350 to 1920, negative binomial regression 
 Dependent Variable:  
Number of male descendants in 
 Gen.3 Gen.4 Gen.5  Gen.3 Gen.4 Gen.5  Gen.3 Gen.4 Gen.5 

















































Controls            
Firstborn N N N  Y Y Y  Y Y Y 
Out-migration N N N  Y Y Y  Y Y Y 
Survival N N N  Y Y Y  Y Y Y 
Birth cohort FE N N N  Y Y Y  Y Y Y 



















N 9,364 9,364 9,364  7,016 7,016 7,016  7,016 7,016 7,016 
Pseudo R2 0.091 0.040 0.023  0.097 0.045 0.037  0.101 0.049 0.041 
Notes: 1. Coefficients are incidence rate ratios (IRR) for the negative binomial regression, and robust standard errors are in parentheses. 2. *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01. 
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4.4.2 Mechanisms through which fertility affected long-run reproductive success 
Galor and Klemp (2014) discern that moderate fecundity could enhance child quality by 
increasing the probability of getting married and getting educated, which would thus enable 
the children to leave more descendants. Therefore, in this section, I examine in the six lineages 
the two types of Beckerian child quantity-quality trade-off: the effects of family size on the 
sons’ probabilities of marriage and literacy.  
 
4.4.2.1 Logistic estimation results  
Tables 4.3 and 4.4 report the Logistic regression results based on Equation (2). In Table 4.3, 
where quality is measured by marriage, the key variable Brothers always retains positive 
coefficients in all six specifications. If a male had more brothers, he would be more likely to 
get married. Column 6 establishes that the results are robust to controlling for the father’s and 
the grandfather’s literacy.  
Table 4.4 suggests a rather different role that family size played. Before the inclusion of 
father’s and grandfather’s literacy, columns 1-5 suggest that for a one unit increase in Brothers, 
the odds for the male of being literate versus not being literate increase by a factor of about 1.2. 
However, after including the two variables in column 6, the coefficient on Brothers is no longer 
statistically significant. Controlling for the male’s lifespan and his father’s lifespan in column 
7 does not much change the coefficient on the number of brothers. The effects of number of 
brothers a male had on his literacy were thus unclear, given the insignificant coefficients on 
Brothers in the two specifications. 
As expected, the variables that have the most substantial effect on sons’ quality are the 
father’s and the grandfather’s literacy. Figure 4.4 demonstrates the predicted probability of 
being literate and being married for different sized families, conditioned on father’s literacy. 
The figure shows that the considerable difference in sons’ quality arises from the difference in 
fathers’ human capital. For a male who was brought up in a family of two sons, the predicted 
probability of marriage is about 75.3 per cent if he had a literate father, while that for a male 
who had an illiterate father is about 65.5 per cent. The difference is wider for the probability 





Figure 4.4 Predicted probability of being literate/married for different sized families, with a 
literate and an illiterate father 
Notes: 1. The predicted values are calculated from the results of column 6 of Table 4.3 and column 6 of Table 4.4. 
2. The shaded area represents the 95% confidence interval for the predicted curve. 
 
Table 4.3 The relationship between family size and marriage, logistic regression 
 Dependent Variable: 
 Marriage 
























     1.091 
(0.070) 
Firstborn 















Controls       
Out-migration N N Y Y Y Y 
Survival N N Y Y Y Y 
Birth cohort FE N Y Y Y Y Y 













N 36,360 31,106 31,106 31,106 31,080 29,449 
Pseudo-R2 0.0001 0.086 0.235 0.235 0.235 0.245 
Notes: 1. If the individual is an adoptee, then “Father’s literacy” and “Grandfather’s literacy” denote his 
stepfather’s and step-grandfather’s literacy. 2. Coefficients are the odds ratio for the logistic regression, and robust 
standard errors are in parentheses, clustered on fathers. 3. *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01. 
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Table 4.4 The relationship between family size and literacy, logistic regression 
 Dependent Variable: 
 Literacy 























































Age at death 
      1.026*** 
(0.003) 
Father’s age at 
death 
      1.007** 
(0.003) 
Controls        
Out-migration N N Y Y Y Y Y 
Survival N N Y Y Y Y Y 
Birth cohort FE N Y Y Y Y Y Y 















N 36,360 31,106 31,106 31,106 31,080 29,449 8,343 
R-squared 0.009 0.145 0.155 0.156 0.160 0.356 0.346 
Notes: 1. If the individual is an adoptee, then “Father’s literacy” and “Grandfather’s literacy” denotes his 
stepfather’s and step-grandfather’s literacy. 2. Coefficients are the odds ratio for the logistic regression, and robust 
standard errors are in parentheses, clustered on fathers. 3. *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01. 
 
4.4.4.2 Child quantity-quality relationship by period 
I then separate the sample into three sub-samples that refer to three different periods. Table 4.5 
shows the positive correlations between the brothers that a male had and the probability of his 
marriage in the period 1600 to 1900, but an uncertain relationship between the two in the pre-
1600 period. In 1600-1900, if a male were to have one more brother, the odds of his being 
married could increase by a factor of 1.1. 
Table 4.5 also details the results by using literacy as a measure for child quality. The 
positive effects of family size were only present for the period 1600-1800. In the periods 1400-
1600 and 1800-1900, the coefficients on Brothers are not statistically significant. The odds 
ratio on Brothers is even smaller than one between 1400 and 1600, which implies a possible 
negative relationship between family size and literacy.  
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Table 4.5 The fertility-marriage and fertility-literacy relationships by period, logistic 
regression 
 Dependent Variable:  
 Marriage Literacy  Marriage Literacy  Marriage Literacy 
 1400-1600  1600-1800  1800-1900 











































































Controls         
Out-migration Y Y  Y Y  Y Y 
Survival Y Y  Y Y  Y Y 
Birth cohort FE Y Y  Y Y  Y Y 













N 1,424 1,420  14,075 14,075  12,963 12,963 
Pseudo R2 0.192 0.360  0.160 0.357  0.300 0.333 
Notes: 1. The coefficients are the odds ratio for the logistic model. 2. Robust standard errors are in parentheses, 
clustered on fathers. 3. *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01. 
 
 
4.4.4.3 Using the offering of sons for adoption as an instrumental variable  
This section turns to the instrumented evidence on the child quantity-quality trade-off. The 
logistic regression results could be biased because of the unobserved parental preference and 
household features, despite the fact that controlling for grandfather’s literacy and the number 
of uncles could partially capture them.  
To start with, I regress only the male’s quality on whether or not he had brothers who were 
given away. Figure 4.5 demonstrates the predicted probability of being married and being 
literate by family size, measured by the number of brothers that a male had. The control group 
includes males who had no brothers surrendered for adoption, and the treated group includes 
males who had brothers surrendered for adoption. For the control group, the positive 
relationships between family size and the two qualities are clear. However, the predicted 
probability of being married was not always higher for the treated group, while the predicted 
probability of being literate was always higher than that of the controlled group at each level 
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of family size. Nonetheless, the raw relationship suggests that if the family size decreased 
because of the adoption, sons who stayed in the family would be more likely to be literate. 
 
 
Figure 4.5 Predicted probability of being literate and married by the number of brothers, 
losing/not losing a brother to adoption 
Notes: 1. The “control” group denotes males who had no adopted-out brother, and the “treatment” group denotes 
males who had adopted-out brothers. 2. Values are the expected probability of being literate and married at each 
level of the father’s number of sons after adoption, calculated from regressing Literacy/Marriage on Brother. 3. 
Only Brother=1 to 6 are included, because the fathers who had more than six sons did not have adopted-out sons. 
4. Error bars indicate 95 per cent confidence intervals.  
 
The IV estimation results based on Equations (3) and (4) are in Tables 4.6 and 4.7. Table 
4.6 details the results of the full sample, which includes all the males who were born from 1350 
to 1920 in the six lineages. The OLS results for the first stage are reported in column 1, and the 
average marginal effects of the Probit regressions for the second stage are reported in columns 
2 and 3, where the dependent variables are Marriage and Literacy, respectively. Table 4.7 
reports the results of three sub-periods, 1400 to 1600, 1600 to 1800, and 1800 to 1900. Columns 
1, 4, and 7 report the first stage results, and the remaining columns report the second stage 
results. 
The F-statistic on the instrument remains higher than the Stock and Yogo (2005) critical 
value in Table 4.6, and also in the specifications of periods after 1600 in Table 4.7, ruling out 
the weak instrument concern. 
As Table 4.6 demonstrates, the instrument results indicate that having brothers who were 
adopted out had both statistically and quantitatively significant average marginal effects on the 
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would be married. The results in column 3 of Table 4.6 indicate that if a male were to have one 
more brother, the probability that he would be literate would decrease by 2.6 percentage points. 
Having a literate father would increase the probability that the male would be married and 
literate by 12.2 percentage points and by 14.7 percentage points, respectively. It suggests that 
if a male had a literate father, then he had to have at least five brothers to counterbalance the 
positive effects that having a literate father had on his literacy. In other words, for the majority 
of males who had literate fathers in the six lineages, despite being raised in larger families, they 
were still more likely to be literate than the ones with illiterate fathers. 
Table 4.7 shows that the relationships also varied across periods. In terms of the marriage 
probability, the insignificant coefficients on the number of brothers suggest that family size 
could not affect the likelihood that a male would be married throughout the entire period. In 
terms of being literate, the negative effects of family size can be found only in the period 1600-
1800. From 1400 to 1600 and from 1800 to 1900, the human capital of the father and the 
grandfather could account for the son’s human capital to a great extent. For males who were 
born in the period 1600 to 1800, having one more brother would lead to an average decrease 
of 5.4 percentage points in the probability of literacy. Nevertheless, in both cases, the father’s 
literacy still remained the factor that mattered the most. For example, in 1600-1800, having a 
literate father would increase the literacy probability by 16.5 percentage points.  
In Table 4.8, I separate the sample again based on the two types of lineage, the common 
lineages and the elite ones. The relationship between the number of brothers and marriage 
probability in the common and the elite lineages were similar, and similar to previous results, 
family size did not affect the male’s “quality” measured by marriage probability. In terms of 
literacy, the trade-off of child quantity and quality is only observed in elite lineages: having 
one more brother would cause an average decrease of 3.5 percentage points in the probability 
of literacy. 
The contradictory results between the instrumental variable estimates and the logistic 
estimates imply that the previous results are biased because of the omitted variables. Clearly, 
the human capital of the father and the grandfather cannot entirely capture the parental 
preference and family features. The positive covariance of the unobserved household features 
and the two quality indicators leads the logistic estimates of the coefficient on Brothers to be 
greater than the real value of the coefficient.  
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Table 4.6 Two-stage regression with adopted-out sons, 1350-1920 
 First Stage Second Stage Second Stage 
 Brothers Marriage Literacy 
 (1) (2) (3) 




















Controls    
Firstborn Y Y Y 
Out-migration Y Y Y 
Survival Y Y Y 
Birth cohort FE Y Y Y 





Observations 27,480 27,480 27,480 
Number of clusters 14,638 14,638 14,638 
p-value, Wald exogenous test  0.090 0.010 
F-statistic on instrument 215.94   
Notes: 1. Robust standard errors clustered by fathers in parentheses. 2. Ivprobit estimation: the first stage being 
OLS, the second stage probit, regressed on predicted values from the first stage. The two models have the same 
first stage. 3. The coefficients in columns 2 and 3 are average marginal effects. The F-statistic on the instrument 
is derived from a 2SLS estimate, which has the same first stage. 4. *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01. 
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  1400-1600    1600-1800    1800-1900  
 Brothers Marriage Literacy  Brothers Marriage Literacy  Brothers Marriage Literacy 
 (1) (2) (3)  (4) (5) (6)  (7) (8) (9) 
Adopted-out brothers -0.538** 
(0.242) 


























































Controls            
Firstborn Y Y Y  Y Y Y  Y Y Y 
Out-migration Y Y Y  Y Y Y  Y Y Y 
Survival Y Y Y  Y Y Y  Y Y Y 
Birth cohort FE Y Y Y  Y Y Y  Y Y Y 
Lineage FE Y Y Y  Y Y Y  Y Y Y 
Constant 5.080*** 
(0.659) 






Observations 1,398 1,398 1,394  13,359 13,353 13,353  11,764 11,764 11,764 
Number of clusters 743 743 741  7,050 7,047 7,047  6,811 6,811 6,811 
p-value, Wald exogenous test  0.693 0.299   0.754 0.0001   0.036 0.718 
F-statistic on instrument 4.95    107.37    119.01   
Notes: 1. Robust standard errors clustered by fathers in parentheses. 2. Ivprobit estimation: the first stage being OLS, the second stage probit, regressed on predicted values 
from the first stage. The two models have the same first stage. 3. Coefficients in columns 2, 3, 5, 6, 8, and 9 are average marginal effects. The F-statistic on the instrument is 
derived from a 2SLS estimate, which has the same first stage. 4. *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01. 
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Lineages 
  
 Brothers Marriage Literacy  Brothers Marriage Literacy 





   -0.569*** 
(0.041) 
  


































Controls        
Firstborn Y Y Y  Y Y Y 
Out-migration Y Y Y  Y Y Y 
Survival Y Y Y  Y Y Y 
Birth cohort FE Y Y Y  Y Y Y 
Lineage FE Y Y Y  Y Y Y 
Constant 3.503*** 
(0.296) 
   3.492*** 
(0.585) 
  
Observations 8,488 8,488 8,464  18,130 18,106 18,130 
Number of clusters 3,649 3,649 3,642  10,569 10,556 10,569 
p-value, Wald 
exogenous test 
 0.131 0.746   0.101 0.002 
F-statistic on 
instrument 
13.46    195.14   
Notes: 1. Males in birth cohort 1900-1920 are dropped in the regressions because none of them were literate. 2. 
Robust standard errors clustered by fathers in parentheses. 3. Ivprobit estimation: the first stage being OLS, the 
second stage probit, regressed on predicted values from the first stage. The two models have the same first stage. 
4. Coefficients in columns 2, 3, 5, and 6 are average marginal effects. The F-statistic on the instrument is derived 




The chapter uses a new genealogical dataset and demonstrates the survival pattern of six 
Chinese lineages in the Ming and Qing dynasties. Empirical investigation indicates the 
presence of an optimal level of fertility for long-run reproductive success, despite the fact that 
the optimal level was beyond the fertility level of most of the males in the sample. A close 
analysis of the mechanisms through which fertility affected the survival of the family line 
demonstrates the dual role that a father’s fertility took in affecting two types of offspring quality, 
measured by marriage and literacy. Instrumenting family size by the variation induced by the 
practice of adoption, I find that the number of brothers a male had could not affect his marriage 
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throughout the entire period; while having one more brother would reduce the probability of a 
male’s being literate in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. The results also point to the 
fact that child quality was more closely related to the father’s human capital than to the father’s 
fertility: the strong positive effects of father’s human capital on child quality could more than 
offset the negative effects of increasing family size.
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Appendices 
Appendix 4.A Extra tables for Chapter 4 
Table 4.A1 Summary statistics for Chapter 4 
Statistics N Mean Std. Min Max 
All Males      
Literacy 36,456 0.08 0.28 0 1 
Father literacy 35,614 0.14 0.35 0 1 
Grandfather literacy 34,524 0.18 0.38 0 1 
Number of brothers 36,456 2.56 1.49 1 12 
Number of uncles 36,422 2.63 1.55 1 12 
Number of marriages 36,456 0.80 0.63 0 10 
Age at death 11,344 50.02 17.60 1 105 
Father’s age at death 16,085 57.05 14.30 15 105 
Adoptee 36,456 0.06 0.24 0 1 
Firstborn 36,456 0.50 0.50 0 1 
Out-migration 36,456 0.01 0.07 0 1 
Survival to adulthood 36,456 0.91 0.28 0 1 
Birth cohort 34,863 5.17 0.98 1 7 
Lineage 36,456 3.77 1.40 1 6 
Ancestors      
Number of sons 9,364 2.05 1.27 0 12 
Number of grandsons 9,364 2.94 2.98 0 50 
Number of great-grandsons 9,364 3.63 5.17 0 88 
Number of great-great-grandsons 9,364 3.89 7.82 0 194 
Literacy 9,364 0.13 0.34 0 1 
Number of marriages 9,364 1.14 0.48 0 10 
Firstborn 9,364 0.51 0.50 0 1 
Out-migration 9,364 0.001 0.04 0 1 
Survival to adulthood 9,364 0.997 0.06 0 1 
Birth cohort 8,725 4.31 0.95 1 7 
Lineage 9,364 3.82 1.29 1 6 
Non-adoptees      
Literacy 34,176 0.08 0.28 0 1 
Father literacy 33,356 0.14 0.35 0 1 
Grandfather literacy 32,326 0.18 0.38 0 1 
Number of brothers 34,176 2.65 1.49 1 12 
Having adopted-out brother(s) 34,176 0.08 0.26 0 1 
Firstborn 34,176 0.51 0.50 0 1 
Out-migration 34,176 0.01 0.07 0 1 
Survival to adulthood 34,176 0.91 0.28 0 1 
Birth cohort 32,646 5.15 0.997 1 7 
Lineage 34,176 3.73 1.41 1 6 
Notes: 1. The “number of brothers” includes the male individual himself, and the “number of uncles” includes the 
male individual’s father. 2. “Father literacy” denotes the stepfather’s literacy if the individual is an adoptee. 3. 
“Father’s age at death” denotes the biological father’s age at death for all individuals.  
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Table 4.A2 Effects of the number of sons on the number of grandsons, OLS regression 
 Dependent Variable:  
ln (Number of male descendants+1) 
 Gen.3 Gen.4 Gen.5  Gen.3 Gen.4 Gen.5  Gen.3 Gen.4 Gen.5 

















































Controls            
Firstborn N N N  Y Y Y  Y Y Y 
Out-migration N N N  Y Y Y  Y Y Y 
Survival N N N  Y Y Y  Y Y Y 
Birth cohort FE N N N  Y Y Y  Y Y Y 



















N 9,364 9,364 9,364  7,016 7,016 7,016  7,016 7,016 7,016 
R2 0.275 0.143 0.083  0.305 0.181 0.168  0.315 0.196 0.180 





Table 4.A3 Effects of losing brothers on child quality, OLS regression 
 Dependent Variable:  
 Marriage Literacy 
 (1) (2) 








Lineage FE Y Y 





N 28,391 28,391 
R-squared 0.109 0.279 










This thesis is a new examination of fertility in Ming-Qing China which uses a novel dataset 
constructed from genealogical biographies of more than 70,000 family members of six Chinese 
lineages. The individual-level dataset allows the thesis to systematically investigate the fertility 
choices in Chinese families from several different perspectives. New empirical evidence has 
been shown of the marital fertility rates, the absence of deliberate fertility controls, social 
gradients in fertility, and the reproductive success in the long run. 
The three substantive chapters indicate three main sets of results. Chapter 2 estimates the 
total marital fertility rates in Chinese families and offers a starting point for studying fertility. 
It exploits the fertility behaviours of the wives in the five of the six lineages and shows the 
trend and changes in fertility rates. The results first suggest a rather low level of marital fertility 
in China compared to that in Western Europe in the pre-modern era, but also an absence of 
secular decline in fertility over this period. At the same time, the chapter shows that two 
effective parity-dependent controls, early stopping and longer spacing were absent in Chinese 
families. The two parts of analyses together demonstrate a unique fertility pattern in imperial 
China, namely, a combination of moderate fertility rates and no deliberate fertility controls.  
Given the common practice of remarriages and concubinage in the upper-class population, 
studies of female fertility alone could hardly give a full picture of historical fertility in China. 
Therefore, Chapter 3 turns the focus to the reproduction of males, and explores the social 
gradients in male net reproduction in the six lineages. The empirical investigation finds a 
positive relationship between social status and fertility. The degree holders and the office 
holders produced three times as many sons as the non-degree holders. The social gradients are 
also robust to a set of individual-level and family-level socio-economic factors, including 
fathers’ and brothers’/cousins’ social outcomes. However, the effect disappears once I control 
for the number of marriages. Increased marriages among upper-class males drove reproductive 
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success. The study of reproduction from the perspective of males thus complements the 
analysis in Chapter 2 and suggests that remarriages and polygamy also served as key social 
institutions that sustained the relatively steady population growth in late imperial China. 
Chapter 4 investigates the transmission of fertility across generation, expanding the single-
generational reproductive success story in Chapter 3 into a multi-generational one. The 
empirical results first show the presence of a Darwinian trade-off and find in the six lineages 
that the optimal level of fertility for long-run reproductive success was about nine sons. The 
chapter then turns to the hotly debated child quantity-quality relationship and finds that family 
size was negatively correlated with child literacy in the period 1600-1800, while its relationship 
between the child’s chance of marriage was uncertain throughout the entire period. Given the 
limited negative effect that family size had on a son’s literacy, the chapter finally concludes 
that it was not family size so much as father’s human capital that was of central importance in 
affecting a son’s quality. 
The rest of the chapter first compares the main findings with those of previous literature 
from three perspectives and briefly discusses the general implications of the thesis. It then 
points out the limitations of the research and finally suggests two underexplored avenues for 
future genealogical research. 
 
5.1 Comparisons with previous works  
5.1.1 The causes of moderate marital fertility in imperial China 
Why was marital fertility low in imperial China? Lee et al. propose mainly four factors to 
explain low fertility in China: 1) the high rate of female infanticide; 2) the unbalanced marriage 
market resulting from the distorted sex ratio; 3) the common practice of adoption and fictive 
kinship; 4) three “demographic mechanisms” within marriages: late starting, early stopping 
and long spacing (Lee et al. 1999a; 1999b; 2002; Wang et al. 1995, p. 98). Contradictory to 
their opinions, the neo-Malthusian scholars argue that even if fertility was low, it was simply 
a result of subsistence pressure, or more specifically, was merely “some combination of poor 
health, inadequate nutrition, heavy labour, and poverty-induced deposal separation”, which had 
nothing to do with deliberate control (Wolf 2001; Huang 2002). They believe that all the so-
called fertility controls were helpless choices of poor Chinese families.  
The main findings of the thesis support some of their views, but also show that the 
arguments of both schools need some qualifications. Regarding the neo-Malthusian view, 
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poverty cannot fully explain the low rates. Of the five lineages studied in Chapter 2 of the thesis, 
the two elite lineages, the Zha lineage and the Gu lineage had much lower marital fertility in 
most of the times. The high proportion of degree holders, stemming from the substantial 
investment in human capital, clearly proves that they were not lineages under high subsistence 
pressure at all. Furthermore, low living standards and poor health conditions could affect 
fecundity to some extent, but they were more harmful to the survival of offspring. Because 
infant mortality is considered in the research, low fertility could not be simply viewed as an 
outcome of poverty.  
The four factors maintained by Lee et al. are not sufficient enough either. The first three 
factors that they propose are mainly related to the overall population growth pattern and attempt 
to explain the low rates of net reproduction from the perspective of family formation. The 
findings in Chapter 3 and Chapter 4 show that these three factors are significant in constraining 
net reproduction of the lower-social-status males in traditional China, but these factors cannot 
account for the low fertility rates of married females demonstrated in Chapter 2. In terms of 
the last factor, the “demographic mechanisms”, as Chapter 2 of the thesis argues, the absence 
of parity-dependent spacing and stopping suggests that the low rates were not caused by 
deliberate fertility controls. As argued in Section 5 of Chapter 2, the moderate level of marital 
fertility was mainly a by-product of a sets of cultural-related customs, rather than a conscious 
choice made by the Chinese parents. 
 
5.1.2 Social gradients in fertility in common and elite lineages 
Chapter 3 of the thesis is not the first attempt to show the relationship between social status 
and net reproduction. Table 5.1 describes the findings on this relationship in previous literature. 
Various variables have been used to measure social status and net reproduction. Although 
positive relationship has been found in most of the works, Chapter 3 uses a new dataset and 
also provides specific social gradients in fertility. Moreover, as the genealogical sample used 
in this present thesis contains genealogies of two different types of lineage, the common and 
the elite lineages, the chapter enables to examine the relationships in the two types of lineage 
separately. The chapter finds different scale of social status effects on marriage and net 
reproduction, and also different scale of close kin effects on social status, marriage, and net 
reproduction in the two types of lineage. These findings are new to the ones in previous works. 
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Table 5.1 Previous literature on the relationship between social status and fertility 
Article Source N Status Measure 
Status-fertility 
Relationship 
Area and Period Comments 














The main results of the paper suggest that a married 
woman in families with larger ownership of land was more 
likely to have a registered male birth. After controlling for 
the household landed status, occupation of the husband 
does not play a key role in affecting wife’s net fertility 
(only the group “soldier” had a statistically significant 
positive effect on female net fertility in one specification).  
























1765 + 125 
The paper reveals the reproductive success enjoyed by 
high-social-status founders in a multi-generational model. 
Social gradients in net reproduction within the generation 
and also number of marriages are not the focus of the 
paper. 







The paper reveals family-level estimates within lineages. 
It does not look at individual-level relationship and it does 














The observation unit is the annual growth rate of lineage 















The paper demonstrates that high nobility and polygyny 
would increase royal nobles’ net reproduction. It is a story 















The empirical results demonstrate the positive relationship 
between the social status of the male individual and his 
likelihood to have the first marriage in the next register is 
positive. However, the effect of the male’s or his father’s 




5.1.3 An effective strategy for child quantity and quality in traditional China  
The results in Chapter 4 of this thesis illustrate a complex relationship between human capital 
and fertility in a multigenerational model. On the one hand, literate males in the six lineages 
could leave more male descendants in at least four subsequent generations, because their sons 
and grandsons were also more likely to be literate. On the other hand, literate males were 
expected to have more sons than the illiterate males had, while a larger family size would lower 
the probability that any of the sons in the family would be literate, especially in the period 1600 
to 1800. 
Because of the strong positive effects brought by fathers’ human capital on sons’ quality, 
the negative effects of increasing family size would be easily cancelled out. It also explains the 
high optimal level of fertility for long-run reproductive success shown in Figure 4.2 in Chapter 
4. The negative effects of family size on the long-run reproductive success could only take 
effect when the number of sons a father had was greater than nine.  
The presence of a negative relationship between offspring literacy and family size in the 
seventeenth and the eighteenth centuries confirms what Shiue (2017) reveals. Shiue (2017) 
argues that, because of the high returns to education in the early Qing period (1644-1800), 
parents were more willing to invest in their children’s education; while after 1800, the 
population explosion, together with the expansion of civil exam degree holders made the 
degree less valuable than before, leading to the disappearance of the trade-off. Nevertheless, 
Chapter 4 takes a further step to examine the relationship in common and elite lineages 
separately, and finds that the negative relationship was present in the three elite lineages, but 
not in the three common ones.  
However, it is worth pointing out that the human capital that is measured by Literacy in the 
present chapter is different from the “standard” human capital measures in previous literature 
on pre-modern Western societies, such as whether or not the individual could sign. Mokyr 
(2016, p. 292) describes literacy in pre-modern China as either “a full literacy, as enjoyed by 
the educated elite [or] knowledge of just a few hundred characters, which would mean reading 
at a rudimentary level only”. With this classification, the Literacy in the chapter represents 
“full literacy”. The literate males in the sample were all capable of producing written works, 
and at least two-thirds of them were the “educated elites” (civil service exam degree holders 
and office holders) in Ming-Qing China.  
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In terms of rudimentary literacy, Rawski (1979, p.23) estimates that in nineteenth century 
China, the literacy rates of the male population ranged from 30 to 45 per cent. “Knowledge of 
just a few hundred characters” was easy to acquire, while “full literacy” was not.74 Although 
the rise in social status created strong incentives for Chinese males to achieve academic degrees 
by taking keju exams, the high opportunity costs and intense competition prevented most of 
them from devoting persistent efforts to taking the exams repeatedly (Ebrey 1993; Shiue 2017). 
Elman (2000, p. 240) points out that a classical literacy “required substantial investments of 
time, effort, and training”, and always exacting “financial and labour sacrifices”.  
Lee and Park (2019) find that in pre-modern Korea, in order to ensure the longest possible 
survival of the family line, parents would rather maximize the probability of having one son to 
achieve the highest social rank than distribute resources equally to raise the social status of all 
the sons. Hence, one strategy that fertile parents in the six lineages could adopt for long-run 
reproductive success would have been to allocate the most resources to one or a few of their 
sons to help them pass the keju exams, which could explain the observed child quantity-quality 
trade-off in 1600-1800, and also in elite lineages only.  
However, besides the changes in incentives proposed by Shiue (2017), another cause for 
the disappearance of the trade-off after 1800 was related to the diminished family size. In my 
sample, the average number of sons born to a male in the period 1600-1800 had is 1.40, while 
that for a male born from 1800 to 1900 is only 0.75. Only the males who had a great many sons 
had to calculate exactly the amount of resources to spend on each of their sons; otherwise, such 
calculations were unnecessary. 
 
5.2 Implications  
In this section, I list three general implications that arise from the three main chapters together, 
which shed light on the long-run stagnation of the Ming-Qing economy. The first two 
implications are related to the absence of a fertility transition and the formation of human 
capital in the Ming and Qing dynasties, while the third is about the survival of the Confucian 
ideology in China. All three implications are also in need of more solid and quantitative 
evidence that future research might supply.  
 
74 In pre-modern China, lineage schools and home-schooling mainly performed the function of equipping the 
offspring of the family with basic literacy. 
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5.2.1 The absence of a fertility transition in imperial China 
The fertility transition was initiated in France around 1820, and then spread to most other 
Western countries in the late 19th century (Lee 2003). Thanks to the fertility transition, by the 
late nineteenth century, most Western European countries were characterized by low fertility 
rates, rising educational levels, and the dominance of human capital over physical labours 
(Alter and Clark 2010, p.44).  
In spite of its significance to the modern economic growth, the causes of the decline are still 
under debate. Since the formulation and development of the first comprehensive theory of 
demographic transition, “the demographic transition theory” (Thompson 1929; Landry 1934, 
cited in Kirk 1996; Notestein 1945), many models have been proposed to illuminate the puzzles 
of the transition by using two main approaches. One is “the innovation approach”, and the other 
is “the adjustment approach” (Carlsson 1966; Cummins 2009). The “innovation” hypothesis 
means that the decline of fertility represents an innovation, a new culture or new knowledge 
that changes people’s attitudes to fertility, while the “adjustment” one believes that the 
presence and prevalence of controlling fertility is a result of people’s response to changing 
socio-economic conditions (Cummins 2009, p. 20).75  
However, regardless of the difference between the two approaches, they agree on the point 
that a series of social changes have to occur first in order to alter people’s fertility choices. 
Coale (1974, pp.352-353) summarizes that a society has to satisfy three conditions to 
experience a secular decline in fertility: first, “fertility must be within the calculus of conscious 
choice”; second, “perceived social and economic circumstances must make reduced fertility 
seem an advantage to individual couples”; finally, “effective techniques of fertility reduction 
must be available.”  
Most Western European societies fulfilled these conditions in the nineteenth century. A 
stylized fact is that during the transitional period, the national-level association between wealth 
and fertility in Europe changed from positive to negative (Alter and Clark 2010, p.63), and 
since then a smaller family size has become advantageous under Europe’s socio-economic 
conditions. Many scholars have offered various explanations for the change, and one of the 
most influential explanations is Becker’s (1960) child quantity-quality trade-off theory. 
 
75 A large amount of literature on the demographic transition centres around the socio-economic development in 
Europe. For example, Caldwell (1976) and Easterlin (1975; Easterlin and Crimmins 1985) both emphasize the 
importance of modernization and urbanization in changing the fertility pattern. Leibenstein (1957; 1975) focuses 
on the increase of income and takes the changing “taste” and “desire” of couples for children into account.  
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Children, in this theory, are treated as “consumer durables”, and parents prefer to spend more 
on improving the human capital of their children rather than increasing the size of their family 
(Becker 1960; Becker et al. 1990).  
However, Qing China, clearly, missed all of these conditions. In terms of the first condition, 
Chapter 2 indicates the absence of parity-dependent fertility controls in the Chinese families, 
and Chapter 3 shows the positive relationship between social status and fertility in Ming-Qing 
China. They both suggest that the Chinese did not consciously limit their fertility, and the 
Malthusian mechanism kept functioning throughout the entire period. The empirical 
investigation in Chapter 4 presents a response to the second condition, implying that in the two 
dynasties, reduced fertility was not advantageous to parents.76  
Chapters 3 and 4 also uncover the reasons behind the parents’ choices. Although the 
empirical evidence indicates a presence of child quantity-quality trade-off in the period 1600-
1800 in the six lineages, the negative effect of child quantity on child quality was moderate. It 
could easily be offset by the positive effects of one’s father’s and grandfather’s human capital. 
A literate man’s household budget constraint in the six lineages was so high that he did not 
need to choose between child quantity and quality, but could have them both. For a literate man 
in Qing China, having more sons could largely translate into more literate sons, thus reduced 
fertility was not an advantage to him.  
 
5.2.2 Human capital formation  
Chapter 3 supports one key element of the Unified Growth Theory – in the Malthusian and the 
post-Malthusian regimes, higher income brought about higher rates of population growth 
(Galor and Moav 2002). As this chapter argues, these high-income males in pre-modern China 
were also males with high educational attainments. Therefore, another critical question may be, 
why, despite the growing representation of these high-quality individuals in the population, 
China still failed to make fast technological progress and thus the transition to modern 
 
76 Regarding the first condition, Lee and Wang (1999a, p. 61; 1999b) believe that female infanticide was an 
internal control to “regulate the number and sex of their children”. However, Cao and Chen (2002) argue that if 
infanticide was a type of fertility control, then male and female infants should be equally treated. The sex-biased 
infanticide proves that couples were not controlling family size per se, but only the sex structure of the family. In 
terms of the third condition, Lee and Wang (1999a) argue that since the Song dynasty, many contraception and 
abortion techniques were widely used in imperial China. Nonetheless, a detailed analysis by Sommer (2010) 
clearly shows that all these techniques were extremely unsafe and ineffective. Moreover, the techniques were 
mainly used when a woman was having an affair or wanted to abort an illegitimate birth.   
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economic growth, as Galor and Weil (2000) propose? Exploring the type of human capital in 
imperial China can shed some light on this puzzle. 
Not every type of “high quality” is conducive to the growth process. The hereditary human 
traits that raised social status and increased income in Ming-Qing China were unable to bring 
about any significant technological changes. Current literature emphasizes the crucial 
importance of the generation and transmission of the tacit, practical, and innovative “useful 
knowledge” to modern economic growth (Mokyr 2016; McCloskey 2010; Epstein 2013). 
However, the mode of knowledge that has been taught and tested for centuries in China, 
concerned with Confucian morals and philosophy, cannot be regarded as a scientific and 
technological type of knowledge and can hardly facilitate modern economic growth (Mokyr 
2016; Lin 1995; Yuchtman 2017).77 As Fei (1953, p.74) once commented, in traditional China, 
“the intelligentsia have been a class without technical knowledge…Chinese literary language 
is very inapt to express scientific or technical knowledge.” 
Education in imperial China, which was not economically useful in nature, promoted 
intellectual obedience and uniformity, rather than innovation. Scepticism of received wisdom 
was strictly suppressed. In the Ming and Qing dynasties, scholars were forbidden to have 
academic discussions about the Sages’ teachings, not to mention discussions about what should 
be taught in schools and tested in exams.78  
In such a case, as McCloskey (2010, p. 162) argues, “the accumulation of human capital 
can be a bad idea, negative capital.” Emphasizing and expanding education during this period 
imposed only more severe intellectual constraints upon a larger population. The reproductive 
success of the Confucians intensified the diffusion of this growth-impeding education, while 
in the English case, the increased proportion of the middle class in society contributed to the 
diffusion of “growth-promoting education” (de la Croix et al. 2019). As a result, even if the 
trade-off between child quantity and child human capital from the seventeenth to the nineteenth 
centuries was effective enough, the quality that the Chinese elites inclined towards at the time 
was not enough to set in motion a process of sustained economic growth.  
Nonetheless, when ideology begins to change, the accumulation of human capital turns out 
to be a good idea. Keju did lead to high literacy and numeracy rates and a culture that highly 
values education in China (Baten et al. 2010). Many studies also argue that keju had a persistent 
 
77 McCloskey (2010, pp. 163) points out, “Education can make people spiritually free…without making people 
rich...” Education based on Confucian morals cannot even make people “spiritually free”, let alone “rich”. 
78 According to Elman and Woodside (1994, p. 112), “[t]he emperor…not the philosopher, had the final say on 
how Confucian concepts, arguments, and beliefs were put into educational practice via examinations.” 
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and positive effect on Chinese economic growth in the present day (Brandt, Ma, and Rawski 
2014; Chen et al. 2020).  
 
5.2.3 Survival of Confucianism 
World history has witnessed many examples of cultural persistence amid changes. Since 
Emperor Wu of Han selected Confucianism as the dominant political ideology in China in the 
second century, it has also experienced its ups and downs — its dominance has several times 
been challenged, but it has also managed to maintain itself for centuries. Even today, Confucian 
culture still plays a vital role in Chinese society.   
A recent study by Giuliano and Nunn (2017) shows that the persistence of culture is 
associated with the stability of the living environment across generations. In a stable society, 
where traditions are relevant and useful to the current generation, the traditional culture is more 
likely to be inherited and to persist than in a variable society. My results in Chapter 3 and 
Chapter 4 provide another demographic perspective from which to examine cultural 
persistence, at least in the Chinese context. The reproductive success of the Confucians ensured 
the reproduction of the existing cultural and political system in imperial China. The 
descendants of the Confucians were brought up by studying the Confucian classics, and they 
would derive much benefit from retaining the dominance of Confucianism, especially in the 
political and educational system. In the words of Fei (1953, p.74), “in the traditional scheme, 
the vested interests had no wish to improve production but thought only of consolidating 
privilege. Their main task was the perpetuating of established norms in order to set up a guide 
for conventional behavior.” With a growing proportion of Confucians in the population over 
centuries, no alternative ideology could easily replace the existing one.  
 
5.3 Limitations and future research 
This thesis has striven to systematically re-examine Chinese fertility in the Ming-Qing period 
by using a new micro-level genealogical dataset. However, the thesis also suffers from two 
serious limitations, which are also worth considering when future research is designed.  
The first limitation lies in the limited representativeness. Imperial China was such a large 
empire with so many faces, that this research, concentrating on six Chinese lineages, cannot 
make claims about the general population without cautiously considering the problem of 
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selection. On the one hand, the thesis studies only six lineages and about 70,000 individuals 
over 500 years. In relation to the large population size in Ming-Qing China, this sample is 
extremely limited. However, with more and more individual-level research, we might finally 
build up a generalized depiction of the Chinese demographic pattern.  
On the other hand, although keeping genealogies was not a privilege for the elites alone in 
the Ming and Qing dynasties, and was remarkably widespread in Southeast China, not every 
single Chinese family would in fact keep its genealogy. Wealthier and higher-social-status 
families were more inclined than the ordinary families to keep them. Therefore, the commoners 
in the present sample still could have higher social status than most of the commoners in society. 
This lack of representativeness is an inevitable limitation of the research. However, within each 
of the lineages, and also between them, there is enough differentiation in individual 
demographic outcomes that cannot be explained by the characteristics of the lineage, and hence, 
an in-depth investigation of these “successful segments” of population is necessary and should 
also be the first step in understanding the Chinese demographic pattern as a whole (Harrell 
1985). 
The second limitation is that in its analyses the thesis has necessarily had to neglect the girls 
and the children who died in infancy. Because lineages were traced through male family 
members only in the patrilineal society, the compilers of genealogies deliberately ignored 
information of daughters and children who died in infancy. Hence, several important questions 
cannot be addressed in the thesis. This is a great pity and it is to be hoped that it can be 
addressed in future studies by discovering and exploiting new data.  
The first unsolved question concerns the rate of female infanticide. Due to the incomplete 
records of daughters who survived infancy, I am unable to estimate the rate of female 
infanticide in the six lineages. In fact, the precise frequency of the practice in pre-modern 
Chinese families is still uncertain, despite the fact that cases of “drowning girls” (ni nv, 溺女) 
are commonly recorded in county annals, local gazetteers, officials’ pleas to the Court, and 
folklore in Ming-Qing China.79 Lee and Wang (1999a) believe that about one-tenth of the new-
born female children were murdered in the Qing imperial lineage between 1700 and 1830; in 
the farming population in Northeast China, the proportion was about twenty to twenty-five per 
 
79 Feng (1986) lists records on female infanticide from the local gazetteers of twenty-seven counties in the Qing 
dynasty. Based on his estimates, the practice was common in Southeast China. See further in Feng and Chang 
(2001), and Guo (2000) for detailed records on bride price, dowry, and infanticide. 
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cent in the period 1774-1873.80 Although in Chapter 2 of this thesis, what I intend to show is 
the “true” number of children that was ever born for each married female, the missing analysis 
on the “true” number of daughters who survived infancy still prevents the research from 
revealing the complete pattern of fertility.  
Moreover, Lee and Wang (1999a) argue that a large proportion of males failed to get 
married, which thus effectively controlled the Chinese population growth, was caused by the 
shortage of women in the marriage market. Without knowing the exact proportion of the girls 
who were victims of infanticide, I could not plausibly estimate how great an effect this shortage 
had on the marriage chances of the males in my sample. This question, in fact, is also an 
interesting question to consider in relation to the marriage pattern in traditional China. 
The second related question is about the rate of infant mortality. Understanding the level 
and the trend of infant mortality was of great importance for us to understand the traditional 
fertility pattern. One of the central elements in the demographic transition theory is that the 
decline of mortality leads to the decline of fertility. The proposition seems to be self-evident, 
but empirical findings indicate that the mortality decline did not always precede the fertility 
decline (see for example Knodel 1974; Lesthaeghe 1977). Cummins’ (2009, p. 22) calculation 
shows that the correlation coefficient between infant mortality and fertility in Europe between 
1840 and 1913 is only about 0.054.  
In the traditional Chinese society, this relationship is even hard to establish in the first place 
because of the lack of accurate data. Fei (1947) points out that some rural Chinese women 
would give birth to a dozen children throughout their lifetimes. The reason for the high fertility, 
in his opinion, was mainly the high infant mortality. The high risk of death forced people to 
procreate more. Without knowing the infant mortality rates in the six lineages, I could not build 
a quantitative association in this thesis between the gross fertility and the net fertility, nor could 
I firmly argue that parents’ expectation of a high infant mortality rate is also one of the reasons 
behind the absence of a fertility transition in Qing China. This unresolved question should be 
addressed in the future. A plausible starting point could be a detailed demographic study of the 
era of Republican China (1912-1949), a period for which more records and data are accessible 
than the imperial era can offer.  
 
80 Their estimates, however, are constructed simply on the basis of the recorded number of boys and girls in the 
imperial genealogies and population registers, but do not take into account the high possibility of under-
registration for girls. In other words, they compare the number of surviving boys and the number of surviving 
girls in the records and assume the gap between the two numbers to be the number of girls who died because of 
infanticide. Using their method, the rate of female infanticide in my sample would be over 70 per cent, which is 
untenable.  
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Nevertheless, except for the two major limitations, the genealogical dataset itself still shows 
potentials that this research has not fully fulfilled. Genealogies are also useful in studies on 
mortality and marriage, the two central but under-researched topics in the historical Chinese 
context. The leading cause for the lack of attention to them lies in the difficulty of data 
acquisition and cleaning. Investigating these two topics needs complete vital statistics at an 
individual level. In order to examine the marriage pattern, moreover, linked genealogical 
records of the involved families are essential, which requires more work on data collection. 
However, as shown in Table 1.4, only about twenty-two per cent of the individuals recorded in 
the present lineage sample had complete records. Therefore, collecting and transcribing more 
high-quality genealogies to construct representative samples is necessary and should be the 
priority in future studies.  
Besides combining the genealogies of different lineages, genealogies should also be linked 
with other historical sources to construct comprehensive datasets. In recent years, with the 
rapid development in machine learning, constructing and exploiting linked individual-level 
datasets has become a growing trend in economic history research (Abramitzky et al. 2019). 
For instance, Abramitzky, Boustan, and Eriksson (2012, 2014) examine the European 
immigrants in the US by linking up censuses data; Aizer et al. (2016) match records of welfare 
programmes in the United States to census and death records to study the impacts of these 
programmes on the received families and their children’s life outcomes.  
This kind of attempts is also not rare for Chinese studies. Jiang and Kung (2020) match the 
candidates’ names on the keju exam papers (zhujuan, 硃卷) by juren to the list of jinshi degree 
holders to study the social mobility in the Qing era. Li and Zhen (2015) merge the genealogies 
of the Que lineage and the records on the division of household properties to investigate the 
impacts of partible inheritance in traditional Chinese families. In this thesis, in order to test the 
reliability of social status information in genealogies, I also match the records of official 
positions in the Zha genealogies to the Qing Government Employee Records. However, most 
of the previous linkages have ended up with datasets of limited size. Further attempts to link 
between the genealogical records and other types of individual-level records at the individual 
level on a large scale could unlock more potentials from these historical sources and elucidate 
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